This paper addressed two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However, the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition of monetary financing and other Treaty and EU law requirements. The choice of the EU entity which should be entrusted with the specific mandate will largely depend on the characteristics the facility would take. The paper considers such characteristics and analyses which authority may best fit that role. The paper also suggests that a well-structured facility could have a positive broader macroprudential impact, and that a fine balance needs to be struck between the risk of moral hazard and the beneficial effect this facility may have on market confidence.
This project was awarded under the Framework Service Contract for the provision of external expertise in the field of banking resolution (IP/A/ECON-BU/FWC/2015-057/LOT2) with the European Parliament. The full list of CEPS’ Framework Contracts is available here.