

Is there a trade-off between deepening and widening?

What do Europeans think?

Antonia M. Ruiz-Jiménez

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Following the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, EU traditional enlargement policy has been called into question. Whereas in the past, the so-called 'deepening and widening' processes have gone hand in hand, a much more conservative policy and mood about enlargement has now taken hold. With discussions about the Constitutional Treaty and future enlargement rounds dominated by a widespread consensus on the existence of so-called 'enlargement fatigue' and concerns about 'EU absorption capacity', the question of public support for enlargement has become crucial.

With the promise (or threat) to hold national referenda to ratify the accession of new member states, the traditional EU enlargement policy has undergone an important change. Whereas in the past the accession of new members was decided in two parallel series of negotiations (one among existing members, the other between existing members and the candidates), it now seems evident that new enlargement rounds are going to require a third set of agreements (between political elites and the public). Public support for enlargement might affect enlargement policy in two ways, one explicit, the second implicit. In the first case, member states or the Union itself would decide to hold popular referenda to validate new accessions. In the second case, EU leaders would stop or speed up accession processes according to the perceived levels of public support. In both cases, public support will be crucial.

The three questions this paper poses are crucial to this debate. First, do citizens share with political elites the perception that there is a trade-off between deepening and widening? Second, how do we explain the variation in levels of support for EU enlargement? Third, what sort of fears are citizens actually harbouring when they express opposition to deepening and widening?

What are our findings? We find, first, that despite the recent rise of negative attitudes towards enlargement, there is still a positive correlation between support for deepening and support for widening. Thus the alleged trade-off between both elements is more apparent and real. We also find that negative attitudes towards enlargement are concentrated among older members states. Third, we find that fears about the future (crime, immigration, sovereignty, etc.) explain losses in support for both integration and enlargement. We conclude by questioning whether a more restrictive enlargement policy would increase public support for integration

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IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING?

WHAT DO EUROPEANS THINK?

ANTONIA M. RUIZ-JIMENEZ* AND JOSE I. TORREBLANCA*

Introduction

After the negative results of the May-June 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendums in France and the Netherlands, it has become commonplace to place responsibility for the current crisis on the 2004 enlargement. Besides the alleged institutional difficulties that the increase from 15 to 27 members has presented to the EU, policy- and opinion-makers have repeatedly cited low support for enlargement among European citizens as one of the causes of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ or ‘enlargement indigestion’.

Following this diagnosis, a more conservative policy regarding future enlargements has emerged, stressing elements such as “absorption capacity” and the need to ensure wider levels of public support before launching new rounds of accession. The June 2006 European Council meeting resulted in a request to the Commission to prepare a report on enlargement that “should also cover the issue of the present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should take into account the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within the Union”. On 12 October, the European Parliament stressed “the importance of taking into account public acceptance of enlargement and recalls the responsibility of Europe’s political leaders in explaining to the public the goals and mutual advantages of enlargement and the unification of Europe”.¹ On 8 November, the European Commission adopted a communication recognising that despite the benefits of enlargement the public’s perception was negative, and concluded that while the EU’s integration capacity was determined by the EU’s own capacity to maintain the momentum of European integration, and by candidate countries’ ability to fulfil rigorous conditions, “better communication on enlargement” was also essential (European Commission, 2006c).

These policy changes reflect that the compatibility between the so-called processes of ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, which in the past tended to be taken for granted, has now been put into question. This view has been summarised by the Commission’s Director General for External Affairs, Eneko Landáburu, who recently wrote: “Enlargement has been a key tool in projecting stability across our continent. But it is a reality that the EU cannot expand ad infinitum – everything has its limits. We must honour our present basic commitments, while strictly insisting on the criteria. One of these criteria is our own absorption capacity – it is clear that in some member states *the pace and scale of enlargement is approaching the limits of what public opinion will accept*” (Landáburu, 2006, emphasis added).

This change in the EU’s enlargement policy has not gone unnoticed. In fact, it has been severely criticised. Barysch (2006), Durand & Missiroli (2006), Emerson, et al., (2006), Hassin (2007),

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¹ Report on the institutional aspects of the European Union’s capacity to integrate new Member, 2006/2226(INI), *Stubb Report*, PR\633706EN.doc, PE 378.846v01-00.

Moravcsik (2006) and Torreblanca (2006), among others, have questioned the way this policy change has emerged and challenged the concept of “absorption capacity” and its political exploitation. Enlargement, these analysts point out, is not the cause of the EU’s current ills. Therefore, though it is true that the EU needs institutional reform if it is to further enlarge, putting an end to enlargement will not by itself solve current problems.

Two aspects of the ‘deepening versus widening’ debate are particularly worth exploring: impact and perceptions. Questions about impact deal with objective facts. Is it true that the enlarged Union functions less efficiently because of enlargement? Have the Union’s institutions collapsed because of enlargement? How costly has enlargement been in terms of trade, investment, the EU budget or jobs – in other words, has the EU benefited from enlargement? All these questions can be settled empirically, and if not definitively then at least substantially.

A second aspect of the debate poses questions addressing more subjective views, i.e. with citizen perceptions of enlargement. Does public opinion perceive integration and further enlargement as incompatible processes? How do citizens link these two processes of deepening and widening? How do we explain variations in support for enlargement across countries? To what extent are opinions held by the wider public similar to those of European elites? What are the fears that explain opposition to the Union’s deepening and widening? In other words, to paraphrase Landáburu (2006, cited above), just how much enlargement can EU citizens take? Following the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands and the ensuing changes in EU enlargement policy, questions about perceptions have become as crucial as those about impact.

Detailed studies on the impact of enlargement on the functioning of EU institutions and on the economy, trade and immigration conclude that enlargement has been economically beneficial but that decision-making has become more difficult (though not impossible) (CER, 2006; European Commission, 2006, 2006a; Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Kurpas & Schönlau, 2006; Kreppel & Gungor, 2006). As the Commission summarised in its 2006 Communication about enlargement, “economically, enlargement has helped to increase prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges of globalisation. This has brought direct benefits for Europe as a whole. Enlargement has increased the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international player” (European Commission, 2006c).

Therefore, when we look at the impact of enlargement, there does not seem to be much difference with respect to previous enlargement rounds (at least in the sense that all of them proved to be economically beneficial but also required institutional changes to improve EU decision-making efficiency). This would mean that recent enlargement policy changes, which have led to a more restrictive approach to enlargement, were driven more by elite perceptions of the public’s negative evaluation of enlargement policy than they were by enlargement’s negative economic or institutional consequences. However, one could ask whether negative citizen views of enlargement are a consequence of negative elite assessment of enlargement rather than a cause of it. But to settle this question, we first need to explain the subjective aspects of enlargement, i.e. why the European public has so negatively assessed the most recent round of enlargement.

Using post-enlargement Eurobarometer data, this paper explores public support for deepening and widening across the EU. In particular, it tries to answer the following questions: (1) Do citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening? (2) Is there a gap between elite discourses and citizen perceptions regarding deepening and widening? (3) Which fears lay behind citizens’ preferences for deepening versus widening?²


² See the methodological note at the end for specific information.

In the first section, we look at the historical trend in public support for enlargement. In the second section, we look at elite views and assessments of the 2004 enlargement and its consequences during the current constitutional crisis. Then, in section three, we examine to what extent European citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening. In section four, we take a closer look at the factors, mainly fears, behind negative attitudes for both integration and enlargement. In section five we explore whether, and how, those fears affect the perception of a trade-off between the processes of deepening and widening, and to what extent these perceptions are similar among citizens and elites. The concluding section summarises our findings and discusses their policy implications.

1. Trends in support for 2004 enlargement and further enlargement

Figure 1 considers the EU-15 as a whole during 2000-04 and shows that the percentage of citizens who supported the 2004 and future enlargements hovered between 40-50%.

Figure 1. Percentage of support for 2004 enlargement and future enlargements




Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure).

After final accession negotiations began in January 2000, support for the 2004 enlargement increased until 2002 (possibly owing to increased media attention). However, after negotiations closed, in December 2002, support for the 2004 enlargement decreased during 2003 and 2004 as the accession date neared (possibly because the media shifted attention to enlargement consequences). Thus, in the spring of 2004, support for the 2004 enlargement was slightly lower than in the spring of 2000, while support for further enlargements reached the lowest point of this time period.

However, as shown in Figure 2, support for further enlargements increased after the accession of the 10 new member states. If we compare public support for the 2004 enlargement to support for further enlargements, the figures are quite similar (or at least not significantly different if we exclude the period between EB56 and EB58). We must also point out that the decreasing trend in support for further enlargements is not directly attributable to the negative results of the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands. Although they might have had an impact, the trend was already apparent.

Figure 2. Net support for 2004 enlargement and future enlargements, EU15



Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure).

We can better understand these trends by looking at the ‘net’ support for enlargement (i.e. the percentage of the population in favour of enlargement minus the percentage of the population against it). We can think of this measure as an indication of consensus in public opinion: low figures (in absolute terms) will indicate a lack of consensus,³ while higher ones (in absolute terms) will indicate either a positive or negative consensus depending on the sign.⁴ If we take figures higher than 10 as indicating moderate consensus, it can be seen in Figure 2 that at the EU-15 level there was a positive consensus on the 2004 enlargement only between the autumn of 2001 and the autumn of 2002 – that is, during negotiations, when the topic was more salient. However, right before the accession the consensus was negative (for the 2004 enlargement but not for further enlargements).⁵ Otherwise, before and after that period, European public opinion (EU15) has been fairly divided between those in favour of and those against the enlargement process.

The same thing is true for further enlargement: at the EU-15 level public opinion is fairly divided between those in favour of and those against it. Furthermore, although public opinion is divided at the EU-15 level, it is less so at the EU-25 level and reaches a clear positive consensus within the NMS-10+ (Figure 3). Thus between the autumn of 2004 and 2005 there was a moderate positive consensus in favour of further enlargements at the EU-25 level. Within new member states, there has been and still is a strong consensus in favour of further enlargement.


³ We take values below 10 (in absolute terms) as indicative of divided opinions or lack of consensus.

⁴ We take values greater or less than 10 as indicating positive or negative consensus of public opinion. This measure excludes those who answered “I don’t know” or did not answer the question. These citizens can be considered as non-attitude-holders. It is likely that they will make up their mind depending on what they perceive as the mainstream public opinion climate and/or the policy initiates. Therefore, only those citizens who express an opinion have an impact on creating a public opinion climate that will influence other citizens. See, for example, the theory of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheufele & Moy, 2000).

⁵ The difference is, in part, because more people expressed an opinion regarding the 2004 enlargement than regarding further enlargements.

Nevertheless, we must mention Turkey as a special case of extremely high negative consensus. In relation to Turkey we find sustained low (even shrinking) levels of popular support at least since 2000 (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007: 7-9). This high negative consensus is clear not only among the EU-15 but also among the NMS, which is also a particularity of Turkey. The case is relevant and requires mentioning because many arguments put forward by elites about the trade-off between deepening and widening revolves around Turkey in particular.

Figure 3. Net support for future enlargements, EU-15, EU-25 and NMS-10+




Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure).

Statistics on support for enlargement at the EU-15 level hide, of course, many divergences among member states. But in 2000-04, only in France was there a moderate consensus against the 2004 enlargement. In seven countries (Germany, Austria, Denmark, the UK, Belgium and Luxembourg), there has not been a clear public opinion climate, i.e. no clear consensus either in favour of or against the 2004 enlargement. However, in eight countries there has been a moderate (the Netherlands and Finland) or strong (Sweden, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Greece) positive consensus in favour of the 2004 enlargement.


If we compare these statistics (Figure 4) with the mean net support for further enlargements among these same countries (Figure 5), we observe that between 2004 and 2006 a moderate negative consensus arose in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, and increased in France. In these four countries, the percentage of citizens against further enlargement is much higher than the percentage in favour of it. In six countries, however, public opinion still remains fairly split, with no clear consensus either in favour of or against further enlargement (Finland, Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom and Sweden). At the same time, however, the positive consensus in favour of further enlargements remains strong only in southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) and Ireland.

Figure 4. Mean net support for enlargement EB54(2000) to EB61(2004)



Sources: EB54(2000), EB55(2001), EB56(2001), EB57(2002), EB58(2002), EB59(2003), EB60(2003), EB61(2004).

Figure 5. Mean net support for further enlargement EB61(2004) to EB65(2006)



Sources: EB62(2004), EB63(2005), EB64(2005), EB66(2006).

This leads us to conclude, first, that support for enlargement was already declining well before the Constitutional Treaty was put to referenda in 2005 in France and the Netherlands. Second, that this trend is not homogeneous across EU member states but quite entrenched among some of them, whereas in the other member states public opinion is either fairly divided or clearly in favour of further enlargements, except in the case of Turkey (and to a lesser extent Albania). Let us now examine elite views as reflected in their discourses.

2. The elite's perception of a trade-off between deepening and widening

To establish whether there is a gap between the elite's and citizens' discourses and attitudes regarding the deepening and widening of the EU, we proceed first to an analysis of elite views. This can be achieved with the aid of well-established sources such as the online *EU-25 Watch* (2006), which offers reliable information about government positions throughout the EU on a wide range of issues related to European policy.⁶

⁶ The *EU-25 Watch* (2006) is an expert survey involving research institutes from all EU member states, coordinated by the IEP in Berlin (<http://www.iep-berlin.de/index.php?id=476>). Concerning possible

The report shows that wide sectors of the elite, especially politicians and mass media, tend to link the European Constitution crisis to the consequences (or fear of consequences) of enlargement. Summarising the *EU-25 Watch* report's main findings, the coordinators make the following assessment about the relation between deepening and widening: "Enlargement fatigue sweeps through the old member states...EU fatigue is on the rise in the new member states also. The consolidation and the limits of the EU in political, functional and also geographical terms is becoming a major concern in member states" (Lippert & Goosman, 2006: 5).

The report thus makes clear the existence of an 'indigestion syndrome', which has economic, political and identity dimensions. Within the economic dimension, the *EU-25 Watch* report explores issues related to the financing of enlargement, the impact on structural and agricultural policies, and economic competition over jobs, trade and foreign investment between old and new member states. Within the political dimension, enlargement is frequently cited as responsible for difficulties in the Union's institutional functioning. Further enlargement, especially if the European Constitution is not approved, is feared to have a paralysing impact on the European institutions. Regarding identity, the complex relation between deeper integration and further enlargement is most obvious in relation to the possible inclusion of large countries with large populations of Muslim citizens, especially Turkey. With no clear cultural identity, concerns centre on the likely stagnation of the Union's capacity as a unitary actor. In fact, there are many instances cited by the *EU-25 Watch* report in which the constitutional crisis is linked to the rejection of Turkey's future accession in particular rather than of future enlargements in general.⁷

This "enlargement fatigue that sweeps through old member states", which the report mentions several times, is related in several country reports to "a change...that acknowledges the need of consolidation and functioning of the EU rather than promoting expansion further and further to the East". It is further pointed out that this type of evaluation is more frequent among older member states, the six oldest ones in particular, than in new member states. A trade-off is thus understood to exist between more integration, especially in the least integrated fields, and the continuation of enlargements (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 8, 15).

alternative sources, we examined data of the Euromanifestos Project, which is based on the published platforms of parties vying for election in each country to the European Parliament (see <http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/>). The pre-release of the database only covers the European elections between 1979 and 1999 and is thus previous to the constitutional referenda held in France and the Netherlands. It contains some detailed codes about party discourses in favour of or against constitutionalism (at the EU level, codes v2_203 and v2_204) and discourses in favour of or against EC/EU enlargement (codes v2_316 and v2_317). Using these variables (net percentage of discourse in favour of constitutionalism and net percentage of discourse in favour of enlargement), we find a positive correlation ($r = .400^{***}$) between them. It seems, however, that these compatible visions changed after the rejection of the draft treaty in France and the Netherlands, according to *EU-25 Watch* (2006), but we do not know to what extent these changes also affected party platform discourses in subsequent EP elections. Another possible source is the data set produced by Benoit and Laver (2005) for their recent book on political party positions, which include several codes related to EU topics (see http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/_ppmd/PPMD_summary_data_GUIDE.pdf). This last data set, however, is similar to the one used in this investigation, as it is based on expert judgement about party positions on a number of issues. While *EU-25 Watch* (2006) has the advantage, for our investigation, of focusing on EU issues in particular and being elaborated by EU specialists, the PPMD data set has the advantage of a common coding scheme that allows running comparative quantitative analysis.

⁷ This is the case in Croatia (p. 33), Cyprus (p. 36), Germany (pp. 53, 55), Lithuania (p. 74), the Netherlands (p. 81), Romania (p. 90) and Slovenia (p. 96). Even in Turkey, debates during referendum campaigns in France and the Netherlands "led to the general feeling that the constitutional crisis would be used to exclude Turkey from the EU" (p. 101).

Among older member states, the report frequently refers to arguments that link so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ to the constitutional crisis caused by the rejection of the European Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda. In France, e.g., the “Polish plumber” debate, which emerged during the May 2005 referendum campaign, is a clear sign of the extent to which enlargement was blamed for the negative economic situation in France. As *EU-25 Watch* (2006: 50-51) reports, the negative outcome was the result of deep dissatisfaction among the French with the present-day EU, especially regarding “past and future enlargements”. As French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin declared when examining the roots of the crisis: “Europe is suffering an identity crisis...Citizens are unclear about the geographical contours...membership must not be the only solution proposed to neighbouring countries...we must recognise today that we did not adequately prepare the ground for this enlargement, neither on the economic nor the political plane.”⁸

In the Netherlands, concerns may have been slightly different, having more to do with the financing of enlargement and the debate about the country’s role in an enlarged EU, but the consequences have been similar. Hence, *EU-25 Watch* (2006: 81) makes reference to “fears of migration and the future accession of Turkey” as key to explaining the negative vote.

Looking at other founding member states, we see similar arguments. Germany, traditionally considered a “driver” of enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2003; Rachman, 2006), also suffers ‘enlargement fatigue’. In contrast to the past, when Germany always defended the compatibility of deepening and widening, it is now common to see leaders such as Angela Merkel making a negative linkage between deepening and widening, attributing the negative votes in France and the Netherlands to enlargement, calling for the EU to define its “final borders” and making the case for a “No” to Turkey’s accession.⁹ As the report concludes, the debate in Germany is now characterised by discussion about overstretching and the need to find alternatives to it (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 53, 112).

In Italy, among the causes for the crisis, the report highlights “the growing fears related to the recent enlargement”, which were also mentioned by political leaders such as Foreign Minister Fini and widely cited by the mass media (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 68). In Austria, the survey stresses, “the reasons for the negative votes on the constitution have been mainly put down to the rapid implementation of the enlargement project” (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 21). The Belgium survey, meanwhile, reports widespread belief that “for the most part, the French referendum has been decided on the enlargement”, while Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt is quoted as affirming that “the reflection period should be the occasion to make some clear choices, choices that have not been made in the past. More in particular a choice has to be made between a strong political Europe or nothing more than a free trade area” (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 25-26).

The situation is different among newer member states. In Spain, support for integration goes hand in hand with support for enlargement. In Portugal, most European analysts understand that the constitutional crisis would have a direct negative effect on the prospect for future EU enlargements. Yet, in both Portugal and Spain, there is consensus across the political spectrum in favour of continuing the enlargement process despite the consequences that it will have on both countries (reduced structural funds, increased migratory flows, industrial relocation and disinvestment, trade competition in key markets, etc.) (*EU-25 Watch*, 2006: 138, 144).

⁸ Keynote speech by French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin at the conference “The Sound of Europe”, Salzburg, 27 January 2006 (http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/2701villepin.html).

⁹ See, e.g., Angela Merkel’s statement to the Bundestag on 11 May 2006: “We cannot take on board all countries seeking membership...There is no question about that”. *European Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German Bundestag*. RegierungOnline (<http://www.bundesregierung.de>).

Even in newer member states, EU-25 Watch (2006) stresses how elites are aware of the arguments that these two policies are incompatible, although they do not share this idea of a trade-off or, if they do, it is to a much lesser extent than elites in older member states. In Estonia, the report attributes the failures in the ratification process largely to fears related to enlargement (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 46): “disaffection with the 2004 enlargement – the accession of ten new members with a liberal economic outlook, preferring English to French, has reduced the role of old members, especially France, as the ‘honour, reason and conscience’ of Europe; perception of the services directive as a threat to Western Europe protectionist social systems; old members have fears about the ‘competitive advantages’ of new members, such as lower taxes and less developed social systems; fears about future enlargement and promises issued to Turkey that enormously amplify the other two sets of fears”, a view that is basically the same in Lithuania (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 74). In Romania, President Basescu stated “that the rejection of the constitution in France and the Netherlands was determined firstly by the fears of the public in both countries to continue to financially contribute to the enlargement of Europe” (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 90). Some newer and prospective member states are rather worried about the negative impact that the failure to ratify the [“a”?] constitution would have on further enlargement.¹⁰ Do citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening?

In order to measure citizens’ views on the compatibility of deepening and widening, we select the items “support for a constitution” and “support for enlargement” from Eurobarometer 62 (2004).¹¹ Though the latter indicator might be clear, we acknowledge that the former might not be perfect. Eurobarometer does not specifically ask citizens about their preferences regarding “deepening”, which leaves few options. But after the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands and the public debate about the Constitutional Treaty and the future of the European integration process, we consider that the item “support for a constitution” might well capture the “deepening” preferences of European citizens. All in all, the item is salient, has a clear political meaning, and represents a concrete entity that most people have at least heard of by now.

Considering the content of elite discourses presented in the previous section, a first surprise in the data offered by Eurobarometer 62 (2004) is that, contrary to widespread expectations, we do not observe a trade-off between deepening and widening (Figure 6).¹² If we take “support for a European Constitution” as an indicator of ‘deepening’ and ‘support for future (further) enlargement’ as an indicator of ‘widening’, the Pearson’s correlation between these two variables shows a positive correlation of $r = .258$ (statistically significant at 0.01 level) within the EU-15 ($r = .256$ within the EU-25).¹³ That is, those citizens who support a constitution for the European Union also tend to support future enlargement, while those who oppose further

¹⁰ See, for example, *EU-25 Watch* reports for Poland (2006: 134-5); Slovenia (2006: 94); Croatia (2006: 109); and Estonia (2006: 117).


¹¹ This is not, however, an optimal solution. When trying to measure abstract or complicated concepts such as deepening and widening, the best option is to have a broad range of different indicators for each (latent) dimension. This would have required the design and administration of a specific survey. Since this was not feasible, we opted for the second-best strategy of selecting two specific policies that most respondents have heard of and understand (support for a European Constitution and support for enlargement).

¹² Eurobarometer 62 (2004) fieldwork, performed in September-October 2004, coincided with the signing of the European Constitution and preceded the French and Dutch referenda held in May-June 2005.

¹³ We used the transformed dummy variables for the analysis (values 0-1), and attributed missing values. Cases were weighted by EU-15 and EU-25. Results using a non-parametric method (Kendall Tau b) are almost coincident: $r = .256$ and $r = .255$, respectively. The tau_b correlation with original variables (recoded as 1 = do not support; 2 = don’t know; 3 = support), produced a correlation of $r = .278$.

enlargement also tend to be against a constitution. In general terms, if we take the EU-25 as a whole, citizens do not see a trade-off between deeper integration and further enlargement, i.e. there is no negative correlation between these two variables.¹⁴ Furthermore, it seems that in the public's opinion the idea of a trade-off between deepening and widening did not have much relevance even in the case of Turkey. Although the elite repeatedly mentioned opposition to Turkey's membership as a reason for constitutional opposition in France and the Netherlands, survey analyses do not confirm this (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007: 1).

Figure 6. Support for deepening and widening in EU member states



Notes: Missing values assigned. Cases weighted as indicated (EU-25, EU-15 and NMS 10+, respectively).

Source: EB62(2004).

However, the relation between these two variables is a little bit more complicated and changes on a country by country basis (Table 1 and Figure 7).

¹⁴ It is possible that the correlation is overestimated owing to both indicators being part of the same battery of questions. There exists some evidence showing that batteries of questions, especially long ones, tend to over-represent the congruence among items because of the cognitive attention demanded from the interviewees. In our case the effect might be minimised because the battery is not too long while the items selected are well known by the general public and do not demand deep cognitive attention of interviewees.

Table 1. Relation between public support for a European Constitution and public support for future enlargement (row percentages)


COUNTRIES			Future Enlargements		
			For	DK	Against
BELGIUM	European Constitution	For	53.8%	3.5%	42.7%
		DK	21.4%	30.4%	48.2%
		Against	29.4%	4.8%	65.9%
	Total		48.8%	5.2%	46.0%
DENMARK	European Constitution	For	61.5%	4.3%	34.1%
		DK	32.8%	33.8%	33.3%
		Against	26.4%	6.3%	67.3%
	Total		43.4%	10.9%	45.7%
GERMANY WEST	European Constitution	For	40.7%	5.2%	54.0%
		DK	16.9%	25.3%	57.8%
		Against	18.7%	2.2%	79.1%
	Total		36.0%	6.5%	57.6%
GERMANY EAST	European Constitution	For	44.5%	4.3%	51.2%
		DK	23.1%	34.6%	42.3%
		Against	15.2%	3.0%	81.8%
	Total		39.6%	5.7%	54.7%
GREECE	European Constitution	For	73.5%	6.2%	20.4%
		DK	34.4%	42.6%	23.0%
		Against	36.5%	6.0%	57.5%
	Total		61.3%	10.6%	28.1%
SPAIN	European Constitution	For	79.0%	8.6%	12.4%
		DK	31.1%	59.3%	9.6%
		Against	39.7%	8.8%	51.5%
	Total		66.0%	16.9%	17.1%
FINLAND	European Constitution	For	52.7%	2.7%	44.6%
		DK	26.3%	19.7%	53.9%
		Against	30.6%	1.5%	68.0%
	Total		43.3%	3.6%	53.1%
FRANCE	European Constitution	For	48.5%	7.5%	44.0%
		DK	17.6%	38.4%	44.0%
		Against	15.1%	3.4%	81.6%
	Total		38.8%	10.6%	50.6%
IRELAND	European Constitution	For	67.3%	10.5%	22.2%
		DK	25.1%	54.0%	20.9%
		Against	32.8%	10.4%	56.8%
	Total		51.9%	21.9%	26.2%
ITALY	European Constitution	For	75.4%	8.9%	15.6%
		DK	20.3%	53.1%	26.6%
		Against	41.2%	8.4%	50.4%
	Total		64.1%	14.4%	21.5%
LUXEMBOURG	European Constitution	For	44.8%	6.0%	49.2%
		DK	18.2%	31.8%	50.0%
		Against	15.3%	1.4%	83.3%
	Total		38.2%	7.6%	54.2%
NETHERLANDS	European Constitution	For	57.8%	6.5%	35.7%
		DK	24.2%	29.0%	46.8%
		Against	28.8%	2.9%	68.3%
	Total		49.9%	7.1%	43.0%
AUSTRIA	European Constitution	For	40.5%	8.1%	51.4%
		DK	9.9%	30.2%	59.9%
		Against	16.7%	4.0%	79.3%
	Total		30.3%	11.3%	58.4%
PORTUGAL	European Constitution	For	68.0%	5.7%	26.3%
		DK	23.2%	52.1%	24.8%
		Against	20.7%	4.5%	74.8%
	Total		48.8%	20.0%	31.2%

SWEDEN	European Constitution	For	56.6%	8.9%	34.5%
		DK	38.8%	20.5%	40.7%
		Against	22.7%	7.7%	69.6%
	Total		43.6%	11.6%	44.8%
UNITED KINGDOM	European Constitution	For	70.1%	5.6%	24.4%
		DK	33.2%	41.7%	25.1%
		Against	28.4%	5.0%	66.6%
	Total		50.0%	13.0%	37.0%
NORTHERN IRELAND	European Constitution	For	75.6%	7.6%	16.9%
		DK	42.1%	40.8%	17.1%
		Against	33.3%	11.8%	54.9%
	Total		59.9%	16.7%	23.4%
<hr/>					
CYPRUS (S)	European Constitution	For	70.2%	11.3%	18.5%
		DK	27.8%	68.1%	4.2%
		Against	32.1%	8.9%	58.9%
	Total		59.8%	19.2%	21.0%
CZECH REPUBLIC	European Constitution	For	78.9%	8.2%	12.9%
		DK	35.3%	53.9%	10.8%
		Against	49.7%	9.6%	40.6%
	Total		65.6%	17.1%	17.3%
ESTONIA	European Constitution	For	72.2%	8.8%	19.0%
		DK	43.6%	38.3%	18.0%
		Against	39.8%	10.2%	50.0%
	Total		61.1%	16.8%	22.1%
HUNGARY	European Constitution	For	78.7%	6.6%	14.8%
		DK	27.0%	62.6%	10.4%
		Against	45.2%	11.6%	43.2%
	Total		62.4%	16.8%	20.8%
LATVIA	European Constitution	For	76.4%	9.6%	14.0%
		DK	40.6%	41.7%	17.8%
		Against	49.2%	9.8%	41.0%
	Total		63.3%	18.4%	18.3%
LITHUANIA	European Constitution	For	86.4%	7.3%	6.3%
		DK	43.0%	51.1%	5.9%
		Against	62.0%	18.0%	20.0%
	Total		75.0%	18.2%	6.9%
MALTA	European Constitution	For	81.0%	8.6%	10.4%
		DK	40.9%	50.0%	9.1%
		Against	29.0%	20.0%	51.0%
	Total		60.0%	21.8%	18.2%
POLAND	European Constitution	For	86.3%	5.3%	8.4%
		DK	44.1%	45.3%	10.6%
		Against	66.4%	13.3%	20.4%
	Total		76.9%	13.0%	10.1%
SLOVAKIA	European Constitution	For	80.5%	6.9%	12.6%
		DK	33.5%	51.9%	14.6%
		Against	43.8%	12.4%	43.8%
	Total		67.7%	15.9%	16.4%
SLOVENIA	European Constitution	For	81.9%	4.4%	13.7%
		DK	43.4%	41.9%	14.7%
		Against	55.1%	11.6%	33.3%
	Total		75.1%	9.7%	15.2%

Notes: Chi square is statistically significant for each country at 0.01 level. Cases weighted by target.

Source: EB62(2004).

Figure 7. Support for deepening and widening, country by country



Note: Original variables were used. No missing values assigned. Cases weighted by target.

Sources: EB62(2004).

As already noted, in most countries, citizens who oppose a constitution are also against enlargement, while those who support either of the two are likely to also support the other. Yet there are some small variations worth noting. First, there are three countries in which most citizens in favour of a constitution oppose further enlargement; these are Germany, Luxembourg and Austria. Here we do observe tensions between deepening and widening. Additionally, in

these countries, as well as in Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, citizens who do not have a clear position regarding a constitution (those whose answer is “don’t know”) have a slight/significant propensity to oppose enlargement. However, in southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal), as well as in the UK and Ireland, citizens who do not know about the Constitution are more inclined to answer that they also do not know about future enlargement.

In contrast, looking at the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (NMS, i.e. those who became members in 2004), we find that the percentage of citizens who oppose a European Constitution but support future enlargements is higher than the percentage of those who oppose both or support a constitution alone. This is the pattern in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, but not in Estonia, where those who “don’t know” about a European Constitution are rather inclined to support future enlargements.

The positive correlation between support for a European Constitution and support for future (further) enlargement holds for each country, although in line with the observations above, the relation is stronger in some of them (Table 2).

Table 2. Symmetric measures of correlation between support for an European Constitution and support for future (further) enlargement

COUNTRIES		Value	Stat. sign.	COUNTRIES		Value	Stat. sign.
BELGIUM	Phi	0.353	0.000	SWEDEN	Phi	0.344	0.000
	Cramer V	0.250	0.000		Cramer V	0.244	0.000
DENMARK	Phi	0.488	0.000	UNITED KINGDOM	Phi	0.605	0.000
	Cramer V	0.345	0.000		Cramer V	0.428	0.000
GERMANY WEST	Phi	0.344	0.000	N. IRELAND	Phi	0.517	0.000
	Cramer V	0.243	0.000		Cramer V	0.366	0.000
GERMANY EAST	Phi	0.379	0.000	CYPRUS (S)	Phi	0.592	0.000
	Cramer V	0.268	0.000		Cramer V	0.419	0.000
GREECE	Phi	0.522	0.000	CZECH REPUBLIC	Phi	0.564	0.000
	Cramer V	0.369	0.000		Cramer V	0.399	0.000
SPAIN	Phi	0.609	0.000	ESTONIA	Phi	0.409	0.000
	Cramer V	0.431	0.000		Cramer V	0.289	0.000
FINLAND	Phi	0.316	0.000	HUNGARY	Phi	0.601	0.000
	Cramer V	0.224	0.000		Cramer V	0.425	0.000
FRANCE	Phi	0.445	0.000	LATVIA	Phi	0.430	0.000
	Cramer V	0.315	0.000		Cramer V	0.304	0.000
IRELAND	Phi	0.552	0.000	LITHUANIA	Phi	0.480	0.000
	Cramer V	0.391	0.000		Cramer V	0.339	0.000
ITALY	Phi	0.525	0.000	MALTA	Phi	0.607	0.000
	Cramer V	0.371	0.000		Cramer V	0.429	0.000
LUXEMBOURG	Phi	0.363	0.000	POLAND	Phi	0.450	0.000
	Cramer V	0.257	0.000		Cramer V	0.319	0.000
NETHERLANDS	Phi	0.341	0.000	SLOVAKIA	Phi	0.516	0.000
	Cramer V	0.241	0.000		Cramer V	0.365	0.000
AUSTRIA	Phi	0.313	0.000	SLOVENIA	Phi	0.455	0.000
	Cramer V	0.221	0.000		Cramer V	0.322	0.000
PORTUGAL	Phi	0.616	0.000				
	Cramer V	0.435	0.000				


Note: No missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target.

Source: EB62(2004).

The group of countries in which the relation is weaker (Cramer $V < 0.3$) includes Belgium, Germany West and East, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.¹⁵ We can also include France in this group, because although its Cramer V is slightly over 0.3, it shares all other group characteristics. In all these countries, support for a European Constitution is clear: around, or above, two-thirds of the population in Belgium, Germany (East and West) Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France support it; over 50% in Austria and Finland; and 50% in Sweden.

Therefore, positions on whether widening and deepening are complementary or rival vary widely. Citizens from the first and second enlargements (United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal) as well as the 10 NMS are not inclined to see them in terms of trade-off: percentages of support for one are similar to percentages of support for the other; whereas citizens from older member states and the Nordic 1995 enlargement tend to be sceptical and would rather sacrifice further enlargement (percentages of support for deepening are significantly higher than percentages of support for enlargement) (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Support for deepening and support for widening of the EU



Note: Missing values assigned. Cases weighted by target.

Source: EB62(2004).

¹⁵ Among newer member states, only Estonia shows a Cramer $V < 0.3$.

3. Fears of and support for deepening and widening

What are citizens' reasons for opposing either the Union's deepening or widening? To what extent do they mirror the arguments in public discourses presented above? Are fears of building Europe a reason for not supporting either an European Constitution or future enlargement? Are those who fear a transfer of jobs to other countries with lower labour costs less supportive of enlargement? Are those who fear the loss of national identity and culture, or an increase in their contributions to the Union's budget, less supportive of a European Constitution?

Tables 3 and 4 show that among citizens of older member states (EU-15) the most widely feared of perceived Europe-building consequences are the transfer of jobs to countries with lower labour costs (79%), price competition's negative impact on national agriculture (72%) and increased contributions to the EU budget (68%). Fear of an increase in crime and drug trafficking, as well as regret for the end of national currencies, rank high (66%). Among citizens of new member states (NMS, EU-10+), meanwhile, the most widespread fear concerns the possibility of an increase in drug trafficking and international crime (73%, a higher percentage than in older member states), followed by concerns similar to those expressed by citizens in older member states: the transfer of jobs (66%) and increased budget contributions (65%). However, except for worries about drugs and crime, citizens from newer member states are less worried about the negative consequences of European integration than citizens from older member states. Concerns about "losing national identities and cultures" do not figure among the causes of new member state citizens' most widely shared fears (only 34% among the NMS-10+; 45% among the EU-15); "national languages being used less and less" worries 35% of NMS-10+ citizens and 42% of EU-15 citizens. However, in other studies different aspects of this so-called 'identity dimension' has shown to play a much more relevant role (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007). We do not have data, therefore it is difficult to figure out how the perception that "cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too large" (used in EB64.2) would translate into a fear of "losing national culture and identities" or a fear of "national language being used less and less" (EB62). It is also possible that "identity" concerns increased between 2004 (EB62) and 2005 (EB64.2).

Table 3. Fears of building the EU (percentages of citizens who fear possible consequences)

	EU-15	EU-10+	CC-4
Small states' loss of power	47.6%	50.1%	45.9%
Drug trafficking and crime	66.3%	72.7%	61.4%
National language used less	42.3%	35.4%	50.6%
Paying more to the EU	68.8%	65.2%	53.2%
Losing social benefits	57.0%	44.4%	34.2%
Losing national identity-culture	44.8%	34.3%	45.6%
Economic crisis	55.9%	49.7%	38.0%
Transfer of jobs	78.8%	66.3%	51.0%
Hurting national farmers	71.9%	60.8%	58.4%
End of national currency*	66.3%	53.8%	56.1%

* Question not posed in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in columns.

Source: EB62(2004).

Table 4. Fears of building the EU, by country (percentages of citizens who fear possible consequences)

	Power small states	Drugs and crime	Language used less	Paying more	Loss social benefits	Loss nat. identity	Econ. crisis	Transfer jobs	Harm nat. farmers	End currency
BELGIUM	53.49	71.05	41.17	69.71	58.83	35.83	58.62	84.29	80.18	-
DENMARK	56.61	63.52	39.11	55.93	48.35	41.44	29.38	71.40	54.96	50.10
GERMANY WEST	19.96	71.65	43.68	70.40	61.72	36.74	55.45	86.21	69.53	-
GERMANY EAST	24.41	74.61	48.82	70.67	71.06	39.37	56.50	85.24	66.34	-
GREECE	53.10	62.20	51.30	68.00	49.50	47.90	61.00	82.90	76.90	-
SPAIN	49.56	55.72	39.39	64.32	55.52	42.03	55.13	68.52	72.92	-
FINLAND	78.61	81.89	41.89	79.60	51.54	38.31	34.73	83.58	84.48	-
FRANCE	50.10	61.96	44.61	74.51	65.49	41.57	58.53	89.41	81.67	-
IRELAND	57.60	74.40	51.00	60.10	44.90	58.90	35.70	78.80	59.40	74.00
ITALY	55.00	60.49	45.98	63.92	46.96	43.82	66.08	69.80	63.73	-
LUXEMBOURG	56.18	79.48	66.53	66.14	55.98	49.20	52.59	82.87	75.50	-
NETHERLANDS	57.58	60.26	39.35	65.41	66.50	39.25	40.83	77.70	78.59	-
AUSTRIA	51.84	74.18	35.95	73.09	59.48	44.69	58.49	79.94	67.23	-
PORTUGAL	59.50	76.20	42.60	66.10	65.90	48.40	68.40	81.30	79.90	-
SWEDEN	53.90	76.70	33.10	67.10	39.80	26.00	33.30	79.90	64.70	45.80
UNITED KINGDOM	58.75	71.61	36.30	71.41	52.23	65.68	53.02	73.29	71.02	64.79
NORTHERN IRELAND	59.20	77.93	36.45	66.22	57.53	57.19	54.52	74.25	64.21	53.18
CYPRUS (S)	47.60	81.40	43.80	66.60	43.80	47.80	75.80	59.40	81.40	47.00
CZECH REPUBLIC	61.21	75.72	44.47	62.51	45.12	39.72	53.58	74.70	77.67	55.91
ESTONIA	47.90	68.17	51.20	64.30	30.00	40.50	38.80	54.30	56.80	57.60
HUNGARY	59.07	71.50	32.35	62.92	41.91	32.94	49.51	77.32	77.71	58.68
LATVIA	46.07	72.04	49.25	75.62	39.90	42.89	55.92	55.62	75.42	58.51
LITHUANIA	36.09	69.06	44.61	53.24	31.24	40.08	39.48	49.15	55.73	47.96
MALTA	47.40	55.40	34.80	54.20	48.40	33.20	52.40	65.20	55.20	45.00
POLAND	45.80	72.20	30.00	67.00	45.00	30.20	49.00	64.10	48.30	53.70
SLOVAKIA	53.43	76.92	39.54	64.38	52.00	42.01	50.48	60.62	74.76	51.04
SLOVENIA	49.00	70.10	53.30	70.07	60.06	42.64	51.60	74.00	76.10	31.50
(Mean)	51.80	70.27	42.68	66.56	51.00	42.11	50.70	73.37	70.27	54.21

Source: EB62(2004).

According to the data in Table 6, fears related to the building of Europe are a reason to oppose both deepening and widening. But it is surprising to learn how limited their impact is. These fears are not a very important reason to oppose either deepening or widening; they explain less than 10% of the variability in support for a European Constitution and for future enlargement of the EU-25. Further analyses (whose results are not shown here) reveal that these fears are associated more with the globalisation process in general than with the process of European integration in particular. That is, these problems are not thought of as the consequences of European integration (they are thought of as consequences of globalisation), thus they do not constitute a reason for opposing European integration (deepening or widening). Moreover, it might be the case that the EU is thought of as a means of protection against the dangers posed by globalisation. In this case, we would find positive signs in the regressions shown in Table 5.

Quite interestingly, we observe that fears of jobs being transferred to other member countries do not negatively affect support for a European Constitution. To the contrary, those across the EU-15 who fear that building the EU might transfer jobs to countries with lower production costs are in fact more supportive of a European Constitution. However, among citizens from older member states, fears of job losses do have (negative) consequences on support for future enlargements.¹⁶

Table 5. Fears of building the EU and support for a European Constitution and future enlargement (logistic regression)

	Support European Constitution			Support future enlargement		
	EU-25	EU-15	EU-10+	EU-25	EU-15	EU-10+
Small states' power	-0.269***	-0.280***	-0.403***	0.282***	0.284***	-0.373***
Drugs and crime	-0.111**	-0.129**	ns	-0.280***	-0.430***	ns
Language used less	0.077*	ns	0.156*	-0.135***	-0.142***	ns
Paying more	-0.403***	-0.461***	-0.137*	-0.442***	-0.552***	ns
Loss social benefits	ns	ns	ns	-0.131***	-0.088*	ns
Loss national identity	-0.645***	-0.666***	-0.423***	-0.215***	-0.150***	-0.241***
Economic crisis	-0.146***	-0.147**	-0.131*	ns	ns	-0.316***
Transfer of jobs	0.145**	0.215***	ns	-0.423***	-0.390***	ns
National farmers	ns	ns	-0.237**	-0.036***	ns	-0.192**
End nat. currency	-0.17***6	-0.208***	ns	-0.456***	-0.460***	ns
Constant	2.146***	2.112***	2.276***	1.666***	1.514***	2.204***
R square Nagelkerke	.062	.067	.041	.095	.102	.039
N	23796	14469	9327	2376	14469	9327

* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level.

Notes: Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in columns. Cell entries are beta coefficients of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable within the same regression.

Source: EB62(2004).

A number of feared consequences have a negative impact on support for enlargement only among citizens from the EU-15: increase in drug trafficking and international crime, decrease in national language use, increase in national contributions to the EU, loss of social benefits and jobs transferred to member countries with lower labour costs. On the other hand, fears of an economic crisis and of national farmers suffering economically have a negative impact on

¹⁶ This could mean citizens perceive that having a constitution might help member states counter delocalisation effects, or, alternatively, that they are willing to accept losing jobs to new member states as part of the price of political union. Unfortunately, available data cannot settle this question.

support for future enlargements only among EU-10+ citizens. Among the variables with a negative impact are those related to identity fears, although their contribution is modest compared to the impact of the so-called ‘identity dimension’ on citizen opposition to Turkey’s membership in particular (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007). Divergences in the items used in different surveys make it quite difficult to explain our general finding on reasons for opposing further enlargement in general (using EB62) relative to our finding on reasons for opposing Turkey’s membership in particular (using EB64.2). However, in a broad sense, our results are not contradictory. Regarding Turkey, we hypothesised that the “more the identity dimension figures in public debate...the more probable it is that support will be low”, according to which our finding indicates that identity-related fears were not very strong or widely shared; from that point of view, if those fears increase, we can further hypothesise that negative attitudes towards Turkey’s accession could even worsen. It is not surprising either that the ‘identity dimension’ will be more salient when interviewees are confronted with a specific country (particularly in the case of Turkey, which is more or less well known by all of them) than when they are asked in an abstract way (without a clear cultural reference) about further enlargement.

Summarising the findings in Table 5, fears of what the building of the EU might entail have a greater impact on widening (support for enlargement) than on deepening (support for a European Constitution). Older member states, however, are unique in that fears of the consequences of integration lead their citizens to support more integration and to be more opposed to further expansion.

This is congruent with the hypothesis that the idea of a trade-off between these two policies was shared by a higher percentage of citizens only among older member states. In fact, when the variable “country” is introduced into the model, it becomes a key to explaining citizen support for deepening and widening.¹⁷ Therefore, we have run different regressions in each country to test the effect of fears on national support for a European Constitution and future enlargements (Tables 6 and 7).

Table 6 shows the results regarding support for a European Constitution. The fear of small states losing power is the variable that most negatively affects support for a European Constitution in a group of nine countries, both older and newer member states, most of which are small.¹⁸ Fears of paying more to the Union have a negative impact on eight countries, seven of them older member states.¹⁹ A similar effect is observed in relation to fears of losing social benefits, which has a significant impact in eight countries, six of them older member states.²⁰ In a similar way, fears of an economic crisis are significant in seven countries, only one of them a newer member state.²¹

¹⁷ Now, in older member states (EU-15), the model explains 13% of the variance in support for a European Constitution and 20% of the variance in support for future enlargements. In newer member states (EU-10+) the variance explained an increase to 8% regarding support for a European Constitution and 7% regarding support for enlargement.

¹⁸ Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Estonia are the small countries and the Czech Republic is a medium size country.

¹⁹ Belgium, Greece, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are the older member states, and the Czech Republic is a newer one.

²⁰ Denmark, Germany East, Greece, Austria, Portugal and Sweden are the older member states, and the Czech Republic and Malta are the newer member states.

²¹ Germany West, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland and Austria are the older member states and the Czech Republic is the newer one.

Table 6. Fears of building the EU and support for a European Constitution, by country (Beta coefficients of logistic regressions; read in files; independent variables in columns)

	Small states	Drugs/crime	Language	Paying more	Social benefits	Nat. identity	Econ. crisis	Transfer jobs	Farmers	Nat. currency
BELGIUM ¹	ns	ns	ns	-.621*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
DENMARK ²	-.606*	ns	ns	ns	-.555***	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
GERMANY W. ³	ns	ns	-.464*	ns	ns	-.497	-.811***	+.640*	ns	ni
GERMANY E. ⁴	ns	-.931*	ns	ns	+.801	-.686	ns	ns	ns	ni
GREECE ⁵	ns	ns	ns	-.535*	-.449*	ns	-.727***	ns	-.527	ni
SPAIN ⁶	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.656**	+.483*	ns	ni
FINLAND ⁷	-.521**	ns	ns	-.317*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
FRANCE ⁸	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.778***	-.570**	ns	ns	ni
IRELAND ⁹	-.386*	+.603**	ns	ns	ns	ns	+.423*	ns	ns	ni
ITALY ¹⁰	ns	ns	ns	-.656**	ns	ns	ns	+.548**	ns	ni
LUXEMBOURG ¹¹	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	ni
NETHERLANDS ¹²	-.350*	ns	ns	-.459*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
AUSTRIA ¹³	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.650*	ns	-.658	ns	ns	ni
PORTUGAL ¹⁴	ns	ns	-.460	ns	-.772**	ns	ns	-.871**	+.856**	ni
SWEDEN ¹⁵	-.463**	ns	+.537**	-.459*	-.589***	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
UK ⁶	ns	ns	ns	-.864***	ns	-.518**	ns	ns	ns	-.739***
N. IRELAND ¹⁷	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
CYPRUS ¹⁸	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-1.069*	ns	ns	ns	-.743**
CZECH REP.C ¹⁹	-.557**	ns	ns	ns	-.339*	-.666***	ns	ns	ns	ns
ESTONIA ²⁰	-.532**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.653**	ns	ns	ns
HUNGARY ²¹	ns	-.438*	ns	-.473*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
LATVIA ²²	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.434*
LITHUANIA ²³	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALTA ²⁴	-.682*	ns	-.597*	ns	-.929**	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.759
POLAND ²⁵	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
SLOVAKIA ²⁶	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SLOVENIA ²⁷	-.593*	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.772**	ns	ns	ns	ns

1. R square Nagelkerke = 0.76. N = 974. Constant 2.747***.

2. R square Nagelkerke = 0.172. N = 1028. Constant 1.416***.

3. R square Nagelkerke = 0.115. N = 1037. Constant 2.468***.

4. R square Nagelkerke = 0.100. N = 508. Constant 2.898***.

5. R square Nagelkerke = 0.120. N = 1000. Constant 2.482***.

6. R square Nagelkerke = 0.044. N = 1023. Constant 1.923***.

7. R square Nagelkerke = 0.029. N = 1005. Constant 1.037***.

8. R square Nagelkerke = 0.088. N = 1020. Constant 2.381***.

9. R square Nagelkerke = 0.046. N = 1000. Constant 2.001***.

10. R square Nagelkerke = 0.051. N = 1020. Constant 1.773***.

11. N = 502. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%.

12. R square Nagelkerke = 0.053. N = 1009. Constant 2.349***.

13. R square Nagelkerke = 0.067. N = 1007. Constant 1.875***.

14. R square Nagelkerke = 0.065. N = 1000. Constant 2.049***.

15. R square Nagelkerke = 0.114. N = 1000. Constant 1.427***.

16. R square Nagelkerke = 0.160. N = 1001. Constant 2.031***.

17. R square Nagelkerke = 0.156. N = 299. Constant 3.002***.

- ^{18.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.132. N = 500. Constant 3.186***.*
^{19.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.060. N = 1069. Constant 1.469***.*
^{20.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.057. N = 1000. Constant 2.138***.*
^{21.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.062. N = 1014. Constant 1.709***.*
^{22.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.045. N = 1005. Constant 2.292***.*
^{23.} *N = 1002. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%.*
^{24.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.292. N = 500. Constant 2.645***.*
^{25.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.0r0. N = 1000. Constant 2.602***.*
^{26.} *N = 1237. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%.*
^{27.} *R square Nagelkerke = 0.059. N = 1000. Constant 2.567***.*

* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level.

Notes: Missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target.

Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable within the same regression.

Source: EB62(2004).

Table 7 shows that the configuration of fears that have an impact on support for enlargement is different across countries. Among the variables that show a negative impact on support for future enlargement in a higher number of EU countries, we find the fear of increased contributions to the EU budget. The negative impact occurs exclusively among older member states, and it is a recurrent subject of argument among all net contributors to the EU budget.²² Out of eight countries in which there is a significant negative impact, only Greece and Finland are not net contributors. Fears of jobs being transferred to other member countries with lower labour costs also have a negative impact in more older member states (five)²³ than newer ones (only Hungary). Two factors that exert an impact on many countries include the fear of losing social benefits and fears of an increase in drug trafficking and international crime. Though we found some newer member states in this group (Malta and Slovenia), the negative impact on support for enlargement of social or welfare concerns is most widespread in older member states.²⁴ Fears of small states losing power and fear of losing national identity and culture have an impact on as many older as newer member states.

It is possible that some negative expectations about the future are accepted as events that will happen no matter what policies the EU follows; therefore, they are not grounds for opposing either deepening or widening (unless, of course, one does not support the concept of an EU at all). As already said, some fears are associated more with the globalisation process in general than with the process of European integration in particular. That is, these problems are not thought of as the consequences of the process of European integration (they are thought of as a consequence of globalisation), therefore they do not constitute a valid reason for opposing European integration (deepening or widening). It might even be the case that the EU is thought of as a protective influence against dangers posed by the globalisation process. This would explain both the little explicative power of fears over support for deepening and widening and several of the positive signs in the regressions.

²² United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.

²³ Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Austria.

²⁴ Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Northern Ireland.

Table 7. Fears of building the EU and support for future enlargements, by country (Beta coefficients of logistic regressions; read in files; independent variables in columns)

	Small states	Drugs/crime	Language	Paying more	Social benefits	Nat. identity	Econ. crisis	Transfer jobs	Farmers	Nat. currency
BELGIUM ¹	-.494***	-.397*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.459*	ns	ns
DENMARK ²	-.391**	-.479**	-.479**	-.525**	ns	ns	ns	-.482	ns	ns
GERMANY W. ³	+.438*	-.424**	-.438**	-.628***	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
GERMANY E. ⁴	ns	ns	ns	-.760**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
GREECE ⁵	ns	ns	ns	-.636**	ns	ns	-.528**	ns	ns	ni
SPAIN ⁶	ns	-.578**	-.495*	ns	+.518**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
FINLAND ⁷	ns	ns	ns	-.551**	-.571***	+.525**	ns	ns	ns	ni
FRANCE ⁸	ns	-.657***	ns	-.504**	ns	-.388*	ns	-.809**	ns	ni
IRELAND ⁹	ns	+.373*	-.363**	ns	-.534**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
ITALY ¹⁰	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
LUXEMBOURG ¹¹	ns	-.712**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ni
NETHERLANDS ¹²	-.351*	ns	ns	-.796***	-.310*	ns	ns	-.494**	ns	ni
AUSTRIA ¹³	ns	ns	ns	-.756**	ns	ns	ns	-.645**	-.508*	ni
PORTUGAL ¹⁴	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.482**	-.503**	ns	ns	+.452*	ni
SWEDEN ¹⁵	ns	-.579***	ns	-.410*	-.348*	-.363*	ns	ns	ns	ns
UNITED KINGDOM ¹⁶	ns	ns	ns	1.036**	ns	-.491**	ns	ns	ns	-.541**
N. IRELAND ¹⁷	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.1081**	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.776*
CYPRUS ¹⁸	ns	ns	ns	ns	+.673**	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.677**
CZECH REP.C ¹⁹	ns	ns	-.464**	ns	ns	-.339**	ns	ns	ns	ns
ESTONIA ²⁰	-.714***	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
HUNGARY ²¹	-.384*	-.511**	ns	ns	ns	-.388	-.670***	-.676**	ns	ns
LATVIA ²²	-.439**	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.460*	ns	ns	ns
LITHUANIA ²³	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALTA ²⁴	ns	-.629*	ns	ns	-.683*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
POLAND ²⁵	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SLOVAKIA ²⁶	-.533**	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.361*	-.338*	ns	ns	ns
SLOVENIA ²⁷	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.447	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.359*

1. R square Nagelkerke = 0.077. N = 974. Constant 1.322***.

2. R square Nagelkerke = 0.172. N = 1028. Constant 1.288***.

3. R square Nagelkerke = 0.107. N = 1037. Constant 0.628**.

4. R square Nagelkerke = 0.125. N = 508. Constant 0.935**.

5. R square Nagelkerke = 0.101. N = 1000. Constant 1.082***.

6. R square Nagelkerke = 0.055. N = 1023. Constant 1.671***.

7. R square Nagelkerke = 0.073. N = 1005. Constant 0.676***.

8. R square Nagelkerke = 0.139. N = 1020. Constant 1.350***.

9. R square Nagelkerke = 0.058. N = 1000. Constant 1.171***.

10. R square Nagelkerke = 0.026. N = 1020. Constant 1.186***.

11. R square Nagelkerke = 0.094. N = 502. Constant 1.166***.

12. R square Nagelkerke = 0.142. N = 1009. Constant 1.782***.

13. R square Nagelkerke = 0.130. N = 1007. Constant 0.676***.

14. R square Nagelkerke = 0.053. N = 1000. Constant 0.938***.

15. R square Nagelkerke = 0.104. N = 1000. Constant 1.020***.

16. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.180. N = 1011. Constant 1.904***.*
 17. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.127. N = 299. Constant 2.223***.*
 18. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.062. N = 500. Constant 1.386***.*
 19. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.034. N = 1069. Constant 1.405***.*
 20. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.071. N = 1000. Constant 1.812***.*
 21. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.146. N = 1014. Constant 2.652***.*
 22. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.037. N = 1005. Constant 1.213***.*
 23. *N = 1002. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%.*
 24. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.179. N = 500. Constant 2.539***.*
 25. *N = 1000. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%.*
 26. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.056. N = 1237. Constant 1.973***.*
 27. *R square Nagelkerke = 0.041. N = 1000. Constant 2.062***.*

* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level.

Missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target.

Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable within the same regression.

Source: EB62(2004).

A comparison of the effects of independent variables (fears of building the EU) shows that the fear of paying more to the EU budget affects citizen support both for a European Constitution and for further enlargement to a much greater degree among older member states than among newer member states. Also, while the fear of jobs being transferred to other countries has a negative impact on support for future enlargements in older member states, it also has a positive impact on support for a European Constitution in those same states. Fears of an increase in drug trafficking and international crime affect citizens' support for enlargement in more countries than those in which they affect support for a European Constitution.

4. Fears and trade-offs: The gap between elite and public opinion

Having established the impact of fears on support for the processes of deepening and widening, we explore now their effects on the perception of trade-offs between these two European policies. Although the perception of a trade-off between deepening and widening is not prevalent among citizens in EU-25 member states, such a trade-off is still perceived by more than one-third of the population in older member states and more than one-fifth in newer member states (see Table 9). This last section tries to explore the factors that make citizens prefer deepening over widening.

As can be seen in Table 8, there are great differences between older and newer member states in relation to the number of citizens who support both, one or none of these two European policies of deepening and widening. Among citizens of both older and newer member states, most support both a European Constitution and future enlargement, but the percentage is much higher in newer member states. This difference is explained by the higher percentage of citizens in older member states (30%) who support a European Constitution but not further enlargement. As we have already mentioned, the tension among these two policies is more apparent among citizens from older member states: one out of three citizens in these countries prefer a constitution over enlargement.²⁵

²⁵ Congruent with the findings above, the greatest percentages are represented by citizens who support a European Constitution and future enlargement at the same time, both within the EU-15 as well as the EU-10+.

Table 8. Trade-off between a European Constitution and future enlargement (percentage of citizens who choose different combinations)

	Constitution and enlargement	No constitution and no enlargement	Constitution exclusively	Enlargement exclusively
EU-25	51.3%	14.1%	27.2%	7.5%
EU-15	47.3%	15.6%	30.3%	6.7%
EU-10+	71.3%	6.3%	11.2%	11.2%

Notes: Missing values assigned. Cases weighted as indicated in rows.

Source: EB62 (2004).

The following analysis compares the group of citizens who prefer the constitution over enlargement with those who prefer enlargement over the constitution (Table 9). A dummy variable, value 1, is assigned to those who express their preference for the constitution over enlargement, and another, 0, to those who prefer enlargement over the constitution. All other citizens are excluded from the analysis at this stage. Fears of building the EU remain independent variables, but we also introduce socio-demographic variables (ideology, involvement in political discussions, education, sex/gender, age, professional situation and size of habitat), and other variables regarding general attitudes towards, attachment to and knowledge about the EU. These variables are included as control variables (though we are still interested mainly in the effects of fears). Introducing these three subsets of variables (socio-demographic, European attitudes and fears), we are able to explain 17% of the variance in preference for deepening over widening in older member states, and 13% in newer member states.

Table 9. Explaining preference for a European Constitution over future enlargement (dependent variable) (beta coefficients and odds ratios of logistic regression)

	EU-25		EU-15		EU-10+	
	Beta	Exp(B)	Beta	Exp(B)	Beta	Exp(B)
Discuss political matters (ref. never)						
Frequently	0.430***	1.537	0.535**	1.708	0.476*	1.609
Occasionally	0.478***	1.613	0.463***	1.588	0.453**	1.573
Satisfaction with life (not at all satisfied)						
Very satisfied	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Fairly satisfied	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Not very satisfied	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Optimism re: the future (ref. get worse)						
Improve	-0.429***	0.651	-0.626***	0.535	ns	
Stay about the same	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Membership a good thing (ref. good)						
Bad	0.209*	1.232	ns	ns	ns	ns
Neither good nor bad	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Trust national government (ref. trust)						
Don't trust	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Don't know	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Trust the EU (ref. trust)						
Don't trust	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Don't know	-0.402**	0.669	-0.558***	0.573	ns	ns
For/against political union (ref. for)						
Don't know	-0.180*	0.835	-0.239*	0.787	ns	ns
Against	-0.274*	0.760	ns	ns	ns	ns
Understand EU works (ref. understand)						
Don't know	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Don't understand	0.676***	1.965	1.039***	2.827	ns	ns

Knowledge about EU (inc. 1-10)	0.045*	1.046	ns	ns	ns	ns
Attachment to nation (dec. 1-4)	ns	ns	ns	ns	0.330**	1.391
Attachment to EU (dec. 1-4)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	Ns
Ideology (left-right. 1-10)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Age education ended	ns	ns	ns	ns	-0.081***	0.922
Sex (1. male; 0. female)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	Ns
Age (years)	0.007*	1.007	ns	ns	ns	ns
Profession (ref. student)						
Self-employed	0.782**	2.185	0.853*	2.346	ns	Ns
Manager	0.871**	2.390	0.915**	2.498	1.650*	5.205
Other white-collar	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
House person	ns	ns	ns	ns	2.302**	9.992
Unemployed	0.569*	1.766	ns	ns	ns	ns
Retired	ns		ns	ns	ns	ns
Size habitat (ref. large town)						
Rural area	0.190*	1.210	0.322*	1.380	ns	ns
Medium size town	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Small states losing power	-0.624***	0.536	-0.665***	0.514	0.585***	1.796
Drug trafficking and crime	0.211*	1.235	0.374***	1.454	ns	ns
Nat. language used less	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Paying more	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Loss of social benefits	0.317***	1.373	0.335**	1.397	ns	ns
Loss of national identity and culture	-0.245**	0.783	-0.384***	0.681	ns	ns
Economic crisis	0.254**	1.289	0.239*	1.270	0.433**	1.543
Transfer jobs	0.695***	2.005	0.658***	1.930	ns	
Farmers	ns	ns	ns	ns	-0.326*	0.722
End of national currency	0.676***	1.966	0.681***	1.975	ns	ns
Constant	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
N	5190	-	3886	-	1304	-
R square Nagelkerke	0.145	-	0.172	-	0.128	-

Notes: Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in columns.

Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions and transformed odds ratios [exp(b)]. Values of beta coefficients are not comparable within the same regression; the size of odds ratio can be compared.

Source: EB62 (2004).

If we focus on fears among EU-15 citizens, those who fear an increase in drug trafficking and international crime, those who fear an erosion of the welfare state, an economic crisis and the transfer of jobs to other member countries, and those who regret the elimination of the national currency are more likely to prefer a European constitution over future enlargements. Those who fear that small states would lose power and those who fear a loss of national identity and culture, meanwhile, are more likely to prefer widening over deepening. This last finding is quite interesting and suggests a rarely considered explanation: is it integration (deepening) that is believed to jeopardise cultural diversity, and not enlargement (widening) which would secure it. This is perhaps an astonishing finding, and one that seems to be in clear contradiction with our conclusions regarding support for Turkey's membership (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007). In the case of Turkey, the perception that the country still exhibited too many cultural differences with the EU was negatively correlated with support for Turkish accession. Our difficulty here is to establish the connection between the perception of these cultural differences and EU citizens' fears of losing national identities and cultures. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that our findings in this study show that these fears are negatively correlated with support for future enlargement (as in the case of Turkey) and positively correlated with the preference for deepening over widening (a composed variable that only applies to a sub-group of

interviewees). Thus, although the perception of cultural differences between the EU and enlargement countries will have a negative effect on public support for specific candidates, that perception does not automatically translate into fears of losing national identities and cultures as the consequences of those entries.

Among NMS-10+ citizens, on one hand, the fear that small states would lose power and the fear of an economic crisis contribute to a preference for a European constitution over future enlargements. On the other hand, those citizens who fear for the well-being of national agriculture are more likely to support enlargement than a constitution.

It is true that in a number of older member states, in which elites speak clearly of a trade-off between deepening and widening, we have also observed some tensions among citizens regarding these two policies. But our findings far from confirm the existence of this trade-off in the eyes of citizens. Even in countries like the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, France, Germany or Austria, there is a statistically significant positive relationship in public opinion between deepening and widening: more than 40% of their citizens who support an EU constitution also support future enlargements. In fact, the best predictor in older and newer member states to know whether a citizen is in favour or against an EU constitution is to know whether he/she is for or against enlargement. Those who do not support enlargement are also less likely to support an EU constitution. Only in a few countries have we found that the percentage of those who support a constitution but oppose enlargement is (slightly) higher than the percentage of those who support both a constitution and enlargement. The difference between these two percentages ranges from between 4 points in Luxembourg to 13 in Germany West (5 points in France, 6 in Germany East and 10 in Austria). This difference is just too small to talk of a generalised sense of trade-off between deepening and widening in these countries. Moreover, it is too small, in quite a small subset of countries, to talk about a generalised sense of trade-off among European member states. Even in older member states only around one-third of the population perceived this trade-off (percentages are lower within the EU-25 or NMS-10+); meanwhile, more than one-half, even in older member states, sees both policies as rather compatible.

A first conclusion to draw from these findings is that the feeling of a trade-off between deepening and widening in public opinion is weak. Thus it is not popular pressure or the desire to satisfy popular demand that is driving elites, especially in older member states, to present such a discourse about trade-offs. In other words, public opinion is not constraining elites and forcing them to choose. Whereas elites have their own assumptions, fears and reasons to understand both processes as incompatible, these are not necessarily shared by ordinary citizens. In fact, despite the claims of interested policy-makers, we can affirm that public opinion does not per se oppose further deepening and widening. If and when deepening and widening are in trouble, we conclude, this reflects elite more than popular preoccupations.

Regarding fears of building the EU and their impact on citizen support for deepening and widening, it is interesting to point out that citizens share the elites' fears (increasing contributions to the EU budget, relocation of business, etc.) and that these fears have shown a statistically significant, although quite small, negative impact on support for future enlargements. However, contrary to expectations based on elite discourses and attitudes, we have found that among citizens these fears also have a negative impact on support for a constitution. We can thus conclude that fears of what building the EU would bring are not a compelling reason to prefer deepening over widening. However, delving deeper in our analysis, it can be seen that a larger number of fears are shared by citizens in a larger number of older member states, which also results in a negative impact on support for enlargement. In fact, there are more fears that have a negative impact on enlargement than there are that have a negative impact on deepening. And although fears have a similar negative impact on deepening and

widening, the fear of a transfer of jobs to other member countries has a positive impact on support for a constitution and a negative one on support for widening.

When it comes to establishing the research agenda based on these preliminary findings, we might argue for a shift in focus from explaining why and how deepening and widening are incompatible to focusing on why and how, given their complementarity, these two policies can reinforce each other. There are several lines of analysis worth pursuing. First, lessons might be learned about what citizens demand from the EU in terms of specific policies; that is, what kind of policies are demanded by citizens who share specific fears as compared to those who do not share the same fears? Second, it would be interesting to carry out an aggregated analysis at the country level, taking into account information such as percentages of unemployment, payments to the EU, GDP increases, balance of payments, percentage and origin of immigrant population, etc. Third, we will need to analyse mass media in order to reveal their portraits of public attitudes toward deepening and widening. Our hypothesis is that elites might use the manipulability of perception of mass collectives to pursue their goals (Mutz, 1998: 13), and that mass media will thus reflect the idea of a more generalised feeling of a trade-off than our data have shown. It will also be interesting to compare citizens' attitudes toward the 2004 enlargement with their attitudes toward future enlargements: Has support decreased? Were fears less pronounced regarding the 2004 enlargement?

Conclusions

Main findings

First, we find a strong positive correlation between preferences for deepening and preferences for widening. This means that those who favour deepening tend also to favour widening, and that those who are against deepening tend to also be against widening. Those who are in favour of further integration but want no further enlargement and those who are in favour of further enlargement but want no further integration are a minority. Thus the perception of a trade-off between deepening and widening, which seems so widespread among political elites and key opinion-makers, is not as widely shared as one would tend to believe. The best predictor, in both older and newer member states, of whether a citizen is in favour of further integration is whether he/she is in favour of enlargement. Conversely, those who do not support enlargement are also likely to be against a European Constitution.

Our finding is congruent with other empirical studies (Karp and Bowler, 2006; Sánchez-Cuenca and Fernández-Albertos, 2005) that show that there is a strong correlation between preferences for deepening and widening. If and when support for enlargement is a function of support for integration, it is no wonder that support for enlargement has declined since 2000: as support for European integration in general has declined, so has support for a particular aspect of it (enlargement).

The fact that many Europeans consider enlargement as a part of the integration process, and not as an exogenous element to it, might have important analytical and policy consequences. On the one hand, it justifies considering that the "No" votes in the French and Dutch referenda were not directly caused by negative attitudes towards enlargement. On the other hand, whereas the recent turn in enlargement policy has been based on the argument that in order to rescue the integration process, the EU needs to put a halt to enlargement, our findings allow for a different hypothesis, namely that support for further enlargement will grow once the integration process is back on track. Therefore, to the extent to which enlargement is not the cause of the present low levels of support for European integration, removing this element will not have a direct effect on building support for European integration.

Second, we find exceptions to the general rule (the positive correlation between deepening and widening) in four countries: Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and France. Here, the positive correlation still holds (with 40% of those who support further integration being also in favour of further enlargement), but there are significant tensions among supporters of further integration over whether the EU should enlarge. Those who see a trade-off between deepening and widening are clearly concentrated in the EEC-6 countries with the exception of Austria. In contrast, citizens from late-comer countries (again, with the exception of Austria) tend to be more positive and optimistic about the compatibility of deepening and widening. These ‘hesitant Europeans’, to use the expression coined by Karp and Bowler (2006), tend to live in founding member states: according to our data, one-third of EU founding member state citizens consider that there is a trade-off between deepening and widening, compared to only one-fifth in newer member states. The more Europeanist citizens of older member states are in fact those who are most wary of further enlargement.

Third, after exploring whether citizens’ fears (of crime, unemployment, immigration, loss of sovereignty, etc.) explain attitudes against a Constitution or further enlargement, we find that these have a greater impact on support for enlargement than on support for integration. In particular, fears of job losses negatively affect support for enlargement among EEC-6 member states. This means that many citizens still see further integration as the adequate response to their fears, but that they worry that an expanded EU might not be able to efficiently tackle these issues. Parallel to this, we also find that fears of losing sovereignty, paying more to the budget and losing social benefits are key to explaining negative attitudes towards integration, especially in older member states. We thus find that fears play a role but that they can negatively affect deepening as well as widening. In other words, while these fears exist, it cannot be easily seen how much more or less deepening and widening they imply.

We conclude by suggesting that the widespread negative consensus on enlargement found at the elite level might not necessarily have a correlate at the public level. Beliefs in the existence of a trade-off between deepening and widening, which are only apparent in a limited number of (founding) countries – and even there shared only by a minority of citizens (one-third) – might thus be more qualified than usually acknowledged. It is true that support for enlargement has consistently declined since the beginning of the decade. However, we see strong indicators suggesting that this is a consequence of a parallel decline in support for integration, not necessarily a cause of it. Therefore, whereas recent EU enlargement policy changes, which have made it more restrictive, have been justified on the grounds of needing to relieve the public’s discomfort with existing enlargement policy, we wonder both whether this change was justified and whether it will have a marked impact on increasing support for integration.

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Appendix I. Methodological note

For this analysis we used 2004 post-enlargement Eurobarometer 62.0 (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm).

Countries	Institutes	N° Interviews	Fieldwork dates	Population 15+
Austria	Österreichisches Gallup-Institute	1,007	11-10/07-11/2004	6,679,444
Belgium	TNS Dimarso	974	08-10/08-11/2004	8,598,982
Denmark	TNS Gallup DK	1,028	06-10/08-11/2004	4,380,062
France	TNS Sofres	1,020	14-10/30-10/2004	44,010,619
Finland	TNS Gallup OY	1,005	10-10/04-11/2004	4,279,286
Germany (East)	TNS Infratest	508	11-10/27-10/2004	12,802,222
Germany (West)	TNS Infratest	1,037	08-10/27-10/2004	51,372,073
Greece	TNS ICAP	1,000	11-10/31-10/2004	8,674,230
United Kingdom	TNS UK	1310	05-10/08-11/2004	46,371,359
Ireland	TNS MRBI	1,000	08-10/08-11/2004	3,089,775
Italy	TNS Abacus	1,020	11-10/01-11/2004	49,208,000
Luxembourg	TNS ILReS	502	05-10/26-10/2004	367,199
Netherlands	TNS NIPO	1,009	07-10/04-11/2004	13,242,328
Portugal	TNS EUROTESTE	1,000	02-10/01-11/2004	8,080,915
Spain	TNS Demoscopia	1,023	06-10/27-10/2004	35,882,820
Sweden	TNS GALLUP	1,000	02-10/01-11/2004	7,376,680
Cyprus (South)	Synovate	500	10-10/31-10/2004	552,213
Czech Republic	TNS Aisa	1,075	15-10/30-10/2004	8,571,710
Estonia	Emor	1,000	08-10/28-10/2004	887,094
Hungary	TNS Hungary	1,014	10-10/28-10/2004	8,503,379
Latvia	TNS Baltic Data House	1,005	12-10/03-11/2004	1,394,351
Lithuania	TNS Gallup Lithuania	1,002	10-10/30-10/2004	2,803,661
Malta	MISCO	500	03-10/22-10/2004	322,917
Poland	TNS OBOP	1,000	16-10/03-11/2004	31,610,437
Slovakia	TNS AISA SK	1,252	02-10/30-10/2004	4,316,438
Slovenia	RM PLUS	1,000	19-10/05-11/2004	1,663,869
Bulgaria	TNS BBSS	1,004	12-10/24-10/2004	6,695,512
Romania	TNS CSOP	1,012	14-10/27-10/2004	18,145,036
Turkey	TNS PIAR	1,027	09-10/26-10/2004	47,583,830
Croatia	PULS	1,000	14-10/03-11/2004	3,682,826
Cyprus (North)	KADEM	500	15-10/28-10/2004	157,101

For our dependent variables (support for an EU constitution and support for enlargement), as well as fears of building the EU, we considered those who did not answer as missing values, and recoded the variables as 1 (support for a European Constitution, support for future enlargement, currently afraid of), or 0 (against a Constitution or enlargement and currently not afraid of). Then we assigned values to missing data using linear interpolation. The resulting values between 0.00 and 0.50 were codified as 0; values between 0.51 and 1 were codified as 1.

The attribution of values to missing data does not significantly change results. We have run the analysis with and without attribution, observing a minimum impact on the size of coefficients and no change at all in signs. Only on rare occasions did some coefficients that were close to, but below, statistical significance become significant.

We use weights when appropriate and indicate it in our results.

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- To hold **meetings** in the member states and candidate countries and further meetings in Brussels offering different national views of the debate, involving a range of different civil society actors as well as policy-makers, analysts and commentators.
- To develop **interaction, contacts and exchange of information** and analysis across the members of the network.
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