Speaker: Ayhan Kaya, Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of International Relations and Politics, and Migration Research Unit

Ayhan Kaya began his presentation by providing background information on his ongoing project, which is being jointly conducted with Ferhat Kentel, on the Euro-Turks living in France and Germany. Kaya stated that the aims of the project are to discover the perspectives of Euro-Turks on the EU and ‘Europeanness’; the political culture that they have created in the West; the kind of incorporation strategies that they constructed vis-à-vis their countries of settlement and their thoughts on key issues such as citizenship, democratisation, political participation, globalisation, human rights, equality, rule of law, justice, religion, multiculturalism, interculturalism, co-existence and political institutions. The field research of the project was conducted between September 2003 and December 2004, and included both qualitative (in-depth interviews and focus group discussions) and quantitative methods (1,065 structured interviews in Germany and 600 in France, each with 90 questions).
 
Following his introductory remarks, Kaya presented his findings, grouped under three main headings: bridging and breaching groups, identities and belongingness and perspectives on EU and Europeanness. In the context of the first heading, he stated that the study suggested three categories of Euro-Turks. The first category that makes up slightly more than 40% of the respondents is the ‘bridging groups’. This category, he argued, can be divided into two sub-sections: those that feel an equal degree of affiliation with the homeland and the hostland (mostly comprised of cosmopolitan youth and those with syncretic cultural identities as well as Euro-Muslims, e.g. the Cojepiennes in France and MUSIAD in Germany, who do not have an essentialist vision of Islam but use it as a symbolic tool of identification) and those with hyphenated and multiple identities (mostly consisting of artists, intellectuals, etc…). The second category under this topic is the ‘breachers’ that make up approximately 40% of the total respondents and that can be characterised by attributes such as extreme religiosity, nationalism and laïcism. The third category comprises those who are ‘assimilated’, accounting for around 20% of the total respondents.

Kaya moved on to present his results regarding the second major topic in the project: “identities and belongingness”. He highlighted that the most striking findings in this context were the existence of hyphenated, multiple identities; compatible identification with both Islam and Europeanness and the affiliation of the Euro-Turks with both their ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, with neither one necessarily negating the other but instead leading to the notion of a ‘third space’ where concepts such as the homeland and the hostland and the past and the future co-exist. He then presented some of the related questions directed to the respondents and the statistics regarding the answers. Accordingly, it was observed that 41% of Euro-Turks living in Germany and 26% of Euro-Turks living in France were not willing to ‘naturalise’, i.e. to gain EU citizenship status. These individuals were satisfied with their ‘denizenship’ status where they had no political rights but various social and civil rights. Here it was mentioned that the number of Euro-Turks who gained citizenship in Germany has increased dramatically (from 300,000 to 730,000) with the modernisation of that country’s citizenship regime. The question regarding affiliation with France and Germany reveals that Euro-Turks no longer identify exclusively with the homeland: members of the younger generation tend to affiliate themselves with both the homeland and the hostland whereas members of the lower class tend to affiliate more with Turkey. Questions regarding ‘identification’ show that ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Europeanness’ exist side by side among the Euro-Turks with the younger generation and especially those with high social status preferring hyphenated identities. Regarding religiosity, it is observed to be stronger in the case of the Euro-Turks in Germany, particularly among the lower social class. However, Prof. Kaya emphasised that this religiosity was not essentialist, but rather symbolic in nature.

 
Lastly, Kaya presented the findings within the scope of the third major topic: ‘perspectives on Europe and Europeanness’. He highlighted that a majority of Euro-Turks perceive the EU as an economic union. In general, attitudes towards the EU were more positive in France than in Germany, reflecting the importance of the context of the attitudes of the respondents. He stressed that the Euro-Turks were generally in favour of Turkey’s entry to the Union with 57% in France and 31% in Germany and they believed that Turkey’s membership to the EU would bring (in order of the frequency of answers) respect for human rights, democracy, job opportunities and a breakdown in moral and family values. Prof. Kaya also pointed to those questions where the respondents were given the opportunity to be self-critical by listing their negative impact on host societies. Responses included: the refusal to adopt national values, construction of closed communities and abuse of the social security system. Labour force, cultural diversity, job opportunities and moral and humanitarian values were cited by the respondents as their contributions to host societies. Questioned on their views regarding politics in host countries, Prof. Kaya reported that a majority of Euro-Turks support the policies of social democrats and that the Greens cite social security and health institutions as the most trusted institutions. Turkish official institutions, the media and French political parties were identified as the least-trusted institutions in host countries. Kaya also stressed that around 70% of the Euro-Turks were concerned about mass migration to the EU after Turkey’s accession, reflecting the fears in general public opinion, despite the contrary findings of academic studies. 80% of the respondents in Germany and 60% in France did not recommend those in Turkey to migrate to Germany/France. Moreover, Kaya stated that approximately 30% of Euro-Turks wished to return to their homeland after Turkey’s accession to the EU.
 
In his conclusions and policy recommendations, Kaya stressed that Islamic ational/ethnic revival in the case of the Euro-Turks does not constitute a security challenge to host societies, but should be perceived more as a quest for justice and fairness. He further argued that the definition of integration should change, since contrary to widespread belief, integration is not limited to cultural assimilation but rather also extends to cover political, social and economic spheres. To illustrate this remark, he pointed to the differences in attitudes between the German and French Euro-Turks where those living in France were more attached to laïcist and Republican values whereas the German Euro-Turks were more religious and more closed, demonstrating how they adapted themselves to the dominant discourses of the host countries. Kaya also highlighted that the Euro-Turks favour the liberal, dynamic and non-essentialist definition of Europe, which is expressed by their high support for the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and Greens in the host countries. Kaya concluded that against this background, Euro-Turks fall into the category of ‘unity in diversity’ where there is a meta-European identity construction rather than fitting the ‘unity over diversity’ approach that reproduces cultural, political and national boundaries and that is opposed to the potential of the European project.
 
Kaya replied to a question raised on the reasons behind the differences between German and French Euro-Turks by pointing to the lower levels of chain migration to France, segregationist migrant policies in Germany sustained up until 15 years ago and the higher poverty levels among the Euro-Turks in Germany. In relation to a question raised on the possibility of Islamic fundamentalism among Euro-Turks, Prof. Kaya highlighted factors that diminish this threat, such as the increasingly individually-oriented attitude of Euro-Turks, their disappointment with the crisis of Islamic political capital and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey, giving a new face to Islam.
 
See the slides of Kaya’s presentation