Europe’s quantum ecosystem is often described as a success story. It hosts world-class research centres, an increasing network of innovation clusters in cities such as Delft, Munich, Oxford, Copenhagen, Paris, and San Sebastian, and a steady pipeline of start-ups emerging from its universities. In fact, around 36% of total quantum companies and startups are European, more than what the US can boast about (only around 24 %).
Yet this apparent success hides a structural weakness. Much of Europe’s public support for quantum technologies has focused on solving fundamental scientific questions or developing early-stage applications. This has produced excellent science – but much less industry scale.
If Europe really wants to become a global leader in quantum technologies, policymakers have a critical question to answer – are we building a competitive European quantum industry… or just a science powerhouse?
If the answer is ‘yes’ to the former, then Europe should seriously consider a dedicated Quantum Sovereign Fund.
The missing link in Europe’s quantum strategy
Over the last few years, and particularly since the pandemic, public investment in quantum technologies has surged across Europe. EU programmes such as the EU Quantum Flagship have been complemented by a growing number of national initiatives.
In total, the EU has invested around EUR 2 billion into quantum projects and EU Member States have declared their intentions for an additional EUR 9 billion, positioning Europe as one of the top three public investors in quantum.
This has delivered clear results. Europe remains a global leader in quantum science, with strong capabilities across domains such as quantum communication, sensing and computing.
However, quantum technologies aren’t simply another branch of digital innovation. They are capital-intensive, hardware-dependent and deeply intertwined with semiconductor manufacturing, advanced materials and cybersecurity infrastructure. Scaling requires fabrication capacity, advanced packaging, testing facilities and integrated supply chains. It also requires patient capital and credible demand signals.
Since the Quantum Flagship launched in 2019, many promising start-ups have been born out of European universities and laboratories but just a few have reached the scale-up phase, and even fewer are ready to compete in global markets. The ecosystem is strong at generating ideas but much, much weaker at transforming them into industrial capabilities.
The US does it differently. It doesn’t treat quantum as an isolated scientific domain but embeds it within a broader industrial strategy encompassing semiconductor manufacturing, supply-chain resilience and defence procurement. Public support isn’t confined to laboratories – it extends to production facilities, infrastructure and long-term demand commitments. The goal isn’t only scientific discovery but creating capacity and capabilities.
In China, state support is showing signs of success with the development of kilometres-long quantum communication channels, even beyond national borders, and the emergence of some interesting players in quantum computing. The goal is technological sovereignty on Chinese terms, i.e. as little dependency on the outside world as possible. And this ambition is delivering on scale.
In contrast, Europe has developed a rich but fragmented policy landscape. For example, the Chips Act strengthens semiconductor manufacturing and gives small grants for quantum pilot lines. Horizon Europe finances research and early innovation. National programmes nurture local clusters.
Meanwhile, large-scale initiatives, such as the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EUROQCI), aim to deploy secure quantum networks across the EU. Each instrument is valuable in its own right – but which one funds scale?
Great programmes are nothing without a good business plan
EUROQCI is a good case study. It’s a forward-looking response to cybersecurity risks and geopolitical uncertainty, showing that the EU takes quantum-secure communication seriously. But its industrial impact will depend less on its technological ambition than on its economic design. If procurement remains fragmented and short term, the initiative risks becoming a connectivity project rather than an industrial catalyst.
If instead it’s structured to create sustained demand for European suppliers, aligned with common standards and long-term commitments, it could anchor entire value chains in photonics, quantum repeaters and cryogenic electronics.
And this will be fundamental not only for industry but also for European strategic autonomy. The difference between these two outcomes isn’t technological – it’s financial and institutional.
This tension between EUROQCI’s design and the lack of a ‘business plan’ for the initiative highlights a broader coordination problem. Europe has invested a lot in knowledge creation, but the financial and institutional mechanisms required for going from lab to market, prototype to production, are still underdeveloped.
On top of this, European venture capital markets, while improving, remain fragmented and often not well-suited to absorb such risk. Public and private buyers hesitate to act as early adopters without mature products, while investors wait for credible revenue prospects before committing larger rounds.
The result is what’s been called the ‘valley of death’, a place of limbo between technological promise and industrial consolidation.
It’s time to build quantum capacity
As Europe is now giving the finishing touches to the upcoming Quantum Act, policymakers have a unique opportunity to close this gap. One proposal stands out – an EU Quantum Sovereign Fund.
The EU is already investing massively in quantum technologies. Structuring investments through a dedicated instrument within InvestEU could help with targeting the missing scale-up phase. This would provide growth capital to companies transitioning from lab to demonstrators to industrial deployment. It would co-invest with private actors, mitigating risk while crowding in capital.
Crucially, it would closely align with procurement initiatives such as EUROQCI and semiconductor policy, ensuring that financing, infrastructure and demand signals reinforce one another rather than evolve in parallel.
The objective wouldn’t be to replace national programmes but to correct a structural coordination failure. In emerging, capital-intensive technologies with high spillovers and strategic relevance, private incentives alone aren’t enough to generate the investment levels required to scale.
A targeted instrument, carefully governed and embedded within Europe’s broader economic security strategy, would help bridge this gap.
Ultimately, the debate should shift from whether we fund research to whether we build capacity. Europe’s scientific foundations are strong. Its regulatory influence is considerable. But sovereignty in critical technologies is measured less by publications or policy documents than by production lines, exports and supply chain resilience vis-à-vis increasing external shocks.
Europe has a choice to make.
It can continue to excel in discovery while relying on others for large-scale deployment – or it can complement its scientific strengths with industrial courage.
The next phase of European quantum policy should be defined by this transition. Funding research was necessary. Funding scale-up is now a must.
A Quantum Sovereign Fund is the way to get there.
