At COP30, the Paris Agreement, which has led to the creation of a complex institutional framework, turns 10. But the framework isn’t delivery. Over the next few years, Paris will face its ultimate test – whether it can move beyond procedure to real-world transformation.
In short, it’s a mixed outlook, with the US withdrawal (spoiler alert, not as bad as it seems) and the global average temperature surpassing 1.5°C for the first time in 2024. But alongside gloomy news, there’s also some positives that should definitely be cheered.
Being deliberately designed as a framework for incremental cooperation based on nationally formulated commitments, the Agreement’s premise was that robust procedural rules – anchored in transparency, inclusive participation and a bit of peer pressure – would propel deeper cooperation. Born from the post-Kyoto/Copenhagen deadlock, this design ensured resilience through flexibility.
With most elements now operationalised, a massive multilateral setup is in place, and we’ll soon see if these detailed procedures can translate into fully delivering the Agreement’s goals.
A glass half full – inward looking multilateralism really does seem to work
On the positive side, Paris has delivered a strong structured framework – the Global Stocktake, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) ambition cycle and the Enhanced Transparency Framework have all provided rules that stimulate cooperation through transparency and trust.
This machinery is now switched on – the first Biennial Transparency Reports were submitted in 2025 and the first Global Stocktake in 2023 offered a glimpse of incremental ambition. COP30, in Belém, Brazil, will mark the third NDC ambition cycle. Peer pressure has also had some effect, as national pledges have shifted to below 3°C, according to the 2023 Stocktake.
Not enough – but still, progress, nonetheless.
Although there’s been resistance to converging developing and developed country contributions, some positive progress has also been made here – flexibility was maintained for developing countries, while overall uniformity improved in reporting standards under the Enhanced Transparency Framework and NDC guidelines. There were even some voluntary finance contributions from several developing countries.
True, negotiations have also preserved the ‘party-driven process’, jealously guarded by certain developing countries, especially China. But despite entrenched positions and even occasional bickering, the UNFCCC remains the default climate governance forum for most Parties.
That’s why the US’ second withdrawal should be put into perspective – yes, it’s financially weakening but it hasn’t triggered cascading exits (thus far). In fact, it may be less damaging to have the US outside the Agreement, rather than paralysing it from within.
A glass half empty – will Paris ultimately deliver?
The new ambition cycle looks lethargic. With less than three months before COP30, only around 30 countries have submitted NDCs. Core emitters, such as the EU, China and India have yet to do it.
Despite repeated calls from the COP Presidency, there’s a risk of many last-minute submissions. We’ll have to wait to see if these NDC submissions result in sufficiently ambitious collective outcomes.
Climate finance remains the most contentious fault line. While there have been success stories, they’re far from sufficient. Definitions over climate finance still need to be agreed and it’s being questioned as to whether the amounts provided are enough.
The New Collective Quantified Goal, a financial target agreed at COP29 in Baku, left many dissatisfied, while prospects for scaling-up in Belém are bleak. EU contributions are tightening, US aid is gone and UN funds are struggling to match rising budget needs.
Meanwhile, the mitigation agenda remains locked into lowest-common-denominator outcomes. Ambitious proposals, such as more strongly aligning national mitigation pathways or earlier emissions peaking, or a fossil fuels phaseout, have been watered down or blocked. The disagreements over the purpose of the Mitigation Work Programme – whether it should accelerate joint action or merely serve as a knowledge sharing platform – highlight persistent divides.
When coupled with the climate finance deadlock, prospects for significant breakthroughs look dim… at least for now.
Time to implement… but how?
Every year, COP’s overloaded agendas, thousands of delegates and observers, and eye-watering costs (with accommodation prices in Belém hitting the roof) feed perceptions of dysfunction. Whether and how the COP system needs an overhaul has become a recurring debate.
This all reflects a deeper malaise – now that operational rules are in place, the gap between procedure and delivery risks being starker than ever.
The elephant in the room is that the Agreement lacks institutions with real operational mandates. Its first decade focused inwardly on building nitty-gritty rules; now, implementation requires outward-facing structures and delivery mechanisms. The COP30 Presidency lists action points based on the 2023 Global Stocktake as a priority, but implementation ecosystems remain underdeveloped.
Climate diplomacy seems to come in waves: UNFCCC (1992), Kyoto (1997), Copenhagen (2009) the Doha Amendment (2012), Paris (2015) … and now perhaps something new on the horizon? Brazil’s floated idea of a Global Climate Council is one example, though still vague. COP30 could brainstorm more ideas… whether it will is another question entirely.
Moving from pledges to outcomes requires Paris to act as a ‘central node’ – linking national policies, financial systems and private actors, while bridging silos between trade, finance and environment policies. Building synergies with other environmental regimes, e.g. biodiversity, plastics, aviation and shipping, could also strengthen outcomes.
In short, if the UNFCCC process fails to secure this central role, it risks becoming a ‘zombie institution’, a functioning bureaucracy that just won’t deliver.
‘Pragmatism’ is emerging as arguably a buzzword. For some, it means retaining flexibility for developing countries and strict adherence to Party-driven principles. For others, it signals a willingness to move beyond rigid consensus rules towards functioning decision-making.
Pragmatism could also lead to ‘minilateralism’ – voluntary coalitions moving faster than global talks. These could deliver deals and exclude adversaries, an appealing option in today’s fragmented geopolitics.
Such coalitions can also help mitigate claims of green protectionism linked to climate-trade policies by bringing those unhappy onboard. Some (developing) countries may also choose to double down on their own interpretations of climate rules vis-à-vis Western approaches.
Alas, as Paris nears its turbulent teenage years, it’s easier for the negatives to outshine the positives. But whilst these concerns are legitimate, the UNFCCC remains the bottom line for climate governance. The Agreement is a compromise – not flawless but still the best framework we’ve managed to construct thus far.
Whether it’s enough is a question that will be answered over the next few years.
This CEPS commentary is based on a new CEPS study under the Horizon Europe ENSURED project. The study reviewed the Agreement’s first decade and explored potential future trajectories for the global climate regime.
