Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits

Wednesday, 27 April 2016
CEPS Special Reports
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Principal authors: Frank Vandenbroucke and Chris Luigjes

Series: CEPS Special Report No. 137      No of pp: 91

This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

This paper has been prepared at the request of the European Commission as Task 1A of the research project on the Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The principal authors are Frank Vandenbroucke (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) and Chris Luigjes (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands). Donna Wood (University of Victoria, Canada) is co-author for the Canadian case study and country fiche. Kim Lievens (KULeuven) is co-author of the Belgian case study and country fiche.