



PROPOSAL FOR A CEPS TASK FORCE ON

**EU TRANSPORT POLICY – INNOVATION, INTEGRATION
AND 21ST CENTURY INFRASTRUCTURE**

Chair: **A.N. (Arie) Bleijenberg**, Manager of Business Unit Mobility and Logistics, TNO Netherlands

Rapporteurs: **Christian Egenhofer**, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Arno Behrens, Head of Energy & Research Fellow, CEPS

First meeting: 17 January 2011 (from 10:30h-17h:00)

Second meeting: March 2011

Third meeting: May 2011

Meeting venue:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Place du Congrès 1, 1000 Brussels

For regularly updated information about this CEPS Task Force, please visit
<http://www.ceps.eu/taskforce/transport-and-climate-change>

1. Introduction

The transport sector is a strategic sector, which is fundamental to all economic activity. Transport costs are an input factor for all products. Transport also constitutes an important component of the European economy. The sector contributes some 7% of GDP and more than 5% of total employment in the EU. Transport connections and networks are also cornerstones of European integration.

Progressive European integration, notably via successive waves of enlargement, has led to a substantial increase in transport volumes in recent years¹. These developments have led to an increasing recognition of the negative side-effects of mass transport in Europe, including deterioration of infrastructure, misuse of land, congestion, air and noise pollution, increasing oil import dependency, injuries and deaths, as well as substantial amounts of GHG emissions.

European transport GHG emissions keep rising quickly and with transport emissions accounting for almost a quarter of total GHG emissions, control and ultimately reduction of them will be a precondition for the new EU climate change strategy that remains in tatters post-Copenhagen. More importantly, decarbonisation of the transport sector is essential for the low carbon technology race that is unfolding. In the new post-Copenhagen world, the 'global narrative' on climate change has shifted from "reducing emissions" to "developing future green technologies" to stay upfront in the future race for global technological leadership. The *development of new and green technologies* is generally seen as the key for future global competitiveness. Transport is essential for this.

Whilst there has been good progress in some areas, especially further liberalisation of all modes, a better safety record or the strengthening of passenger rights, EU transport policy has failed to deliver on a number of accounts², notably:

- A shift towards low GHG emissions modes and reversing the decline of rail,
- Decoupling of freight transport growth from economic growth,
- Ensuring full marginal cost pricing including externalities, and
- Adequate infrastructure funding and development

While in some areas lack of progress is associated with reluctance of member states to contribute their part or simply to implement, in others strategic orientations will need to be questioned. Overall, an assessment of the EU transport policy calls for a new strategic direction ensuring the development and financing of infrastructure changes based on a shared understanding of the kind of products and services the European transport system will need to offer to guarantee sustainable and demand-responsive services. This will require political choices and new instruments most likely going beyond a mere adaptation to existing EU policies. The discussions around the forthcoming European Commission White Paper is the forum to engage in this debate.

2. EU Transport Challenges

As recognised by the European Commission in its 2009 Communication "A sustainable future for transport", the 2001 White Paper on Common Transport Policy is outdated and cannot tackle the challenges and opportunities for the transport sector in the long term. While the list of challenges is long and has been described in various Commission documents, four principal questions stand out. Some of them are old but must be seen in a new light after the evaluation of the last decade of transport policy and emerging new challenges. Others are new and relate to the new challenges such as decarbonisation and resulting technological revolution that the sector faces.

¹ On average, passenger transport increased by 1.7% annually since 1995 – mainly driven by air and road transport – while freight transport increased by 2.7% over the same period – primarily by road and sea transport.

² 2009 Communication on CTP; *Evaluation of the Common Transport Policy (CTP) of the EU from 2000 to 2008 and analysis of the evolution and structure of the*

European transport sector in the context of the long-term development of the CTP, prepared by Steer Davies Gleave for the European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport, Final Report, August 2009

2.1. Restructuring of the supply side through sound transport pricing

Transport creates emissions, congestion and noise and imposes very significant costs on society. It is essential that prices paid by transport users fully reflect the true costs, including external costs (emissions, noise, congestion, infrastructure etc.) in order to give the right price signal and level the playing field between the various transport modes. This is one way to provide transport users with a clear incentive to shift towards less polluting modes, provided it is accompanied by other measures intended to create more demand elasticity and price sensitivity. This in return will affect investment in infrastructure.

Work on internalisation of external costs from transport has started in earnest as early as 1995 with a European Commission Green Paper, leading to the 1998 White Paper “Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use”, which recommended marginal social cost pricing for transport infrastructure use aimed at improving the overall efficiency network usage and reducing congestion.

However, progress towards an approach to infrastructure pricing principles in framework legislation has been slow. For example, today the negotiation of the new Eurovignette Directive is blocked in the Council of the EU, despite a clear support from the European Parliament at its first reading, whereas the review of the Directive on taxation of energy products has been discussed in the College of the European Commission on June 23, 2010.

A rational transport pricing system will be at the heart of EU transport policy, especially to allow for competition within and between modes but also to make available funds for much needed infrastructure investment. It is often forgotten that the way investments are financed and charged will impact the final price structure passed to consumers. Therefore scrutinising not only the apparent price structure but rather the whole chain costs and what actors are facing these will determine the effectiveness of economic instruments aimed at establishing a level playing field between transport modes and at ensuring sufficient investment in sustainable transport infrastructure.

2.2. EU-level infrastructure development and finance

On the EU level, the Trans-European Network (TEN-T) is the main instrument dealing with infrastructure, a policy defined in 1996. It is widely recognised as no longer adapted to current and future challenges because of growing mobility needs, urban development, scarcity of fossil fuels, climate change and environmental protection.

TEN-T policy is not driven by genuine EU objectives, resulting from a lack of funding and sovereign responsibility by the member states in infrastructure planning (subsidiarity), who use first EU Structural Funds for financing highways, thus increasing GHG emissions from passenger road transport. This has not been reversed despite the attempt to boost TEN-T development through the EU economic recovery plan. The way TEN-T projects have been designed so far (network layer + priority projects) does neither integrate the different transport modes nor does it provide for an optimal functioning of transport elements (infrastructures, nodes, ICT applications, network services, operational and administrative procedures), which should work in combination in order to promote co-modality, modal shift and an efficient and effective organisation of the whole transport system. Moreover, TEN-T policy is not driven by climate change mitigation and adaptation objectives. This comes on top of a largely absent transport pricing system, further undermining the steering of infrastructure investment and depriving member states and the EU of vital funding (see above).

2.3 Revitalising railways

The opening of the transport market is one of the main objectives of the Common Transport Policy and a key element of the rail revitalisation strategy through the adoption of three “railway packages”. To date, freight and international passenger transport are fully liberalised; the degree of liberalisation of *domestic* passenger transport differs widely according to member states.

The case for EU liberalisation has been based on standard economic and EU-treaty arguments such as optimised cross border services, quality and service differentiation, the elimination of redundancies, generally more

efficient allocation of capital and the belief that liberalisation of cross-border services will lead to (cross-border) competition. Exposure to competition would increase overall rail efficiency through innovation in management, outsourcing, cost-consciousness, customer-responsiveness and generally, less rent-seeking inherent in monopolies. Higher efficiency would also contribute to ironing out differences between transport modes, eventually leading to a relative rebalancing of prices between transport systems.

Specifics of the railways, e.g. suitability of liberalisation or complementarity with other transport modes has been catered for by different arrangements according to the nature of the market segment (competition *for* the market versus competition *in* the market). EU legislation also establishes exemptions to intra-modal competition to introduce the possibility to deliver Public Services Obligations contracts to ensure that the less profitable routes or services will be delivered.

A key element of railway liberalisation is the removal of legal and technical barriers, to increase interoperability (urgently pursued by the European Railway Agency). Another one is the very important development costs for tracks³, making the network an essential facility. With 90% of railways costs linked to infrastructure costs, the ability to incentivise an effective use and management of transport system depends on the appropriate elaboration of pricing conditions.

In practice, liberalisation is too recent to assess in details its effectiveness. Like in the energy sector, unbundling may reintroduce coordination costs whereas the economies of scope, legal features and interdependencies can make the case for tight coordination within the sector. As for energy, an association, Rail Net, has been set up to coordinate European Rail Infrastructure Managers and Allocation Bodies, in order to harmonise conditions of access to the network. However, this is a far stretch from being a supranational regulatory body to push for further harmonisation and transparency of network pricing and access, despite the attempt to establish a pan-European vision as regards infrastructure investment and development, in particular through the TEN-T

³ Estimated between 6 and 10 M€ for 1km of track, according to countries and topographical conditions.

policy. A redefinition of markets and access at pan-European level is indeed an essential element towards sustainable transport systems and should be supported by EU instruments.

2.4 A new transport policy spurring innovation (with focus on road transport)

While the EU Common Transport Policy has “assisted social and economic cohesion and promoted competitiveness of European industry, therefore contributing significantly to the Lisbon Agenda for Growth and Jobs” (European Commission, 2009), there has been little progress in designing an integrated response to rising GHG emissions, security of energy supply issues and the transport sector’s innovation challenge arising both from ever increasing GHG emissions and quest for technological innovation in the sector.

a) The emissions challenge

Transport accounts for close to a quarter of total GHG emissions and more than a quarter of total CO₂ emissions in the EU-27. Transport emissions (excluding international bunker fuels) increased by 28% between 1990 and 2007, with the annual rate of increase going up from 0.97 % between 2005 and 2006 to 1.29 % between 2006 and 2007. This compares with a reduction of 5 % in emissions across all sectors as compared to 1990 levels (reduction of 11 % from the non-transport sectors)⁴. While most EU Member States continue to increase their emissions, a few have shown a decrease of emissions from 2006 to 2007.

Transport is one of the largest energy consuming sectors, accounting for 34% of EU final energy consumption. Most of the energy used is imported.

In the long term, energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions are projected to increase significantly up to 2050. Road freight in the EU is forecast to increase by about 60% between 2005 and 2050, and long-distance road freight (trips longer than 150 km) to more than double. Car travel is forecast to increase by about 40% to 70% until 2050. Projections for rail passenger transport differ significantly, ranging from 30% to double, between 2005

⁴ In this context, freight and passenger road transport account for 71% of total CO₂ transport emissions, against 15.3% for navigation, 12.2% for civil aviation (domestic flights), and 0.6% for railway.

and 2050, whereas growth in rail freight ranges from 25% to treble current levels.

b) The innovation challenge

So far, EU Policies have targeted specific areas but in a fragmented manner⁵. Typically they have been designed as short term policies added for example on top of the Climate and Energy package or sectoral EU policies. The focus was particularly put on technological improvements⁶ and demand side and traffic management measures, including through pricing and economic/fiscal instruments⁷, which sometimes conflict with each other because they respond to different policy objectives. Alternative fuels, in particular bio-fuels, are now promoted through the Renewable Energy Directive on the condition that sustainability criteria can be met, though still raising high concerns with regard to possible impacts on indirect land use change inside and outside the EU.

If each modal policy has proved to have some relative potential to reduce GHG emissions in each of the targeted areas, each was very much developed in isolation from the others, thus not maximising the combined potential that could be gained through a fully integrated approach. And the increase of GHG emissions from transport has occurred despite the fact that fleets have generally improved their energy efficiency for the last two decades because of the marketing of heavier and more consuming vehicles combined with an increase of use (speed) and transport volumes (km/vehicle and number of vehicles/inhabitant).

Still, the transport-related elements of energy and climate change policy represent a step in the right direction but fall significantly short of an integrated strategy leading to a low-carbon transport sector. This raises the question on whether to draw up a 'transport and climate change package' comparable to 2009 energy and climate change package to give answers to fundamental strategic questions about what a

sustainable EU transport system would look like and how it can be achieved.

This includes the review of numerous policies at EU or Member State level such as taxation, infrastructure, land-use planning, or many integration issues (e.g. road transport infrastructure and electricity grids etc).

R&D and demonstration initially will be at the heart of these efforts. But technology push alone will not be enough to bring down emissions. For example, demand side measures, including infrastructure pricing, internalising the full environmental and social costs together with better data and information will be crucial in influencing consumers' behaviour and responding to customers' needs.

Ultimately, a fully integrated long-term strategy should aim at better maximising co-benefits from sustainable transport (security of energy supply, road safety, air quality, noise, territorial cohesion, traffic management, prevention of congestion etc.) and develop synergies with other EU policies and legislation, also to reduce transport related social costs including environmental costs. Most important will be the development and deployment of future technologies that will not only keep the EU's economy competitive (founded on low-carbon transport services) but also allow technology providers to successfully compete in the global market place for future technologies.

3. Proposed Issues

Recent evaluations have identified a number of concrete issues that the new EU transport policy will have to address. They include, for example:

- modular vs. inter-modal approaches and how to integrate them into a consistent strategy
- the role of technology support versus regulation or taxation to reduce CO₂ emissions in surface transport
- the *real* scope for changing demand patterns - in passenger and in freight
- the contribution of standard and high-speed passenger rail
- inter-modality within and between urban areas
- financing infrastructure and public services
- drivers of decarbonisation (taxes, charges or emissions trading?)

⁵ Adopted: Fuel Quality Directive, CO₂ Cars, bio-fuels in renewable energy; Proposed: CO₂ from vans, competitive rail freight transport.

⁶ E.g. energy efficiency of vehicles, clean road vehicles, fuel quality including carbon reduction requirements

⁷ E.g. internalisation of external costs, taxation of energy products, inclusion of aviation in EU ETS, deployment of Intelligent Transport Services etc.

- Trans-European Networks (TEN-T)
- the role of the EU or the role for internal EU market.

These and others are potential issues for the Task Force to discuss, depending on the preferences of its members.

Irrespectively, CEPS proposes to focus *also* on the following four principal issues:

1) *The potential need (and scope) for a hard GHG emissions target in transport at sector, mode or economy level*

A transport policy without headline objective will fail to give direction as it will try to achieve too many objectives at the same time. This has been acknowledged by the Climate and Energy Package that implicitly set the GHG objective as headline target, yet ensures that other objectives such as security of supply, competitiveness are not jeopardised.

This has been achieved by testing the effects of the GHG target on the other objectives. This is not the same as pursuing three objectives simultaneously. One can make a case that the GHG reduction target indeed is the headline objective for transport given the importance for EU climate change objectives, the race for innovation, the drive to resource efficiency as well as the need for infrastructure development. Indeed, a long-term target can give a clear signal to sectors and will, over time, benefit low-carbon modes. Yet, whether a European low-carbon transport strategy requires a GHG target remains a highly controversial issue.

2) *The link between efficient pricing and infrastructure finance*

As has been argued throughout this report, transport pricing (e.g. energy, CO₂, congestion, health, local pollution etc.) is a precondition to unlock the efficiency gains from competition and drive integration (i.e. inter-modality) within and between the modes. More importantly, transport pricing will generate desperately needed revenues to upgrade and build new transport infrastructure. Ultimately, Europe will only be able to develop its transport infrastructure if users/consumers pay for the full cost of it, irrespective if provided privately or by governments. The experiences of the TEN-T tells us that without some ‘meaningful’ EU role in both planning and

financing EU infrastructure will remain dominated by national interests, lacking interoperability and thereby intra and inter-modal competition. It will also continue to be deficient in solidarity, miss an efficient (i.e. EU-wide) pricing system and therefore remains unable to meet the needs of Europe’s transport sector during the transformation phase. Past attempts by the European Commission have not achieved the objective of full-cost pricing across the EU but remain a patchwork of initiatives, mainly as a result of member states’ reluctance to “cede too much power to the EU” as it was seen. Can the EU envisage success without a dedicated EU fund for sustainable transport infrastructure? If not, by which means can “transformational” infrastructure for the new technologies (e.g. battery charging stations, smart grid, hydrogen infrastructure) be built and financed?

3) *Customer responsiveness as a precondition for success*

The previous questions have all dealt with supply side measures - without doubt a crucial aspect, but not the only one. EU transport policy will only meet economic, environmental and innovation objectives, if transport services meet users’ and customers’ needs. Even if attention has been given, there have been no or only insufficient indicators to evaluate customer responsiveness. As a side effect, such indicators would increase buy-in by technology developers and providers. To fully integrate customers’ perspectives into policy making, the EU could strive to develop a set of indicators for each mode against which a service can be evaluated. Such indicators would at the same time provide for guidance for service providers and transparency for customers. An example of a set of indicators in the rail freight sector could be i) always available rolling stock, ii) flexible train configurations, iii) availability of integrated mobility hubs, iv) tracking system available to customer etc. Indicators for all other modes could be developed.

4) *The transformation of fossil fuel based road passenger and freight transport: how quick and with what tools?*

EU policies for decarbonisation are already in place concerning the improvement of fleet efficiency, the promotion of biofuels or hydrogen. Yet, it appears that the possible

contribution of electric/hybrid and hydrogen vehicles to this objective is still unclear and diversely appreciated among Member States and stakeholders, and that the strategies to maximize this contribution need clarification. At the same time, what is at stake is the future of the European car industry, but also the synergy between this evolution and the correlative changes to occur in the power sector, both in terms of production and grid services. Finally, the possibility to develop a sustainable and widely accepted biofuels – or more remote, a hydrogen – option depends on internal factors (second and third generation, criteria for international supply) but also on the share of demand that can be covered by alternative fuels. Finally, an integrated long-term strategy should aim at co-benefits from sustainable transport (security of energy supply, road safety, air quality, noise, territorial cohesion, traffic management, prevention of congestion etc.) and develop synergies with other EU policies and legislation, also to reduce transport related social costs, including environmental costs. It will be key to develop tools for a strategic coordination between EU policies that interact with the EU transport policy. Such a strategy is still absent.

4. CEPS Task Force Objectives

Although it will be up to CEPS Task Force's to agree on the final agenda, we propose to concentrate on a number of key issues and explore practical solutions to them. Generally, the Task Force is meant to

- Assess the ongoing EU policy discussions
- Share knowledge between different key stakeholders and create a broad network of interested stakeholders;
- Provide input ahead of the White Paper publication (through an Interim Report)
- Work out a set of concrete recommendations to be presented to EU and member state policy-makers.

An initial short **Interim Report** to focus on a small number of strategic issues will be published ahead of the European Commission's White Paper.

5. Format

The Task Force constitutes a unique forum of representatives from the European Commission (DG Transport and Mobility, Climate Action, Energy, Budget, Research etc.), European Parliament, member states, business and industry, International Organisations, NGOs, transport experts and other stakeholders to facilitate an in-depth discussion and provide background research.

The new CEPS Task Force will meet **three times between January and May 2011** (a possible fourth meeting could be added if required).

It will be chaired by **A.N. (Arie) Bleijenberg, Manager of Business Unit Mobility and Logistics, TNO Netherlands**. Rapporteurs will be Christian Egenhofer, Senior Research Fellow and Arno Behrens, Research Fellow of CEPS.

At the end of the Task Force, CEPS will **publish** and circulate among EU and member state policy circles policy recommendations together with a **CEPS Task Force Report**, which will also be formally published in the CEPS Task Force Report publication series.⁸ This report will be based on discussions in the meetings supplemented by research carried out by the rapporteurs. The Draft Task Force Report will be circulated before the third meeting (in spring 2011) to be discussed and approved by the Task Force.

An initial short **Interim Report** to focus on a small number of strategic issues will be published ahead of the European Commission's White Paper.

6. Indicative agenda

An indicative agenda of the first meeting is provided in APPENDIX 2.

7. Conditions for participation

The CEPS Task Force is primarily designed for CEPS Corporate Members but participation

⁸ For further information, please visit www.ceps.eu or contact Christian Egenhofer at Christian.egenhofer@ceps.eu.

is open to non-members as well, albeit at a higher fee.

The fee covers participation in all workshops, documentation, lunches and three copies of all reports produced. Upon request by participants, CEPS will mail additional copies of the final CEPS Task Force Report to persons identified by participants.

Participation fees:

€1.000 for CEPS Corporate Members⁹

€7.000 for non-members

For further information, see APPENDICES 1 and 2. A registration form is provided in APPENDIX 3 at the end of this prospectus.

⁹ Regarding information on CEPS Corporate Membership, please contact Staffan Jerneck, Deputy Director and Director for Corporate Relations (staffan.jerneck@ceps.eu) at +32 2 229 3910 or +32 475 903 924.

APPENDIX 1. WHY A CEPS TASK FORCE AND HOW DOES IT WORK?

The CEPS Task Force's main objective will be to involve the CEPS constituency in the crucial EU policy processes relating to decarbonisation of the EU transport sector, the upcoming White Paper on Transport and its follow-up. This involves i) informing about policy formulation in the EU and its member states, as well as ii) regular feed-in from the CEPS Task Force into the relevant policy processes of the European Commission, the European Parliament and member states.

In practical terms, the CEPS Task Force will be based on three full-day multi-stakeholder workshops designed to create an informal but structured dialogue on the future of the European transport sector. The Task Force will constitute a unique forum of representatives from the European Commission (DG Transport and Mobility, Climate Action, Energy, Budget, Research etc.), Members of the European Parliament, officials from member states, representatives of international organisations, business and industry, NGOs and other stakeholders to facilitate an in-depth discussion and provide background research.

At the end of the Task Force, CEPS will publish and circulate among EU and member state policy circles policy recommendations together with a **CEPS Task Force Report**, which will also be formally published in the CEPS Task Force Report publication series. This report will be based on discussions in the meetings supplemented by research carried out by the rapporteurs.

The new CEPS Task Force on EU Transport Policy - Innovation, Integration and 21st Century Infrastructure will meet three times between January and May 2011. Chairman will be **A.N. (Arie) Bleijenberg**, Manager of Business Unit Mobility and Logistics, TNO Netherlands. Rapporteurs will be Christian Egenhofer, Senior Research Fellow and Arno Behrens, Research Fellow of CEPS.

APPENDIX 2. DRAFT AGENDA FIRST MEETING

First meeting of the CEPS Task Force on

EU Transport Policy – Innovation, Integration and 21st Century Infrastructure

17 January 2011

CEPS Conference Room
CEPS, Place du Congrès 1, 1000 Brussels; tel.: +32 2 229 3911 ; www.ceps.eu

Draft Agenda

- 10:00-10:30 Registration and welcome
- 10:30-10:35 **Welcome by CEPS**
Christian Egenhofer, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
- 10:35-10:45 **Introduction by the Chair of Task Force**
A.N. (Arie) Bleijenberg, Manager of Business Unit Mobility and Logistics,
TNO Netherlands

Session I: Critical Issues for EU Transport Policy

The objective of this session is to briefly introduce the new CEPS Task Force on Transport (objectives, scope, timelines etc.) and to identify critical issues that EU transport policy faces and how the Task Force could address them.

- 10:45-11:20 **Short Introduction to the Task Force & Presentation of an Issues Paper¹⁰ on “EU Policy Choices”**
- Introduction by **Christian Egenhofer**, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
- Comments¹¹:
Sandro Santamato, European Commission (DG MOVE) (tbc)
Jos Dings, Director, Transport & Environment (tbc)
- 11:20-12:30 Discussion
- 12:30-13:30 *Lunch break*

¹⁰ CEPS will present an Issues Paper outlining key issues. The document will be circulated a week before the meeting and will also be available for download on the Task Force’s website before the meeting. The task force website is: <http://www.ceps.eu/taskforce/transport-and-climate-change>

¹¹ Approx. 10 minutes each

Session II: EU-level infrastructure development and finance

This session will address the EU's role in infrastructure development and investment. A distinction will be made between "traditional" EU infrastructure issues such as missing links and "transformational" infrastructure, e.g. the need to develop new low-carbon infrastructures.

| | |
|-------------|---|
| 13:30-15:00 | A. Traditional Speakers: European Commission, TEN-T Comments from industry Discussion |
| 15:00-15:15 | <i>Break</i> |
| 15:15-16:45 | B. Transformational Speakers: Utility, electricity producer, car manufacturer Discussion |
| 16:45-17:00 | Wrap-up and agreement on the final terms of reference of the Task Force |
| 17:00 | <i>End of meeting</i> |



REGISTRATION FORM

CEPS Task Force on EU Transport Policy – Innovation, Integration and 21st Century Infrastructure

Person attending the meetings

Salutation: _____ First name: _____ Last name: _____

Job title: _____

E-mail: _____ Telephone: _____

Company

Company name: _____

Postal address: _____

Postcode _____ City _____ Country _____

Contact Person: _____

E-mail: _____ Telephone: _____

Billing information

Tax register number (VAT for Europe): _____

Your reference, Customer Purchase Order No. or Cost Code N: _____

Department: _____

Postal address: _____

Postcode _____ City _____ Country _____

Contact person: _____

Telephone: _____ Fax: _____

E-mail: _____ Other: _____

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Date: _____ Signature: _____

Return to: Isabelle TENAERTS at isabelle.tenaerts@ceps.eu | Tel: +32 229 39 56 | CEPS | 1 Place du Congrès | 1000 Brussels

More information: If you would like to become a member or need more information, please contact Staffan Jerneck at staffan.jerneck@ceps.eu +32 2 229 3910 or +32 475 903 924. Discounted fees for this Task Force will be considered for non-members if they decide to become member of CEPS.