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The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

by Ansgar Belke / Barbara Styczynska
01 November 2004

The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

Ansgar Belke / Barbara Styczynska

This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, classical power indices that have their origin in solutions of cooperative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out of the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its re-nationalisation.


About the Authors


  • Author
    Ansgar Belke
    Ansgar Belke
    Associate Senior Research Fellow
  • Author
    Barbara Styczynska
    Barbara Styczynska
The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model
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