CEPS World Economic Forum Feed

Globalising FP10: better engagement with associated and low- and middle-income countries

2026-04-23T13:12:50+01:00

The EU is currently designing its tenth Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP10), the successor to Horizon Europe, against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tension and a renewed focus on industrial competitiveness. The programme’s reach has transitioned from a European arrangement to a global network, placing the EU at a strategic crossroads. Association has proven mutually beneficial, fostering scientific excellence and soft power; yet, the current proposed programme gives the impression that it will be less open to non-EU countries, as the narrative of tackling global challenges seems overshadowed by the drive to strengthen the EU as a competitive power. To ensure FP10’s success, this analysis suggests moving away from an EU-centric narrative, which risks alienating global partners. Instead, this report advocates for a 'Team World' approach that integrates Associated Countries into governance and prioritises joint missions on climate and health. Key recommendations include establishing stable, predictable association models from the outset, adopting risk-based security rules for dual-use technologies, and empowering LMIC partners through leadership roles rather than symbolic consultation. In short, FP10 must adopt international collaboration as a core strategy to amplify European influence and tackle global challenges effectively.

Policy options to create lead markets for clean, sustainable and circular feedstocks in the chemical industry

2026-04-21T08:54:29+01:00

Reaching the EU’s climate targets requires cutting emissions across its entire economy. While low-carbon energy and notably electrification can significantly reduce emissions in many sectors, the chemical industry faces a specific challenge: Around half of its emissions arise from industrial processes linked to chemical reactions and feedstock use. For chemical products, carbon is, and will remain, an essential building block – yet more than 90 % of it is currently fossil-based. Defossilising feedstock requires a fundamental transformation of the industry’s value chains, i.e. a (gradual) shift towards alternative carbon sources such as sustainable biomass, recycling and captured CO₂. This CEPS report examines alternative carbon pathways from both a technological and a market perspective, with a particular focus on both methodological and policy frameworks required to make this transformation happen. To contribute to this debate, the report reviews a range of policy options to generate demand for alternative carbon sources currently under discussion for the chemical industry, including voluntary labelling, public procurement and mandatory targets as well as certification or credit-based mechanisms. The analysis suggests that no single policy instrument is likely to be sufficient on its own to drive the transition. Instead, a mix of measures will be needed to incentivise investment in alternative carbon pathways at scale, with scope to become more stringent or be complemented by additional tools over time. Without robust market signals, for example in the form of a lead market framework, the transformation towards defossilised feedstock will not happen – putting the translation of European technological leadership into investment and scale up at risk.

Study supporting the evaluation of the EU Executive Agencies

2026-04-16T14:00:33+01:00

According to Article 25 of Council Regulation laying down the statute for the executive agencies, an external evaluation of how each agency operates must be carried out every three years. This report presents the findings of the cross-analysis of external evaluations of six EU executive agencies for the 2021-24 period: the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA), the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), the European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA), the European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA), the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA), and the European Research Executive Agency (REA). The study examines whether the executive agencies met their operational objectives, how efficiently they used their resources, and how aligned their activities were with institutional goals. It also evaluates the agencies’ interaction with their parent Directorates-General and the coherence of their programme portfolio. The study doesn't consider results and outcomes of managed projects, or programme results, which are subject to a separate programme evaluation cycle. This independent expert report was produced for the European Commission's DG Research and Innovation. CEPS’ contributed to the cross-sectional report by drawing on findings across the executive agencies, with a focus on effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. The study was originally published here.

Private credit’s liquidity façade is beginning to fracture

2026-04-16T09:44:06+01:00

The recent string of withdrawal limits in private credit shouldn’t be waved away as a US-only sideshow. Over just a few weeks, BlackRock restricted withdrawals from one private credit fund; Blackstone flagged unusually elevated redemption requests at BCRED; Blue Owl paused redemptions in a vehicle; and this week both Apollo and Ares limited quarterly withdrawals to 5% after investors sought to redeem more than 11% of assets.

This isn’t a full-blown systemic event – yet. Still, it’s a pointed reminder that segments of private credit are running into an old constraint: assets that don’t trade easily don’t become liquid simply because a fund wrapper offers periodic exits.

Securitisation is back on the agenda. The question is whether the EU will use it properly

2026-04-15T13:43:01+01:00

Brussels is no longer asking whether securitisation should return – that question has already been answered. The European Commission tabled reform, the Council has agreed its position, and the European Parliament is shaping its own. The real question now is whether the EU will use this moment to build a better market or settle for a technical clean-up of an underused one.

The timing isn’t accidental. The revival of securitisation sits at the heart of the Savings and Investments Union (SIU), the EU’s attempt to mobilise private capital at scale. The logic is straightforward: Europe doesn’t lack savings. It lacks efficient channels to turn those savings into productive investment.

That gap is especially visible in credit markets, where the EU remains heavily dependent on bank balance sheets to finance households, small businesses and infrastructure. As capital requirements tighten, risks become more complex, and investment needs continue to rise, that model is coming under growing strain.

This ECMI Commentary summarises the key findings of a longer report which you can find here.

Leaving coal behind: international carbon credits under the EU’s 2040 climate target

2026-04-15T10:52:00+01:00

With the EU’s 2040 climate target, the emerging role of international carbon credits raises important policy choices. They could remain a limited flexibility mechanism or become a key component of the EU’s external partnerships. Taking a strategic approach to international carbon credits could help align the EU’s own climate ambitions and broader economic and geopolitical interests while supporting the overall global clean transition. As part of such an approach, the EU should consider a range of carbon crediting mechanisms, aligned with partner countries’ transition needs. Coal is still a major source of emissions in many emerging and developing economies, where fiscal constraints and high capital costs are slowing the shift to clean energy. To address this, carbon credits (or ‘transition credits’) linked to retiring coal-fired power plants early could be one option among a wider set of possible solutions, provided they ensure high environmental integrity. International carbon credits – potentially including transition credits – could be sourced for the EU’s post-2036 framework through strategic partnerships. Embedded within broader cooperation agreements, such as Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships, they could combine finance, technical cooperation and market access to support the clean transition – in both the EU and partner countries across the world. This CEPS Policy Brief was supported with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

The benefits and costs of website-blocking legislation: an economic, legal and policy assessment

2026-04-14T13:31:35+01:00

In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of new EU Member State measures and cases that seek to block the access of the public to specific internet content. These have been enacted at the Member State level, mainly in an effort to reduce online piracy. But little consideration has been given to their apparently limited effectiveness, or of the possible risk of overblocking, much less the costs imposed on network operators and service providers. The enactment of different and mutually inconsistent rules by different Member States has led to fragmentation and tension between these rules and EU guarantees of freedom of expression (as embodied for instance in the goals of the Open Internet Regulation). This study seeks to provide an independent, evidence-based assessment of the economic costs and benefits of Member State website blocking laws and practices in the EU-27. It is inspired by recent Member State measures and case law that, in attempting to curb online piracy, require the blocking of web content in burdensome ways, while possibly missing the goal of preventing intellectual property violations.

Patient-centred health research and innovation in the EU

2026-04-14T08:29:39+01:00

Patient-centredness refers to the deliberate and systematic integration of patients’ preferences, perspectives and lived experiences into the research and innovation (R&I) process. Within health R&I, the concept has gained increasing recognition and visibility across the EU. However, its practical implementation remains limited and fragmented. This study explores how patient-centredness is understood and applied in R&I across the European Union. Drawing on case studies from Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and insights from a range of stakeholders, it aims to inform future policy and practice. While patient-centredness is gaining prominence at the EU level, its implementation remains variable across Member States and funding instruments. Overall, the findings highlight both the recognised value of patient involvement in enhancing research relevance and the need for more coherent structures, definitions, and approaches to support its consistent uptake. This study was prepared at the request of the European Parliament’s SANT Committee.

More credit, better risk sharing: why Europe needs securitisation

2026-04-15T13:42:45+01:00

Securitisation can strengthen the EU’s financial system by expanding lending, supporting the green and digital transitions, and improving financing resilience, particularly in periods of stress. Although issuance remains well below pre-crisis levels and trails other major jurisdictions, the basic economic case for securitisation remains strong. With targeted legal, regulatory and institutional support, it can help channel long-term capital to underserved sectors and improve the efficiency of credit intermediation across the continent. This study presents securitisation as part of a broader funding and risk-transfer ecosystem. Its value lies not only in mobilising additional financing for SMEs, households and infrastructure. It also complements other financing tools – from bank lending to covered bonds and more. Instruments like synthetic risk transfer, green asset-backed securities and public mezzanine support can help free up capital and broaden investor participation. International experience shows that successful securitisation markets rely on legal clarity, proportionate disclosure, predictable supervisory treatment and institutional backing. Under realistic scenarios, a stronger EU securitisation market could free up EUR 16-32 billion in Tier 1 capital annually and support EUR 130-320 billion in new lending per year, amounting to more than EUR 1 trillion over five years. Reforms should therefore focus on making significant risk transfer more predictable, tailoring disclosure for private deals, recalibrating capital treatment for senior tranches and supporting the pooling of green and digital assets. To read a shorter ECMI Commentary summarising the key findings of this report, please click here.

Orbán’s out, Magyar’s in – after 16 years, change in Hungary arrived by a landslide

2026-04-13T13:22:38+01:00

For the first time in 16 years, Hungary’s prime minister won’t be called Viktor Orbán. Péter Magyar, an erstwhile Orbán ally who built a resistance movement from seemingly nothing, emerged victorious from yesterday’s parliamentary election. And victorious he was – following record turnout, his TISZA party secured a supermajority with a projected 138 of 199 seats (69%). Orbán’s Fidesz, meanwhile, suffered an enormous defeat (only 55 seats). The extreme right Our Homeland Movement may have narrowly cleared the 5 % threshold, though with some absentee votes trickling still in from abroad, this could still change. Credit where credit’s due, Orbán quickly phoned Magyar with his congratulations. He then delivered a sombre, teary-eyed concession speech, vowing to serve the nation from opposition. An hour or two later, Magyar was greeted by a euphoric crowd, where he spoke for the first time as PM-elect with a firm, yet conciliatory tone that centred on the promise of a new beginning for all Hungarians.

Spring breeze

Fidesz, once the undisputed master of political communications and propaganda, stumbled its way through the campaign with uncharacteristic clumsiness. Having already started the year with a disadvantage in the polls, the government was also shaken by several scandals. Leaked audio recordings between Orbán, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and their Russian counterparts laid bare where Fidesz’s loyalties lay. The campaign was then further derailed by whistleblowers who – among other things – detailed a James Bond-worthy secret service operation to bring down TISZA. To turn things around towards late March, Orbán had to embark on a nation-wide tour. At a stop in Győr, when confronted by counter-protesters chanting ‘filthy Fidesz’, Orbán, who usually appears calm and personable in public, lost his cool and lashed out. His hoarse-throated outburst revealed the desperate fury of a man whose grip on power was slipping away. As a last hail Mary, JD Vance campaigned alongside him, which most likely only hurt Fidesz’s campaign further. Likewise, not even the documented attempts at electoral fraud in rural areas – where the votes of the poorest were secured by money, food, threats and even drugs – could help save Fidesz. While Fidesz deteriorated, the TISZA campaigned remained laser-focused on domestic issues. Over the past year, Péter Magyar visited every corner of the country, from big cities to small villages, engaging hundreds of thousands of voters and turning districts that were previously Fidesz strongholds into promising battlegrounds. Unlike Fidesz, which hasn’t produced an actual electoral programme in over a decade, Magyar presented a comprehensive plan that offered policy proposals that appealed to left and right alike. And wherever he went, he brought a message of hope as opposed to Orbán’s fearmongering, encouraging people to ‘fear no more’. A recently released film documenting Magyar’s road to the election only underlined him as the anti-Orbán seeking unity forged by hope, not fear. The hope for change has become so central to TISZA’s campaign that supporters have dubbed the phenomenon ‘hopium’ – a portmanteau of ‘opium’ and ‘hope’ – which highlights just how addictive the promise of meaningful change can be after 16 years built on inciting hatred and exclusion.

Are we out of the woods?

As the election novelty wears off, the country is at a point of transition and uncertainty. Domestically, TISZA’s programme outlines a clear roadmap towards system change, including uncovering past political and economic abuse, restoring the democratic rule of law, increased spending on healthcare, education and social welfare, as well as restoring media freedom and putting an end to political propaganda. At the same time, there’s little to say about Magyar’s foreign policy aspirations, as his focus has been firmly on domestic affairs. While Fidesz’s propaganda machine painted him as an ardent supporter of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, it’s difficult to gauge what his approach will be. It’s likely he’ll abandon Orbán’s staunch opposition to sanctions against Russia and he could be more amenable when it comes to enlargement or aid. However, one shouldn’t expect him to immediately join the Coalition of the Willing or rally behind EU efforts to maintain its spheres of interests and increasingly controversial allegiances, especially as the beginning of his term will likely be all about domestic affairs. Nevertheless, the EU should hope for much better cooperation, at least in most policy areas. Though Magyar said that TISZA has no interest in cooperating on migration, it is seeking to restore Hungary’s place as a ‘respected, influential member of the community’ and to ‘constructively shape’ the direction of EU integration. The new government will also be keen to unlock currently frozen EU budgetary commitments, which also suggest a willingness to rebuild the Brussels-Budapest friendship through cooperation and mutual support. The next few months will also test whether the EU institutions are ready for some soul-searching after 16 conflict-ridden years. Despite Orbán’s departure, the EU must assess its own mistakes and the structural weaknesses he exploited to ensure that the Treaty framework is ‘fit’ for the challenges of this decade and beyond. He may be gone, but his way of doing politics lives on through his fellow ‘Patriots’ across the EU.

The promise of Prometheus

While this is a moment of joy for many, it would be dangerous to paint Magyar as a messiah that freed Hungarians from their chains – we should still be cautious. Though the supermajority could allow him to begin a sweeping overhaul of Orbán’s self-serving system, uprooting the entire regime won’t happen immediately. And just like Orbán or any political leader, he must be held accountable by the people and the EU alike. But at the end of the day, Magyar pulled off an enormous feat. In the span of merely two years, not only did he build a nationwide movement from the ground up, he brought together over three million voters to unseat a deeply entrenched strongman backed up by a corrupt, unjust system. Things may not get better in the blink of an eye and dismantling Orbán’s ‘kingdom’ will be very difficult – but now we have the chance to at least try. And an empowered population that came together and overcame the slim odds of ridding itself of Fidesz by democratic means will be much better suited to keeping a vigilant eye on the new man in charge, ensuring he’s held accountable for how he takes the country forward.

The EU vs Hungary: a 16-year battle with no winners

2026-04-09T09:26:49+01:00

Hungary’s government has been at odds with the EU ever since Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, reclaimed power in 2010. But by all accounts, Hungary has largely benefited from being part of the European project. Why, then, has the prime minister continued his 16-year crusade of attacking and discrediting the EU, while overtly arguing for reversing the integration process? The answer is simpler than it seems. Since 2010, Orbán has employed a unique ‘playbook’ that secured his unprecedented longevity. He built a legal-political system designed to entrench power structures and processes that benefited him and his circle – but no one else. The fight with the EU was inherent in consolidating the regime, as ‘Brussels’ was presented to voters as an enemy of progress and sovereignty, from which only Orbán could protect. On the eve of the parliamentary elections in Hungary, this CEPS Explainer attempts to explain the whys of the past 16 years, with a combatant, hardline Eurosceptic strongman on one side and a hesitant, weakened integration fighting on multiple fronts on the other.

How to integrate social and climate objectives into the EU’s housing policy

2026-04-08T14:29:48+01:00

We spend the largest part of our lives either inside buildings or travelling between them. How and where we build is not only fundamental for household spendings but also for society’s social fabric. Housing policy also has significant implications for energy demand, material requirements, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mobility needs as well as safety, security and – more generally – resilience. In the EU, buildings are responsible for about 40 % of net energy consumption. In the EU, housing expenses are the largest expense, amounting to almost one quarter of total spending on average. Making housing more affordable and sustainable means we need a new and more comprehensive perspective on housing, one which would unlock the efficiency and innovation potential of the climate and digital transitions. Three aspects stand out. First, the time dimension, which addresses the whole life-cycle of buildings. Second, the value chain dimension, which includes the impacts from primary construction materials to the design and use (or reuse) of buildings, as well as recycling. Third, the spatial dimension, which covers the consequences of where buildings are located, including for mobility and energy systems. Buildings’ higher costs can be offset by longevity, which in return can be supported by more flexible and modular designs. Eco-services such as storing GHG emissions in building materials can also create new revenue streams.

Unpacking the radical right’s (non-)paradoxes – and why their unity shouldn’t be underestimated

2026-04-07T11:10:19+01:00

At first glance, radical-right groups like the Patriots for Europe (PfE) are full of contradictions – they hold pan-European rallies yet would dismantle the EU in its current form; they’re highly active in the European Parliament (EP) yet disdain the institution; and they seek alliances with MAGA groups, though they’ve traditionally opposed US administrations. But once the radical right’s own theories of sovereignty, democracy and politics are considered, unpacking these paradoxes becomes easier. And understanding them reveals that the radical right is more than a simple byproduct of the EU’s past mistakes... but rather a coherent political force that will continue to shape European politics for the foreseeable future.

Paradox 1 – united by Euroscepticism

When looking at the radical right’s many rallies in Europe, particularly those held by the Patriots for Europe (PfE), one discovers that their national leaders stand united on a common stage, to deliver a common message, to a common European audience – something we’d expect federalists to do, not nationalists looking to deconstruct the EU. The elephant in the room is that the Patriots are vehemently against European integration in its current form and – as stated in The Great Reset, recently published by a think tank aligned with their thinking – would rather return the EU to its pre-1957 model, presumably gutting most EU law. This offers one of the clearest shared visions of the EU’s ideal end state from any EP group... even if that means dismantling it. To add to the contradiction, the nature of nationalist parties inherently makes reaching common policy positions challenging. For example, their economic positions strongly deviate from party to party. That’s why it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Patriots reject most reforms but rarely offer alternatives, well summed up by one of their catchphrases: ‘no migration, no gender, no war.’ It’s a mistake, however, to assume that radical right parties are merely acting opportunistically to further their own domestic agenda or that their unity is doomed to fall apart as soon as national interests start diverging. Such moments have already come and gone, without significantly affecting their cohesion. Rather, their rhetoric is underpinned by a coherent political philosophy that reinforces their unity – especially through Euroscepticism.

Paradox 2 – inside the EP but against the EP

A Patriot MEP explaining how sovereignty and democracy should be defined would likely raise plenty of eyebrows among EU officials but it would also help explain why the Patriots are very active in the EP despite often treating it as illegitimate. The EU’s legitimacy rests on the (partly unresolved) understanding that sovereignty can be lent, shared or even transferred. In trade policy, the EU exercises exclusive competence based on a mandate from the Member States. Normally, whenever more integration is opposed, subsidiarity is invoked because it’s the scope of competences in question – not the EU’s overall legitimacy. The Patriots understand sovereignty as absolute, non-negotiable and only belonging to the Member States. Whenever a supranational EU institution takes the initiative without Member States’ consent, they believe it’s doing so illegitimately and in disrespect of their sovereignty. This also explains why veto politics is, for certain leaders, a question of principle rather than mere obstructionism or sabotage. And why going back to pre-1957 might be preferable, so that neither the European Commission nor the EP could challenge national sovereignty. Radical-right MEPs might say that they’re all playing at ‘pretend democracy’ in the EP. Although the case can be made that the EU is democratic, as Radosław Sikorski did at the 2026 Munich Security Conference, for the radical right this is beside the point. For them, the only basis of democracy is the nation(-state) and so, without a common European demos (which doesn’t exist), the EU’s only democratic legitimacy comes through the national governments in the Council. A nativist would argue that all democratic elements at a supranational level are a farce and nothing more than a power grab by EU Institutions. That’s why, based on the same logic, their presence in the EP is to use it to make their own power-grab in the opposite direction – away from the supranational EU institutions.

Paradox 3 – the ‘Washington Connection’

The radical right’s newest paradox is its ideological alignment and quasi-political unity with MAGA, even though parties such as France’s Rassemblement National, or Germany’s AfD were previously intensely critical of US administrations and their influence in Europe. This hasn’t been smoothed over, as the radical right must often scramble to react to, for example, tariffs or the Greenland crisis. Yet radical-right MEPs will still speak as if there’s no ideological contradiction. There is – but again, it doesn’t matter to them. The Trump administration is highly convenient for European radical-right parties for two reasons. First, their beliefs about sovereignty and democracy are nearly identical and so their tirades against ‘unelected EU officials’ rhyme well. Second, the Trump administration is a strong material backer – as confirmed by its reported plans to finance ideologically-friendly think tanks across Europe. This helps radical-right parties in their mission to deconstruct European integration, even at the cost of accepting the very American influence they once denounced.

United in opposition, fragmented once in power?

The radical right’s shift from rejecting the EU to actively seeking to reshape it alongside other radical-right parties is a form of political adaptation. Things may change if they enter government. In opposition, internal contradictions can be managed or deferred – but once struggling for power gives way to exercising power, it’s much harder to avoid tough policy questions. Giorgia Meloni is a clear example. Despite initially being denounced as the leader of a neofascist party, she became something of a ‘Commission President’s favourite’ after entering office. Her domestic policy shows that her radical-right convictions haven’t disappeared but that the realities of governing have forced her to adopt a more pragmatic approach – including at EU level. Overall, the radical right should be pleased to eventually enter government, right? In fact, no. Radical-right ideologues may instead warn against the ‘deradicalisation’ of figures such as Meloni. Whether other radical-right leaders follow Meloni’s example once in power remains to be seen. What matters now is that these (non-)paradoxes shouldn’t obscure the fact that the radical right has emerged as a powerful political force whose unity – at least for the time being – probably won’t fall apart anytime soon. The radical right isn’t a passing fad that will eventually peter out. It’s a force that will stick around for some time yet and will undoubtedly leave a lasting mark on the EU’s future.

2026 Ideas Lab report

2026-04-10T09:52:03+01:00

As the EU works to adapt to the tumultuous international situation, discussions around competitiveness, security, sustainability, strategic autonomy and other pressing policy challenges are only becoming more urgent. And that’s where CEPS’ flagship Ideas Lab comes in. For its 13th edition from 2-3 March 2026, we once again brought together hundreds of speakers and participants from across Europe (and beyond) to debate these challenges and work towards solutions that could help light the path ahead. With overall attendance going far beyond past editions, we welcomed almost 900 representatives from international institutions, policymakers, academia, industry and civil society. Still proudly the largest annual forum on EU policymaking, this year featured six plenaries (including a hastily assembled one on the new conflict in the Middle East, the impact of tariffs on global trade, the US intervention in Venezuela, and what these developments means for the EU and transatlantic relations) and over 20 smaller, more intimate lab sessions, covering a plethora of policy areas. This report provides a summary of each plenary and a thematic roundup of all the key themes discussed throughout the lab sessions. And, with CEPS’ motto to ‘think ahead for Europe’ in mind, we very much look forward to seeing you in 2027.

The production of irregularity in Europe

2026-04-01T08:43:31+01:00

Migrants’ irregular status in Europe is commonly framed as a border control issue, unauthorised entry or failed return. However, irregularity and legal precarity are structurally produced through the interaction of migration, labour, welfare and family policy regimes at the EU and national levels. Legal precarity often occurs due to restrictive residence permit renewal criteria, employer dependency, income thresholds, administrative delays and limited status transitions. These are embedded in segmented labour markets and shaped by racialised and gendered hierarchies, meaning that precarity becomes economically functional and politically normalised. This Policy Brief calls for reducing the structural drivers of irregularisation in residence and migration regimes, mainstreaming fundamental and socio-economic rights and non-discrimination in migration governance, separating labour protection from immigration control and addressing housing conditions as a structural dimension of labour precarity and irregularisation. The authors of this policy brief also include Ilse van Liempt (Professor of Geographies of Migration and Urban Inequalities at the Utrecht University) and Nando Sigona (Chair of International Migration and Forced Displacement at the University of Birmingham and Director of the Institute for Research into International Migration and Superdiversity (IRIS)). This report is part of the I-CLAIM Horizon Europe project.

Building an EU industrial ecosystem of circularity applications for battery packs

2026-03-31T10:30:39+01:00

Electric vehicles (EVs) are rapidly transforming the transportation landscape. In this context, circularity solutions, namely recycling and second-life applications, are central to addressing environmental impacts and securing access to valuable materials in electric vehicle batteries (EVBs). While the EU is at the forefront of regulatory action in this domain, with the 2023 Batteries Regulation as a cornerstone, further efforts are needed to develop viable circular supply chains and a domestic recycling market. Consolidating lessons learnt from the 4-year BATRAW project, this report dives into the evolving landscape of battery circularity applications and draws lessons from their implementation. Based on a review of the landscape, it shows that both recycling and second-life use of EVBs remain at an early stage of development in the EU with some positive trends noted. We identify three key enabling conditions for scaling up circularity applications for EVBs in the EU: (i) effective implementation of the EU policy framework underpinned by the Batteries Regulation; (ii) strengthened financial support for scaling up battery circularity applications; and (iii) further harmonisation of the standardisation landscape impacting EVB circularity. This paper was prepared in the context of the BATRAW project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101058359.

The Return Regulation will ‘ICE-ify’ the EU’s migration policy

2026-03-27T09:13:46+01:00

Europe is drawing on the US playbook on migration enforcement – precisely as that playbook’s costs are now becoming abundantly clear. It’s doing so on a misleading premise, without addressing how migrants’ irregularity is produced in the first place. On 26 March, the European Parliament voted in plenary on the proposed Return Regulation, with 389 votes in favour, 206 against and 32 abstentions. The report by rapporteur Malik Azmani (Renew Europe) – already much more punitive than the Commission proposal – had previously been voted down in the LIBE Committee. An EPP-backed alternative passed with support from the ECR, Patriots for Europe and ESN, marking yet another collapse of the von der Leyen majority in the Parliament. With trilogue negotiations now due to begin and a Council general approach that goes even further, the direction of travel is clear. The Return Regulation is a decisive acceleration in a long-running direction: detection operations inside EU territory, expanded detention (including for children), forced deportation across a wide range of cases, cooperation penalties, return hubs in third countries that people may not have a connection with, and entry bans stretching to 10 years or more – with the Council now pushing for home raids.

Europe on ICE

While some European political groups have condemned the US’ Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), others are voting to replicate its logic here. During the recent Milan-Cortina Olympics, some groups declared that it wasn’t acceptable for ICE agents to operate on European soil. These sentiments were linked to Renee Nicole Good and Alex Pretti’s murders in Minneapolis in January 2026, alongside 32 other people who died at ICE's hands in 2025. Notably silent were the EPP, ECR, Patriots and ESN – the same majority that days later passed the revised report on the Return Regulation through LIBE. For the European right, ICE's actions aren’t a warning. The ‘ICE-ification’ of Europe is the clear goal. And, if what’s happening in the US is anything to go by, the result will be less security for all of us – EU and non-EU citizens alike. ICE deployments have cost cities millions, stretched police departments thin and driven people away from medical care, food programmes and schools – harm that could take years to reverse.

The 20% myth

Under pressure from Member States and with no impact assessment, the Commission paved the way for this Regulation on a completely misleading premise: only around 20 % of migrants who receive a return order are removed from EU territory. This can only mean the system is broken and more 'innovative' solutions are needed. But the statistic hides more than it reveals. Some individuals are counted more than once across Member States. Return orders are issued where removal was never legally or practically feasible – be it because of pending appeals, health conditions, family ties or non-cooperation from the country of origin. The low enforcement rate reflects, in large part, legal constraints that no reform can override. Recent research from the EU-funded I-CLAIM project adds a structural dimension: ‘irregular migration’ isn’t just a border or asylum issue. People fall into irregular status through European rules operating normally: a permit tied to a single employer that lapses when the job ends; an income threshold missed after a difficult year; a family breakdown that removes the legal basis for residence. In various labour sectors, employer-tied permits convert migration control into labour discipline. Workers who risk losing their status by changing jobs cannot assert their rights, refuse unsafe conditions or organise. The constant threat they’ll be deported is an economic feature – not an accident.

What the Regulation actually does

The Return Regulation doesn’t merely tighten return procedures. It shifts migration policy towards policing and coercion. The Commission's original proposal included expanded provisions allowing enforcement authorities to detect undocumented people inside EU territory. The Azmani report deleted them. The Council's general approach goes further, endorsing home raids and searches of ‘other relevant premises’. The EPP's François-Xavier Bellamy didn’t oppose including such provisions in the final text. Detection on EU territory means identity checks, workplace inspections with a migration focus, and home raids. Where enforcement enters workplaces, workers who fear detection won’t report wage theft, unsafe conditions, labour exploitation or trafficking. Racialised communities bear a disproportionate burden, with racial profiling being further normalised across the EU. A PICUM and Médecins du Monde report warns that the Regulation could allow for the sharing of medical data across authorities and with third countries for deportation purposes. This means people will simply stop seeking the care they need. The cooperation obligation is among the most troubling provisions. It requires individuals – including vulnerable ones – to cooperate with a system designed to detain, sanction and remove them. This applies even to those recognised as non-removable: people who cannot be expelled because of fundamental rights reasons, health conditions or non-cooperation from their country of origin. They would be sanctioned for failing to facilitate a removal that cannot legally take place.

There’s another way…

Nothing in the Regulation addresses what causes irregularity. There’s no pathway for people in administrative limbo. No firewall that protects access to basic services. And there’s nothing about regularisation. If policies lead people into irregularity, and the only available solution is return, irregularity will only become more prevalent – and with it, precarious living and working conditions, labour exploitation and fundamental rights violations. As the file moves into trilogue negotiations, the following four issues should be considered. First, immigration enforcement must be separated from essential services – healthcare, education, labour inspections – so that accessing your rights doesn’t trigger expulsion. This is a precondition for effective public health, worker protection and fundamental rights. Second, fix the cooperation trap. Being sanctioned for non-cooperation mustn’t apply to people who are non-removable. Penalising someone for failing to facilitate their own expulsion that cannot lawfully occur is disproportionate, legally dubious and counterproductive. Third, address the root causes. The Regulation should be accompanied by a commitment to decouple residence permits from single employers, expand regularisation pathways and reform the income and family reunification rules that cause irregularised people in the first place. Fourth, consider alternatives to return. Spain's recent regularisation process has been politically controversial – but it does precisely what this Regulation claims to do. Alternatives exist, have also been used by centre-right governments, and would reduce irregularity while complying with fundamental rights, unlike the Regulation’s enforcement-first approach. Europe has a choice: either double down on US-style enforcement that’s expensive, legally fragile and inconsistent with its own stated objectives – or start from being honest about why irregularity exists and what could actually reduce it without having to compromise the EU's own founding values.

More finance, less friction – how the EU’s rulebook turned into a levy on investment (and what to do about it)

2026-03-24T10:56:21+01:00

Europe’s financial problem isn’t a lack of rules. It comes from too much friction, and a large share of that drag is self-inflicted. After 15 years of post-crisis repairs, the EU can point to two real gains: a more resilient system and stronger protection for investors and consumers. Yet alongside this, we’ve assembled a regulatory and supervisory apparatus that’s increasingly difficult to operate as a true single market. Rules pile up in layers, evolve via technical standards and guidance, then get interpreted differently across jurisdictions and finally they force firms into yet another round of internal overhauls. The outcome is a quiet, compounding toll on capital formation, paid through larger compliance teams, duplicate reporting, slower approvals and business models that stay domestic because EU-wide scaling simply isn’t worth the effort. That should trouble anyone thinking seriously about Europe’s growth model. A Savings and Investment Union won’t emerge from slogans alone. It requires a financial system that can move savings into productive investment at scale. And that, in turn, depends on regulation and supervision that are usable, predictable and aligned across borders. This isn’t an argument for deregulation, as President Ursula von der Leyen put it plainly on 1 October 2025 in Copenhagen. It’s an argument for better design.

The real competitiveness gap isn’t standards, it’s usability

When policymakers discuss competitiveness in finance, the conversation often slips into a false binary. Either we maintain high standards, or we weaken them to keep up with other jurisdictions. Such framing misses the point. In financial services, competitiveness largely comes down to whether the system can do three things effectively: 1) direct savings into investment with efficiency, 2) enable innovation and new entrants without opening loopholes, and 3) allow firms to scale across the single market without paying 27 times for the same idea. None of this requires weaker safeguards. It requires fewer moving parts and clearer accountability. That’s why the Council’s December 2025 conclusions on simplifying EU financial services regulation matter. They signal an institutional acknowledgment that complexity has gone beyond what’s necessary and that both the existing stock and flow of rules need to be managed with greater discipline.

We keep adding when we should be replacing

The EU has become very effective at introducing new obligations and weak at phasing out old ones. Consolidation is rare, sunset clauses are uncommon, and we almost never force a real trade-off. When something new is added, something else should come out. This habit of layering leads to a framework that grows harder each year to interpret, automate and supervise consistently. It also creates an innovation drag, as established players can absorb the fixed costs of complexity, while challengers struggle. If the goal is to reduce friction, the EU needs to adopt discipline that sounds boring but would be transformative – new measures should clearly map what they override, merge or remove. If nothing is being replaced, then we’re not simplifying, we’re expanding.

Sequencing isn’t bureaucracy, it’s economics

Much of the burden doesn’t stem from the rule itself but from the timing. When key technical standards and guidance arrive late (or shift repeatedly), firms don’t just implement, they’re forced to rebuild. These rebuild cycles are costly, resource-heavy and often regressive, hitting smaller firms hardest. And when identical rules are enforced differently across supervisors, cross-border groups respond in predictable ways. They duplicate structures, localise operations and avoid scaling across Europe. That’s why ‘readiness gates’ are essential. If critical standards or supervisory clarifications aren’t finalised early enough for proper build-and-test cycles, application dates shouldn’t pretend otherwise. This is just basic execution logic. It’s also telling that the ESAs themselves are calling for streamlining and more risk-based, proportionate processes. That is clear evidence that the current model is accumulating complexity faster than it can manage.

Supervision is market-shaping – so divergence is a competitiveness problem

Supervision doesn’t just enforce rules, it actively shapes markets. The speed of authorisations, model approvals, data requirements and enforcement intensity all affect whether firms invest, enter and grow. When these vary significantly across Member States, the result isn’t a true single market, it’s a shared rulebook with 27 different operating environments. That’s why stronger convergence with accountability matters. Not just peer reviews that stop at diagnosis but concrete remediation, follow-up and transparency on whether gaps actually close. Because EU markets differ in their level of integration, we also need a practical way to move past the ‘centralisation vs decentralisation’ debate. This means a supervisory efficiency test. Where activities are highly cross-border, standardised, and enforceable at EU level, fragmented supervision is inefficient. Where markets remain genuinely domestic, national oversight still makes sense. The aim is to match oversight to market reality, function by function, rather than rely on a one-size-fits-all approach.

Data: stop collecting more and start collecting better

Europe’s reporting burden is often framed as a volume problem, with too many templates. But the deeper issue is reuse. Firms still generate similar data repeatedly, in different formats, for different authorities and purposes. That’s simply inefficient. A serious simplification effort should focus on machine-readable standards, interoperable taxonomies and reporting built around clear supervisory use cases. The objective is straightforward – collect once, use many times, across authorities, sectors and borders.

One hard truth: Europe won’t get its SIU without reform

The Letta and Draghi reports reached the same conclusion: Europe’s fragmentation and slow execution have become strategic weaknesses and this includes finance. If simplification continues to be treated as an occasional burden-reduction exercise, the system will keep drifting towards more layers, more divergence, higher fixed costs and less financing capacity. So, the core argument is simple. Europe should stop measuring success by how much regulation it produces and start measuring it by whether the framework actually supports investment, scaling and supervision that works across borders. High standards are essential. But standards that can’t be used effectively end up stifling their own purpose. We can have more finance with less friction. But only if we accept that simplification is a redesign of how Europe writes rules, maintains them and supervises them. To read the full Task Force Report that this CEPS Expert Commentary is based on, please click here.

More finance, less friction: how to simplify the EU’s financial regulation and strengthen supervisory structures

2026-03-24T10:56:44+01:00

Europe’s financial regulatory and supervisory framework has delivered major stability and protection gains over the past two decades but it has become increasingly difficult to operate as a coherent single-market system. The core challenge isn't a lack of rules, but the frictions caused by how rules are designed, sequenced and applied across borders. These frictions translate into higher fixed costs, slower time-to-market and weaker incentives to scale cross-border activity. With the EU seeking to mobilise savings more effectively, deepen capital markets and support strategic investment under its Savings and Investment Union agenda, regulatory and supervisory usability has become a first-order competitiveness issue. This report builds on the debates stemming from the CEPS -ECMI-ECRI Task Force 'Adjusting the EU’s regulatory process and supervisory structures' and comprehensively examines how the EU’s regulatory and supervisory framework affects the competitiveness of its financial system - and, most importantly, what can be done to improve it. To read a CEPS Expert Commentary that summarises the key findings of this report, please click here.

Savings and investment accounts: the wrapper is easy – the system is not

2026-03-19T16:22:31+01:00

Europe doesn’t lack savings. It lacks conversion. Households save a lot but too much of that money sits in low-yield places that preserve nominal value while quietly losing purchasing power year after year. At the same time, Europe’s investment priorities – innovation, transition, productivity, security – need larger pools of patient capital than bank balance sheets alone can reliably supply.

That’s the case for savings and investment accounts (SIAs). SIAs are a straightforward ‘wrapper’ that can make investing easier to access, more routine and more commonplace. But the wrapper is just the surface. The tougher issue is whether they become true mass-market infrastructure for long-term investing or simply a subsidised route into complexity.

The real policy question isn’t whether SIAs sound good in theory. It’s whether they are built to shift behaviour at scale without fragmenting the single market or skewing outcomes.