Some Paradigms for the Evolving Map of Europe

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Abstract

Two sets of opposing paradigms governing the map of Europe are struggling to predominate at the beginning of this second decade of the post-communist era.

At the macro (continental) level the struggle is between the Common European Home versus the Europe of Two Empires – the enlarging European Union, and a Russia newly re-assertive towards its near abroad.

At the micro (state or entity) level the struggle is between the Nationalising State versus the Europe of Fuzzy Statehood.

This double competition of paradigms is most intense and sensitive in Borderland Europe around the frontiers between the two empires, or in their Overlapping Peripheries.

It seems that the Europe of Two Empires has much more political energy these days than the Common European Home; and in Borderland Europe the Nationalising State has more energy than Fuzzy Statehood.

However these trends should be of concern, since they point to the persistence of tensions and in the worst cases conflicts. A successful and stable Europe would need to see more of the Common European Home and of Fuzzy Statehood.

The EU has been instrumental in helping most of its candidate states largely overcome the problems of the post-communist transition through the incentives and demands of accession, and thus converge on the norms of the Common European Home, with elements of the Fuzzy Statehood package included.

However in the Overlapping Peripheries of Borderland Europe there is no such mechanism, and many of these entities are stuck in a state of unresolved conflicts, demoralised poverty and confusion over their future.

This is where a real strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, not just declarations, could be very useful. Such a partnership would, however, require much bigger political and economic investments than so far seen, as well as some rehabilitation of the Common European Home.

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1. Paradigms for Geopolitical Europe

1.1 Common European Home

Many politicians say they like the idea of a Common European Home (Gorbachev), or a Europe without Frontiers (most European leaders), or One Europe Whole and Free (US presidential speeches), or simply a Europe with no Berlin Walls (a language that everyone understands). This is the world of liberal idealists in the texts of international relations, governed by principles, moral codes and liberal market economics.

It has its institutions and norms, with the OSCE and Council of Europe, whose functions fit alongside the international organisations of the UN family – UN itself, IMF, IBRD, WTO. Together all these organisations are called by some political scientists the regime of cosmopolitan democracy. It is also the Europe of the end of ideological conflict, for Fukuyama it was even to be the end of history. The OSCE and Council of Europe supply the political, human rights and security norms. The IMF and IBRD administer the so-called Washington consensus and how to succeed economically.

This regime is not functioning well in Eastern Europe, beyond the advanced EU accession candidate states of central Europe.

The EU regards the rules and norms of the OSCE and Council of Europe as fundamental parts of its system of values. But as organisations the OSCE and Council of Europe are secondary, valuable as providing outreach into the former communist states for its value system. But they are not entrusted with large resources and operational responsibilities. For the EU the serious outreach business is the apprenticeship for its accession candidate states.

Russia for its part initially treated both the OSCE and Council of Europe as desirable clubs of which to be member. But subsequently the political elite of Moscow has become irritated by these forums. There have emerged serious cleavages between politicians who do not like their state to be constantly criticised for failings (e.g. over Chechnya), versus non-government organisations and individuals who want their society to converge on these ‘civilised’ values and standards.
However the states of Borderland Europe find the OSCE and Council of Europe more important. It means a way of subscribing to norms of society, political and international relations, which they would like to see take hold. EU candidate states correctly see the Council of Europe’s human rights convention and minorities codes as part of the entry examination tests. The weak states of Borderland Europe see membership of these organisations as a way of joining with modern European civilisation, albeit on a limited scale. This could be seen in recent months with the accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe. The organisations are valued by Borderland Europe states as providing some soft protection from Russian pressurisation or pretensions to a zone of influence.

1.2 Europe of Two Empires

Empires are big, powerful and dominating. They are very extensive territorially and will normally be multi-ethnic, but with a core leadership group or power centre. Empires tend to set their own rules. They expand, either by power of attraction or by force, until they go too far, become unmanageable or degenerate. Then they collapse. Europe has a lot of experience of empire. Almost every European nation has tried it at some time over the last two millennia. Today empires can be democracies at their core, even if they were not so in the past. However even the most democratic of contemporary empires, the US and EU, collect associated states or protectorates at their peripheries, which do not have full powers of representation. In addition some of the manifestations of empire, in particular in the economic and cultural field, extend way beyond the powers of government. All this has been subject to a magisterial historical analysis in Dominic Lieven’s “Empire – the Russian Empire and its Rivals” (2000).

The formation of state frontiers and of empire has also been analysed more from a social political science standpoint by Malcolm Anderson (1996). He draws attention to the argument of Boulding (1962), who proposed a general theory. The thesis is based on assumptions derived from a realist (international relations) framework, in which “states always seek to maximise their territorial influence. The costs of competing for territory (influence over territory rather than sovereign control) increase with distance just as costs for firms in a particular market increase with that market’s distance from the point of production. Territories far distant from the metropolitan heartland might be given up to a competing power without a contest, but each state has a critical frontier across which a competing power cannot cross without a fight”. \(^1\) On an earlier occasion I have argued along similar

\(^1\) Anderson (1968), pp. 31.
lines in more detail with a schema for analysing the factors of demand and supply for integration, as set out in Table 1.

The European Union (EU) and Russia today are empires, more or less, the term being used here in a technical sense – without value judgement. The first is still growing and immature. The second has gravely degenerated and shrunk, but still shows some will to halt and reverse the process. To extend Boulding’s analysis, the idea of distance may be not just geographic, but also normative, cultural and political. For example Estonia is on Russia’s frontier, but it is far away politically. Russia, concerned to reverse disintegration trends, concentrates of the CIS states as a sphere of actual or desired influence. The EU, concerned not to expand too fast, will only accept new member states that are able and willing to come close to its norms. However, typically for the behaviour of hegemons, both the EU and Russia prefer to deal with the states of their peripheries bilaterally, rather than multilaterally. This is the other side of the coin, compared to the multilateral institutions that would be at the heart of the Common European Home. The two empires begin to notice the complications of having overlapping peripheries, and at this stage more problems than solutions.

Table 1. Factors determining integration tendencies

| Demand | country X’s interest to integrate with Y, or with core group Z |
| Supply | interest of country Y, or core group Z to admit country X |

**Explanatory variables**

**I Historical integration**

1. Geography – watersheds, mountains, river basins
2. Culture – language, religion, alphabet
3. Perceptions – of citizenship, trust, destiny

**II Economic integration**

4. Markets – benefits and costs of participation
5. Money – benefits and costs of joining monetary area
6. Redistribution – benefits and costs of budgetary transfers

**III Political integration**

7. Values – commonality or otherwise
8. Power – gains or losses
9. Security – gains or losses

European superpower

The EU empire is growing very fast in both its powers and territorial extent. For the first time now, at the turn of the millennium, the EU project assembles (already has done so, or is set upon doing so) the complete tool-kit of the superpower: economic and monetary union, freedom of movement and common citizen’s rights internally and immigration and frontier controls on the external border, common foreign, security and defence policies, and political institutions including directly elected parliament and supreme court. Its leaders now talk without inhibition about the EU’s ambition to be a superpower, even if the EU’s capacities to act externally are still very underdeveloped. Superpower talk comes not only from the president of France, but also more cautiously the chancellor of Germany and now more recently the Prime Minister of Britain.

The enlargement process is seriously engaged, with 13 actual candidates states, most of whom are likely to join within the decade, and other potential candidates including the whole of the Balkans and at some stage the reluctant Norway and Switzerland. The map of Europe becomes quite neat at this stage. A straight line or curve down from Finland on the Barents and Baltic Seas down to Turkey on the Black Sea, and then simply the Northern coastline of the Mediterranean basin. This becomes an EU of even up to 40 member states.

Obviously such a huge number of states requires a considerable federalisation of its political institutions, if all those competences are to be retained and deepened. Or, in the next 30 years or so, the least strongly qualified applicant states for membership will have to be satisfied with associate or virtual membership, a subsidiary paradigm useful for the EU, as it has been for many other empires at their peripheries.

But while all of this is clear by paradigm, it not quite so clear whether it is going to work in practice. There are several hazards in the process: refusal in the democratic processes (e.g. refusal in ratification of new treaties extending the powers of the Union or its membership – Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland), or incapability to devise efficient decision making and executive structures in the institutions. The EU is so far able to project its huge political and economic resources externally with only rather limited effect (beyond the accession candidate states). If the enlarging EU becomes itself unmanageable, there will have to be some restructuring, as the demands for a more compact core group within the EU already suggest.

Great power Russia
After collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, it even seemed possible that the Russian empire might itself fragment. A triple big bang for the end of communism was postulated by some: first to go was the Comecon, then the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation.

However Russians seem to have decided that enough was enough, and elected a new president empowered to stop the disintegration. Whereupon geo-political strategists in and around the Kremlin began in the last year to aim at reconsolidation of the near abroad, or, to use plain language, renewal of the Russian empire. The target became the whole of the former Soviet Union except the Baltic states, which were given up to the EU. The policy also gave up on the C.I.S. as an organisation. It was originally conceived as a kind of replica of the EU, able to save the Soviet Union from disintegration.

Instead under President Putin policy aims at the target states bilaterally, with differentiated polices. First there was constitution in October 2000 of the EurAsian Economic Community, with the states willing to reintegrate economically and with the required policy control mechanisms: Russia with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Khyrgizstan and Tadjikistan. There is also a defence alliance, the Tashkent Treaty, which includes all of these plus Armenia.

Then there has been a set of initiatives, spearheaded often by presidential diplomacy to tidy up and consolidate relations with the rest of the near abroad, and preferably render defunct the embryonic GUUAM grouping (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan Moldova). This latter organisation had been shaping up as a southern belt to pursue common interests like East-West trade routes, and also to resist excessive Russian influence. In the last months Russia has been active. It has intimidated Georgia with visa restrictions and turning of gas supplies in winter. It has settled the Caspian seabed question with Azerbaijan. President Putin has extended a hand of friendship to President Kuchma at his hour of need, facing devastating criticism in the West for his alleged part in the murder of a journalist. Russian businesses make strategic acquisitions in Ukraine’s economy, where western business has been discouraged by poor governance standards. Moldova has returned a new communist dominated parliament, and talk of joining the Belarus-Russia Union has surfaced. The GUUAM summit convened for spring 2001 is postponed sine die.

Some geo-political analysts in Moscow are explicit. Alexander Dugin says: “I am convinced that with Putin as president the processes of consolidating our geopolitical space is accelerating”. Andrei Federov says: “Today we are more or less openly talking about our

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zone of interests. One way or another we are confirming that the post-Soviet territory is such a zone. In Yeltsin’s time we were trying to wrap this in a nice paper. Now we are saying it more directly: this is our territory, our sphere of interest”.

**The two empires face to face**

How indeed do they regard each other? David Gowan (2001) has produced the following image from Alice in Wonderland: “The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice. It looked good-natured, she thought: still it had very long claws and a great many teeth, so she thought it ought to be treated with respect.”

Gowan goes on to comment “Russia and the European Union are both inclined to regard each other as the Cheshire Cat. Russia now regards the EU as a strong but ambiguous organisation that could either encroach on Russia’s interests or be helpful. Likewise, the EU is uncertain how to develop its relations with Russia, which remains complex and sometimes unpredictable”.

Marius Vahl (2001) has examined the recent strategy documents of the EU towards Russia and vice versa, exchanged in 1999, and comes to similar conclusions to Gowan. Vahl describes how the EU strategy is a weak derivative of an association agreement, whose objective is for Russia to converge on EU economic and political norms; whereas the Russia strategy sees the EU in geo-political terms as a useful agent for a multi-polar world (i.e. not a US hegemony). This view of the two strategies is a more substantive interpretation than that of the merely enigmatic Cheshire Cats. However these are completely different animals. The EU is saying “be like us”, whereas Russia is saying “help us reduce US hegemony”. A better analogue might be that of two ships passing in the night without noticing each other.

These strategy documents were just paper exercises, far removed from real action, as indeed the EU itself seems to have concluded. However the real world has the habit of intruding on such innocent past-times. The initiatives of Russia in recent months were not, for the EU, the

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4 I am indebted to Nicholas Whyte for drawing my attention also to the story of the cats of Kilkenny, from the mists of Irish folklore, which has a message too for geopoliticians. There were two cats of Kilkenny, each thought there was one cat too many, so they fought and scratched till excepting their nails and the tips of their tails, instead of two cats, there weren’t any.

5 The EU has now received an evaluation report on Common Strategies from High Representative Solana, concluding that they have not been effective, becoming bureaucratic exercises (Council of EU document 14871/00 of 21 December 2000, declassified 30 January 2001).
ship that passed unnoticed in the night. Russia apparently wants to put both its near abroad policy and its EU policy into higher gear at the same time.

Russia’s Security Council chief, Sergei Ivanov, was reported on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 29 January 2001 saying: “The European Union is now the key interlocutor on problems of European and global security”. On the same day President Putin visited the Ministry, declaring in his speech: “... the significance of our relations with the European Union is surely growing. We do not at present set the task of becoming a member of the EU. But we must seek dramatically to improve the effectiveness of cooperation and its quality”.6 The message is conveyed that President Putin is a serious Europeanist in Russian foreign policy terms.

However the EU regards Russia’s policy towards Georgia as being inconsistent with common OSCE, Council of Europe principles, and indeed with the idea of deepening relations with the EU itself. Commissioner Chris Patten said this in a public speech in Moscow already on 18 January 2001. “The question of Russia’s role in the ‘near abroad’ is a highly sensitive matter. But it does go to the heart of what we expect from Russia in the context of partnership. Let me put it this way. Should we expect Russia to play a role in ensuring peace and stability beyond its borders? Incontestably. But how will Russia play that role? ... from your knowledge of us, you will recognise that the way Russia approached these questions at the recent OSCE ministerial meeting and the way in which it appears to be using the visa regime and its monopoly of gas supplies in its relations with Georgia are bound to provoke controversy in the European Union and raise some anxieties. ... Any country which is a member of the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a right to international support and if Russia is to take on the international role we all feel it should be playing, I am sure you would agree that it must be on the basis of the rules and criteria to which we have all subscribed”.7

Not to miss out on the joys of using animal imagery in diplomacy, Patten concluded: “I do not believe that the European Union and Russia are really like the elephant and the whale, doomed never to meet because their environments are incompatible”. But the idea had crossed his mind, it seems.

These several speeches may be summarised as follows. Russia would like to have a strategic partnership with the EU, playing presumably under common rules. It would also like to regain

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7 http://europa.eu.int/comm/extern.
its dominant influence over the near abroad, playing by its own rules. The EU is saying: sorry, you cannot have it both ways. For the next moves there are two scenarios:

- (A) there is no real strategic partnership, and the zones of interest of the two empires become more pronounced and mutually exclusive;
- (B) Russia accepts to play (more or less) by common rules in the near abroad, and the EU cooperates with Russia there too, as well through their bilateral strategic partnership;

If scenario B were to prevail, then the two empires would be in a position to give renewed life and credibility to the Common European Home.

2. Paradigms for Borderland Europe

2.1 Nationalising State

This concerns particularly the newly independent states of the post-communist period whose first priority has been the process of building and consolidating their new states – nation states and nationalising states. Pride and determination as newly independent states, or as old states with their independence renewed, is a main motor force of their efforts to overcome the transition towards the common ideal – to become advanced social market democracies.

These are mostly fragile states in terms of the institutions and culture of democracy and civil society, but not all are so.

In some cases the problems are real dilemmas. Take for example the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. These two states make rapid progress towards modern European social, political and economic norms. They are serious candidates for membership of the EU. Estonia even has a long tradition of enlightened law for the protection of national minorities, notably for the communities of Germans and Jews as well as Russians in the pre-Second World War period (Smith, 2001). But still Estonia feels compelled to protect its renewed statehood, to retain an Estonian language test for citizenship, which many of the Russian community cannot pass or do not want to try to pass. Large numbers of ethnic Russians therefore remain stateless persons, and the EU will therefore soon have a large community of stateless Russians (with the rights of EU citizens, or not?).

But in other cases the politically correct task of state building gets mixed up with the misappropriation of state assets and vicious ethnic nationalism. The virus of aggressive nationalism becomes irresistible as glue to hold the state together, or as the rallying point for
separatism, or for war, or for ethnic cleansing, even bordering on genocide in some cases. The normative language of politics and international relations becomes debased, where the concepts of self-determination, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are used by political leaders on opposite sides of the same conflicts to defend policies of war, or of uncompromising bargaining positions. And then at times the concepts are thoroughly abused in the interests of personal power or money or both. This is the story all too often recognisable in the Balkan and Caucasus.

Borderland Europe is full of mosaics of different nationalities, languages, cultures and religions. It is full also of the historical legacies of the great powers, up to and including the 20th century, by way of arbitrarily or cynically drawn frontiers, or changes in frontiers and forced movements of population. This has meant vulnerability of the post-communist states to these abuses of nationalism. This happens still at the beginning of the 21st century, when Western Europe has moved way beyond the regime of nation states, with complex and deep integration processes.

To western Europe the newly independent states of central and eastern Europe seem to be fighting the nationalist struggles of state formation of the 19th century, if not the mid 20th century struggles of decolonialisation. The EU can and does say this to its candidate states. The EU has a new model to offer them. Broadly speaking the incentive of joining Europe is proving powerful enough to bring these states along the European way, and to avert the dangers of abuse of the nationalising state.

But for the non-candidate states this incentive is not present or strong enough. In the most violent part of the Balkans, in the middle of the enlarging EU territory, the abuses had to be stopped by force (Bosnia, Kosovo). In the case of Kosovo it was left for Russia, the other empire, to complain that the EU and NATO’s actions were disregarding the rules of international law. However in the Caucasus the EU and West is not willing to intervene in the same way, certainly not in Russia’s Chechnya, and not even in the South Caucasus.

Ukraine is the biggest of the overlapping peripheries. Here too the priority of state building at the central level has dominated, notwithstanding the nation’s historic and deeply structured regional differences between West and East (Wolczuk, 2001). This nationalising state has kept the peace, but beyond that its performance has been dismal. Ukraine seems to cry out for a solution that would fit with the ‘Europe of the regions’, in which the West could profit from continuing open contact and indeed integration with Western Europe, while the East could
focus more on its Russian connections. Ukraine wants to have a multi-vectored foreign policy. But can it work?

2.2 Europe of Fuzzy Statehood

What is the modern European model? The official answer to guide EU accession candidates lies in the Copenhagen criteria for accession, which at the political level calls for “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities”. Official EU does not go further in specifying the model, beyond technical requirements to comply with the legendary 30,000 pages of EU legislation.

Yet more can be said on the subject, getting closer to problems of the newly independent states seeking to join Europe. Western Europe is thinking about its own recent experiences of finding compromises over pressures for separatism and antidotes to the virus of violent nationalism. This has both its macro and micro aspects. The macro concerns building EU institutions that can integrate together medium-sized states such as Germany and France as well as numerous small states. The micro, sub-state level sees solutions to tensions between national or ethnic or religious groups. Belgium and Northern Ireland might be taken as a sample of two such cases, but there are many other from the Italian Tyrol to the Åland Islands of Finland, as well as the obstinate, anomalous, unfinished tragedy of the Spanish Basques.

The system as a whole is treated in integration theory, as opposed to international relations theory (see Rosamund, 2000). This is basically the EU story, whereas more general theories are offered under the heading of the confusingly labelled “post-modern” paradigm (Buzan and Little, 2000), or “cosmopolitan democracy” (Held, 1995). The cosmopolitan theory brings together the role of the international as well as European organisations, and the trans-national operations of corporations and non-government organisations.

Let us use the term “fuzzy statehood” in the European context, as the categorical alternative to the ‘nationalising state’. Fuzzy statehood is about, firstly, a multi-tier governance system, with five vertical levels: local, regional, national (sovereign state), European (EU), global. Recent processes of globalisation, Europeanisation and regionalisation, all at the same time, have greatly undermined the primacy of the sovereign nation state. Secondly, it is about a system, which finds special solutions to the complex problems of the ethnic mosaics. This may have several elements: respect for minority rights in questions of language and
education, techniques of personal federalism overlapping territorial federalism (individuals who associate with a given cultural community can draw on certain public services wherever they live), mechanisms for inter-regional relations between frontier regions of neighbouring states (including asymmetric cases of a sub-state entity of one state dealing with another full state as partner). This takes place in a Europe where citizens’ rights become increasingly the common property of all EU citizens. Therefore the legal content of citizenship becomes substantially Europeanised. Subjective matters of identity become blurred between the regional, the national and the European.

This model of fuzzy statehood is one which the newly independent states of central and Eastern Europe are warmly invited to join. In fact it suits them even better than Western Europe, since their ethnic mosaics are often more complex, their frontiers have been changing more often, and so the old nation state model is more perilous for them. Indeed the idea is that their frontiers should be really fuzzy.

2.3 Borderland categories

The two empires are going to have many complicated borderland issues to manage. They are of several different categories, each requiring distinct approaches.

Clean cut frontiers. The Finnish-Russian frontier is the only case in point. The frontier was moved as a result of the Second World War to Russia’s advantage, Finland evacuating its population from the Viborg area and from what is now Russian Karelia. This is now a simple frontier between two nation states. But there is still the question how high will be the barriers at the frontier, for the movement of people in particular.

Overlapping peripheries. Here there are territories or peoples which find themselves on the ‘wrong side of the frontier’, but with no question of changing the jurisdiction, sovereignty or frontiers.

Kaliningrad is set to become an enclave in the enlarged EU. It is a region with many ills, which will require strong medicine to recover. The EU has made some cautious suggestions. Some Russians (e.g. Boris Nemtsov) have advocated a strong solution – a Hong Kong level of economic autonomy. Foreign minister Ivanov said on March 8 that Russia wants a long-t...
agreement with the EU over Kaliningrad, with legally binding solutions to ensure that the 
oblast benefits from EU enlargement.

In the Baltic States there are large Russian minorities, whose statehood and citizenship is not 
yet clear. In Estonia and Latvia in particular the nationality laws require knowledge of the 
Estonian or Latvian languages, which many adult and elderly Russian are unable or unwilling 
to pass. The EU will therefore take in many stateless Russians when Estonia and Latvia 
accede. Will these people have travel documents and EU citizen’s rights of employment, 
movement and residence? Those born in these states after independence automatically gain 
citizenship, but for the elder generation there remains a problem to be resolved.

**Integrating peripheries.** Here the state or entity is set on a strategy to integrate fully with 
Russia or the EU, but is unable to do this immediately.

Belarus’ present authoritarian leadership wants to deepen the union with Russia, and Russian 
nationals are now entrenched in government positions in Belarus. But opposition forces want 
a western orientation. Russia is wary of taking financial responsibility for a state which 
prefers to retain some international sovereignty.

The Balkans for their part seek integration with the EU, and historic links with Russia, 
especially in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro are now largely matters of past history.

The regimes of the South East European states provide a full spectrum: the advanced EU 
candidate state such as Slovenia; the less advanced EU candidate states such as Bulgaria and 
Romania; others no doubt to join the accession queue at some stage – Albania, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro; and finally the states or entities which cannot yet be trusted to live in 
peace, and have therefore become international protectorates – Bosnia and Kosovo. These 
weaker states call for special relationships with the EU in the virtual membership category, 
with considerable extension of EU policies and resources into their territories (Emerson, 
2001).

**Divided peripheries.** These are the states which are torn between West and East, for which 
stable solutions are not yet found.

Ukraine is deeply divided between Western and Eastern orientations. It might have devised a 
federal regime to satisfy both inclinations, but instead Kiev has established a poorly 
functioning centralised ‘nationalising state’ (Wolczuk. 2001). The EU Schengen visa regime
will hurt the western region and disappoint their western orientations. Russian capital is buying up strategic pieces of the Ukrainian economy.

In Moldova ethnic Romanian citizens can and do obtain Romanian passports, in order to attach themselves to Romania’s EU prospects, whereas the ethnic Russians of Transdniester run a separatist mafia-micro-state. Moldova also wants to look both East and West.

In Nagorno Karabakh an ethnically cleansed, Armenian ‘nationalised’ sub-state has frontiers of trenches and landmines marking its frontier with Azerbaijan. Fuzzy (common state) compromises have been considered, but so far nationalist sentiment has prevented a solution.

In Abkhazia an ethnically cleansed, Abkhaz ‘nationalised’ sub-state has become an informal Russian protectorate. Russian citizenship is available to Abkhazians who do not want to be Georgian, the frontiers are protected militarily by Russia, the Russian rouble is the currency. The demands of militant Georgian nationalists and Abkhaz separatists prove so far to be irreconcilable, with no inclination to devise a fuzzy statehood solution.

South Ossetia is a small contraband county in Georgia, a would-be autonomous republic and informal Russian protectorate. Russian citizenship is available. The Russian rouble is the currency. Northern Ossetia in the Russian federation proposes a free trade are with its Southern brothers in Georgia – a very fuzzy solution.

**Secessionist peripheries.** Chechnya has been seeking secession from the Russia Federation, and has become subject of two devastating wars in the last decade, to the point that Grozny resembles a Hiroshima landscape. Of course Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Kosovo, Montenegro and the former Yugoslavia generally are stories of secession. But for the present we follow the logic of the Europe of two empires. The EU complains that Russian methods on Chechnya are contrary to OSCE and Council of Europe standards of human rights. To which Russia replies that it is doing all of Europe a service, protecting its Eastern frontier against militant and even fanatical Islam, the ultimate frontier of the Common European House maybe.

The EU has its secessionist tendencies as well, principally in the UK and Denmark. The EU treaties have no secession clause. However it is recognised that any member state can walk away if it wants. Indeed the reluctant EU member state can walk away gradually if it wants to, as provided for by flexibility provisions which exclude some areas of EU policy competence (UK and Danish opt-outs).
To discuss these cases alongside each other serves to underline two points. First the EU is a reluctant empire. Russia wishes to fight for maintenance of its empire as its vital priority, apparently any cost. A democratic right to secession is not tolerated. Russia has also been seeking to regain dominance over the former Soviet space, not excluding crude pressurisation (Georgia, 2000-2001). Secondly, these differences in political culture confront each other. Do they simply co-habit Europe as neighbours? Or do these differences mean that this all-European regime is itself unstable and unsustainable?

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Space does not permit that we discuss all these cases, only a few words on the Balkans compared to the Caucasus. The two regions are comparable in size of population and territory, as also in topography and degree of ethnic ‘Balkanisation’ and in suffering from ethno-separatist conflicts. However one region is destined to ‘join Europe’, whereas the other is part of what Russia calls its ‘near abroad’.

Southeast Europe has been subject of a western Stability Pact, which is a circuit of official committee meetings. This mechanism is not highly regarded because its role is ambiguous and powers non-existent. The real mechanism is the prospect of Europeanisation (EU membership) for the whole of the region. Since neither is the EU itself ready for huge and rapid enlargement, nor are many of the states of the region capable of meeting EU criteria, methods of association have to be developed for a period or years, possibly decades in some cases. These are the classic mechanisms of empire, which may include encompassing policies of several types – trade, money, infrastructures, security system etc. The pressures in favour of European political norms (minority rights etc.) are also strong, either through incentives of EU integration, or through military intervention (with the help of NATO) where the entities are violently nationalistic. A model for this regime has been presented in the “CEPS Plan for the Balkans” (Emerson et al., 1999).

In the Balkans Russian influence has become minimal. But then how might one devise cooperative strategies for the EU and Russia together in the overlapping peripheries where Russia has been, and still wants to be the main player? One proposal has been worked out in CEPS under the title “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus”, setting out scenarios for conflict resolution (in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh), which would be based on political and constitutional settlements in the fuzzy statehood model (Emerson et al., 2000, and 2000a). In addition it is proposed that the EU with Turkey and Russia would cooperate in
reconstruction and development programmes, for example restoring the infrastructures of Abkhazia and allowing this potentially rich agricultural and touristic region to prosper again. This also would require that the blockaded frontiers of the region be completely opened up. Russia’s ‘national interests’ in the region would have to be reformulated in terms of securing favourable economic, social and political development for the wide Black Sea, South Russia and Caucasus region. The objective becomes to maximise ‘welfare’, rather than maintenance or power bases (literally military bases and frontier checkpoints guarded by Russian armoured personnel carriers). This is an invitation for Russia and the EU to make a convergence of paradigm. The so-called ‘realist’ paradigm of international relations theory, in which power over the largest feasible territorial space is the variable to be maximised, cedes its place to the norms of cosmopolitan democracy. Of course the convergence requires more movement on the Russian side, since it is an asymmetric situation. The Soviet Union collapsed because of system failure. The EU expands because of comparative success. But still the EU has to find ways to join Russia constructively, to make the transformation of paradigm profitable.

Such is the intention of the CEPS proposals for a joint action over the Caucasus. These texts have elicited reactions in Moscow think tank circles, and the following extract from Dmitri Danilov (2001) at least hints at the possible beginnings of a strategic dialogue on these questions, with suggestions of a mirror image symmetry between EU and Russian roles in the Balkans and Caucasus respectively. “What would meet Russia’s interests to a maximum extent is probably bilateral cooperation with the EU (not at all at the expense of cooperation with other partners in the Caucasus). Such cooperation would be viewed as an integral part of developing strategic partnership between Russia and the EU in the sphere of international policy and security, calling for increased interaction in other regions where Russia and the EU have common interests. But whereas in such regions as the Balkans or the Mediterranean the question is to which extent Russia can fit into the EU political strategy, being of interest as a partner, in the Caucasus the situation could be viewed is a mirror reflection. The prospects of the EU cooperation with Russia are determined by the extent to which Europeans are capable of formulating their interests in the context of those of Russia, taking account of Russia’s key role in the Caucasus. Here Russia itself faces a major task of formulating its fundamental interests in the region. It is worth supporting a proposal … to work out a “Platform of Russia’s Interests in the Caucasus”, which might lay a foundation for a dialogue with the EU over regional stability and development. … The bigger the scope of
such cooperation is, the higher will be the reputation and political potential of Russia and the EU in the Caucasus.”

3. Conclusions

In the struggle of paradigms for representing the evolving map of Europe, at the macro level the Europe of Two Empires is presently dominating the Common European Home. At the micro level, in Borderland Europe the nationalising state seems to have more force behind it than the Europe of fuzzy statehood. The cleavage between the two empires is becoming stronger and clearer.

Concretely, the movement of persons is becoming more difficult between the two empires, partly as a result of the ‘unintended’ effect of the EU’s Schengen rules in central Europe, while Russia uses visa policy as an instrument of pressure to consolidate its geo-political space in the Caucasus.

More generally a model of divergence dynamics can be recognised in the post-communist transition of Borderland Europe. EU candidate states are under enormous, self-willed, pressure to converge on EU norms and rules of all kinds. The non-candidate states are on the contrary perceiving exclusion, and lack of credible incentives to overcome the vested interests, which profit from murky corporate and public governance. Political leaders use the rhetoric and sentiment of the ‘nationalising state’ to protect their murky business interests. This also plays in favour of Russia’s efforts to consolidate its near abroad, playing by its own rules. The common rules, of OSCE and Council of Europe, become increasingly theoretical beyond the sphere of EU integration, even if there are some positive moves (recent accession of the South Caucasus states to the Council of Europe). These cleavages reinforce nationalising state tendencies in Borderland Europe, where several frozen or open conflicts really need fuzzy statehood solutions.

These trends mean trouble. Europe has long experience of its major powers getting fixed onto disastrous political tracks, which observers saw to be heading for trouble, but which proved politically impossible to correct until huge damage was done first. One should not spread alarmist exaggerations. At present the two empires have limited ambitions and capacities, and certainly do not want to threaten each other fundamentally. However their modes of cooperation are still weak compared to various underlying forces, of the type described by Tolstoy in War and Peace, which push for divergence. The problems of the overlapping peripheries are not being well handled, either by the local powers, or the two empires.
To correct these trends the two empires would have to engage together on a huge task of political will and organised deployment of resources. As is customary in European integration, there are alternative tracks: the pragmatic development of concrete common interests, and/or the working out of a grand design for convergence of common interests and ideology. Pragmatic projects could include the following:

- energy cooperation, not only for gas and oil supplies as already agreed in principle between EU leaders and President Putin in October 2000, but also over post-Kyoto implementation of measures to stop global warming. Here there is a huge project if Kyoto is taken seriously, as EU leaders claim, with Russia sitting on the biggest resource for CO2 emission savings. President Bush’s first moves in April 2001 (“Kyoto is dead”) encourage the EU to ally with Russia and Japan in this domain to rescue Kyoto;

- wider environmental cooperation, over nuclear hazards post-Kursk, and for conventional cleaning up of Baltic Sea pollution. The Stockholm summit encounter of the EU and President Putin in April 2001 saw authorisation by the EU for the European Investment Bank to make its first investment in Russia for this purpose;

- regional cooperation on a multi-sectoral front, started already in Baltic and Barents Sea ‘Northern Dimension’, with the model to be reproduced maybe in the Black Sea with a ‘Southern Dimension’;

- modernisation and humanisation of the regime for movement of persons between the two empires, notably for the DHL brigade (the decent, honest, law-abiding citizens). The present archaic visa system does not hinder the bandits, but does deter and humiliate the DHL brigade, and entrenches societal divergences;

- crisis management with joint operations between the EU’s planned rapid reaction force and Russia, for which the Caucasus region could be a good test, to see whether this is feasible or not;

- Russia even addresses to Europe through NATO a proposal for common missile defence system. Technically this is conceivable. Politically it would be highly interesting, since it would mean a strategic alliance. But, to be serious for the EU, or European NATO members, Russia would have to demonstrate credibly and durably its will and capacity to converge on common political norms. This is not clear so far the case.
This last point is the most fundamental argument. These several vast and interesting projects cannot get far without convergence on common rules and standards, be it for economic investments, or intervention in crisis regions, or strategic security. The common political norms already exist in the OSCE and Council of Europe. But these organisations – now assemblies of so many small states - become impractical for operational strategic business and inconvenient for both Russia and the EU in different ways. The bilateral EU-Russia strategic partnership would therefore have to take the lead role. A major revision and modernisation of Russia’s conception of its national interests would be needed, in favour of modern economic, social and political models. It would also need a major upward commitment of EU resources. If all this were done it would amount to a considerable rehabilitation of the Common European Home, an admirable project for the two empires.
References


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