Greenland, remote and mysterious, rarely made global headlines, mainly featuring in nature documentaries. Now, it’s a hotspot in the Arctic’s growing geopolitical rivalry, with top European and American officials routinely visiting Greenland, direct flights opened to New York and US-Denmark tensions heating up.
And of course, there’s Donald Trump’s outlandish desire to ‘buy’ Greenland (a proposal not so out of the blue – the US allegedly floated the idea some eighty years ago).
For the EU, carving out a role in the current frenzy over Greenland seemingly offers few working strategies. But engaging openly and honestly with Greenlanders now could massively pay off in the not-so-distant future.
Greenland has CRMs. But it’s complicated
Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) are arguably the main reason why the EU is doubling down on strengthening ties with Greenland. With the growing appetite for CRMs in the green transition and heavy dependence on China, the EU has been signing a series of strategic partnerships with third countries – including Greenland in 2023.
Hopes are high, as Greenland holds substantial estimated reserves. Thus far, one European company has been granted a license by the Greenlandic government. The EU is also leveraging its limited competences by supporting training for a Greenlandic mining workforce, making sure to align with local educational aspirations.
Yet expectations risk being overinflated. CRMs are unlikely to become economically viable in Greenland, at least in the short- to medium term. Mining in extreme conditions requires massive investment, with no guaranteed pay off. There’s barely any existing infrastructure and the local workforce is almost non-existent.
Sustainability issues add another layer of tension. Locally, the EU’s policies are often seen as bordering on hypocrisy. This echoes controversies in Serbia and Rwanda where CRM deals sparked opposition that Brussels essentially ignored. Concerns over indigenous rights, like those of the Sámi in northern Sweden, further fuel criticism, with some framing such EU deals in neocolonial terms.
Environmental risks deepen the unease. Many resources in Greenland are tied to uranium, making extraction hazardous. The Kvanefjeld project, for instance, was shut down over such concerns. Subsequent arbitration claims against the Greenlandic and Danish governments effectively reinforced locals’ perception of the precarious nature of resource development on the island.
Yes, some researchers do advocate further exploration and knowledge-building, arguing for technological advances. But for now, put bluntly, developing CRMs in Greenland remains meagre and is much more expensive than in other parts of the world. But that may change in the future.
‘Nothing about us without us’ – but Denmark is still in the driving seat
Attempting to expand cooperation on CRMs, despite current difficulties, is one step the EU can take to move beyond its traditionally limited engagement with Greenland. Since leaving the then-EEC, Greenland’s relations with the EU have been managed as one of the Overseas Countries and Territories, offering only narrow areas for cooperation – mainly fisheries, education and training programmes.
The EU’s limited competences are then layered onto the historically sensitive relations between Denmark and its semi-autonomous territory, which are currently going through a rough patch. Historic scandals like ‘the experiment’ to ‘re-educate’ Inuit children and the insertion of contraceptive coils into young girls without their consent – which the Danish Prime Minister only recently apologised for – continue to cast a shadow. As recently as this year, protests erupted after Denmark removed a newborn from her Greenlandic mother.
None of this fosters goodwill and Greenland’s push for greater autonomy through a ‘nothing about us without us’ approach is understandable, allowing it to explore alternative sources and partners for economic development, despite still being heavily dependent on budget transfers from Denmark.
Yet Greenland’s rising global visibility has given it leverage. When China offered to expand infrastructure investments in Greenland, Denmark quickly financed a new airport – under US pressure to meet Greenland’s needs and to keep China out. And just days ago, Denmark signed a new agreement with Greenland that includes ambitious infrastructure projects.
But Greenland’s quest for more external autonomy goes beyond infrastructure, trade or diplomatic ties. It’s also about forging closer connections with fellow Inuit communities in North America.
Thus, Greenland’s instinctive westward-looking inclination shouldn’t come as a surprise – and that’s why Brussels must clearly spell out the benefits of closer Greenlandic ties with the EU.
Getting it right – local priorities and EU credibility
Even as Greenland increasingly asserts its own voice on the world stage, big geopolitical games often feel like ‘much ado about nothing’ to the local population. Bread-and-butter issues garner much more attention.
Still, the EU, even with its limited competences, could build on these areas to more meaningfully engage with Greenland. With a proposal to double financial support under the next EU budget, it’s definitely showing its willingness for increased involvement. But due to Greenland’s limited capacity to implement funding programmes, the EU must get its priorities straight and communicate the benefits clearly.
And herein lies the problem. Education, the EU’s main area of cooperation with Greenland (90 % of the budget), has already delivered tangible results and has further potential, but Brussels struggles to convey these successes on the ground, reinforcing local indifference to its role.
The same goes for its highly promoted sustainability agenda. For many Greenlanders, the EU’s lofty ambitions feel vague at best, unrealistic at worst. Brussels’ sustainability narratives are often perceived as uncompromised attempts to trade economic development (understandable, given the island’s poor infrastructure and shaky, subsidies-reliant budget) for an ambitious green agenda. For example, the EU’s objections at the International Whaling Commission in the mid-2000s to Greenland’s request to expand indigenous whaling quotas were not well received in a land defined by a whale hunting culture.
Once the EU begins to see things from a more local, Greenlandic perspective, it’ll be better positioned to highlight the tangible benefits that the EU can bring, regardless of how its bilateral relationship with Denmark evolves. But additional funding can only be profitable with full Greenlandic support – and cooperation.
The EU’s recently established office in Nuuk is a step in the right direction, for gaining a local perspective and increasing visibility. Now, it must further finetune its ‘sales pitch’ by incorporating Greenlandic views and emphasising the real advantages of a European future, such as the possibility for Greenlanders to take part in programmes like Erasmus+.
If the EU puts in the effort, it could really pay off. Having Greenland firmly in the European camp, as an equal, valued partner, isn’t just logical. It’s essential.
