Abstract

In April 2011, France reintroduced internal border checks with Italy to prevent mobility by North African immigrants who hold temporary residence permits issued by Italy and who had entered the EU from Tunisia as a result of revolutions and war in the southern Mediterranean region. This has caused a diplomatic row between the two countries, as well as reactions by other EU member states and at the EU levels. This paper examines the compatibility of the Italian and French measures with EU border legislation and legal principles as well as the foundations of the Schengen regime. It argues that the Franco-Italian affair illustrates a ‘race to the bottom’ on European principles of solidarity, loyal cooperation and fundamental rights. The affair ultimately reveals the very limits and unfinished elements of the EU’s immigration and border policies. Finally, the paper puts forward policy recommendations to the parties involved.
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A Race against Solidarity
The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair
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Introduction

The effects of the turmoil in North Africa on human movements and displacements, both in North Africa and towards Europe, have been well documented by the media and politicians during the last months. Certain member states of the EU have most visibly faced the challenges of migratory movements from North Africa because of their territorial location as ‘gatekeepers’ of the common EU external border in the Mediterranean.

Italy has been a case in point, with Interior Minister Roberto Maroni repeatedly expressing concerns to Italy’s Schengen counterparts and the European Commission, and calling for more ‘European solidarity’ in handling the entries of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants through its territory, particularly through the island of Lampedusa. The presumed isolation and lack of assistance from the EU even prompted Maroni to question the value of Italy continuing to be a member of the EU.1

These past weeks have witnessed yet again another test of the capacity of Europe’s immigration and border policies to provide a legitimate, common and fundamental rights-compliant answer to the dilemmas posed by migratory flows in this period of reform and instability in North Africa. Since the beginning of April 2011, Italian authorities have issued temporary residence permits for humanitarian protection to undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia who arrived in Italy before 5 April 2011.2 These residence permits grant them an automatic right to move freely within the Schengen territory and other EU member states. In response to the Italian measure, France introduced internal border checks between the two countries, which have resulted in pushing back hundreds of immigrants holding these permits during the last three weeks3 and the blocking of trains from Ventimiglia, the last Italian town before the French border, carrying some 300 migrants and NGO representatives on 17 April 2011.4

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This has caused a bilateral diplomatic row between the Italian and French governments, which is persisting at the time of writing and whose final solution is likely to come from the EU level in Brussels, and potentially before the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Other EU member states, such as Germany and Belgium, have also expressed concerns about the Italian measures, but unlike France they have not reintroduced internal border controls with Italy so far. A harsh reaction came for example from the Netherlands, where Prime Minister Mark Rutte declared that “[a]ny Tunisian who got in through the Berlusconi arrangement, must leave the Netherlands”. Other EU member states, such as Austria, Germany and Belgium, have also expressed concerns about the Italian measures. The case has finally attracted the attention of the European Commission, which according to information provided in a press briefing on 18 April 2011, is waiting for an official letter to be issued by the French government providing detailed information on the reintroduction of internal border controls with Italy.

The Franco-Italian affair raises several EU-relevant issues in need of reflection and critical assessment, not least in view of their effects on the legal commitments that both France and Italy have under the EU’s migration policy and border law. Yet also and more generally are the wider implications of the affair for the political legitimacy of the Schengen border regime within and outside Europe, in a case presenting such significant foreign affairs consequences for Europe’s ‘southern neighbourhood’ and Africa.

A first question relates to the legality of the Italian measures and the French border practices in light of European legislation. Both countries are members of the Schengen regime, and consequently they are bound to respect the rules stipulated in the Schengen acquis when managing the common EU external borders and guaranteeing the principle of free movement of persons within their internal territories. The Franco-Italian affair especially calls for a test of the consistency of the national immigration measures and actions with the common corpus of legislation on border crossings harmonized by the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).

Beyond these legalistic considerations, a second important aspect is that of the negative repercussions of the case on the general principles of law at the foundations of Europe’s immigration policy and the Schengen system as a whole. More specifically, these are the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, and sincere and loyal cooperation, as well as respect of the fundamental human rights of persons on the move.

This paper examines the compatibility of the Italian and French measures with EU border legislation. It tests the national laws and practices in the Franco-Italian affair against EU rules and principles. On the basis of the results stemming from our assessment, the paper argues that the Franco-Italian affair illustrates a ‘race to the bottom’ on European solidarity as well as a challenge to the legitimacy of the Schengen regime and the EU’s border policy.


6 See S. Pignal and J. Chaffin, “Italy’s release of EU migrants strains EU ties”, Financial Times, 12 April 2011 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c7f70cc-6466-ea9a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1K9R77IoD); see also D. Mara, “Germany tells Italy to ‘solve its own problems’ in Tunisian refugee row”, Deutsche Welle, 10 April 2011 (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,14980272,00.html).

The scope of the case goes beyond an anecdotal example of the temporary reintroduction by an EU member state of internal border controls in the Schengen area. It rather needs to be interpreted as a tangible instance of repressive policy responses emerging in a context of widespread anti-immigration and xenophobic political discourses expressed by certain EU national leaders, which artificially link human mobility (and especially that labelled as ‘illegal immigration’), with insecurity and criminality.

Additionally, it has visible impacts on the fundamental rights and freedoms of those hundreds of persons who have faced ‘the borders’ imposed by France. It also affects the EU’s foreign relations because of the message being sent from these EU member states about the kind of solidarity that the countries and populations in North Africa experiencing democratic uprisings and violence can expect from the EU.

From this viewpoint, not only does the Franco-Italian affair entail several legal and political questions that directly challenge the principles of solidarity and sincere/loyal cooperation between member states in a dispute. It also reveals the very limits and unfinished elements of the EU’s immigration policy.

1. Testing legality in the Franco-Italian affair

The relevance of the affair at the EU level stems directly from France and Italy’s membership in the Schengen regime. Almost 25 years after its inception,8 and 16 since its formal implementation, Schengen continues to be one of the central political components of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ has been established and to a large extent developed on the basis of achieving a common external border policy along with a common internal space exempted from internal border controls, where the right to free movement of persons is duly guaranteed and promoted.

The Schengen regime relies on the absence of any controls on persons (independent of their nationality),9 “in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls”. Membership of the EU does not fully correspond with that of Schengen. Currently, there are 22 EU member states in the Schengen area,10 to which we need to add 4 non-EU member states (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein).

The operability of the Schengen system and the Europeanization of border and immigration policies have led to various important consequences for its members, which are also of special significance when examining the background of the Franco-Italian affair.

First, certain member states, especially those in southern (Mediterranean) and south-eastern Europe have become the territorial external borders of the Union. Their own external borders have been transformed into those of the Schengen territory. They now hold the main responsibility for checking the entry conditions and determining the lawfulness of crossing the territorial external borders for the entire ‘Schengenland’. This transformation has been particularly apparent in relation to the migration movements from Africa to Europe through the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and their dramatic and humanitarian considerations.

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8 See the Agreement between the governments of the states of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed at Schengen, 14 June 1985. This was succeeded by the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 239, 22.09.2000.

9 Refer to Art. 77.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

10 Five EU member states currently do not participate in Schengen: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK.
Second, Schengen relies heavily on a high degree of confidence among the participant states at times of automatically recognizing the positive or negative decisions (border checks)\(^\text{11}\) taken by any member country to allow entry into the common territory and the crossing of the external border. It is firmly embedded in a profound level of solidarity and cooperation among the participating states.\(^\text{12}\) The system has also been founded on a premise of imagining the Schengen system as equivalent to an internal space, where the divide between the internal and external borders of the nation-state (and differentiation between inside and outside) are no longer supposed to be relevant and internal frontier controls constitute an exception to the general rule, which is free mobility. Third, the abolition of internal border controls has led to a situation whereby immigration policy measures and border control practices by one member state have immediate (or potential) knock-on effects for the other members of the ‘Schengen club’. Border checks are no longer in the exclusive interest of the member state at whose external borders ‘the control’ is supposed to occur, but in that of all EU member states having abolished internal border controls and participating in a common space of free circulation.\(^\text{13}\)

Schengen now has a set of consolidated legal contours. Since 2006, the previously fragmented and obscure Schengen acquis has benefitted from a common corpus of legislation that has taken the shape of a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across the borders – the SBC. It provides a common and transparent set of harmonized rules and procedures for crossing the external borders of the EU, which are legally binding for (and enforceable upon) all Schengen members.\(^\text{14}\) The European Commission has recently presented a revision of the SBC, designed to improve the clarity of the Schengen rules and the efficiency of border crossing procedures.\(^\text{15}\)

Indeed, no longer can France or Italy behave as freely as they would like to when it comes to powers to control of the admission, expulsion and access to rights by non-EU nationals. The SBC constitutes the materialization of a common set of European rules, standards and general (rule of law) principles that have reduced the margin of manoeuvre and sovereignty of EU member states over the management of human mobility and frontiers.

The next two sections of this paper examine the consistency of the measures taken in the Franco-Italian affair with the SBC, in particular the lawfulness of the Italian residence permits granting an automatic right to free movement and the reintroduction by France of internal border controls.

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\(^{11}\) According to Art. 2.10, border checks are to be understood as “checks carried out at border crossing point[s], to ensure that persons, including their means of transport and the objects in their possession, may be authorized to enter the territory of the Member States or authorized to leave it”.

\(^{12}\) Art. 3.2 TEU states that “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”.


\(^{14}\) Ibid.

2. The lawfulness of the Italian temporary-residence permits

The decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (DPCM) adopted in Italy on 5 April 2011 provides for the issue of temporary residence permits for humanitarian reasons in favour of “citizens of North African countries” who arrived in Italy from 1 January 2011 to 5 April 2011.\(^{16}\)

The decree was adopted on the basis of Art. 20 of the Italian Single Text on Immigration, which establishes measures of temporary protection in cases of “exceptional events”.\(^{17}\) In an attempt to provide grounds for the decree, the Italian authorities passed a second DPCM, which declared in rather contradictory terms a “state of humanitarian emergency in the territory of North Africa in order to effectively contrast the exceptional flow of migrants in the Italian territory”.\(^{18}\) So, while acknowledging that a humanitarian state of emergency was taking place in North Africa, the decree proposed action to mitigate its effects solely on the Italian territory, whereas – as discussed in section 3.1 – there was no such emergency in terms of the total number of entries into the Italian territory compared with those taking place in North Africa.

These acts need to be seen in conjunction with the bilateral agreement signed on 5 April 2011 by the Italian government with the Tunisian authorities.\(^{19}\) Even though the precise content of the agreement has not been made publicly available, it seems that it allows for the “swift repatriation” of migrants from Tunisia who landed on Italian shores after 5 April.\(^{20}\) On 18 April 2011, according to Roberto Maroni, 330 of the approximately 800 Tunisians who were still in Lampedusa had been repatriated.\(^{21}\)

The modalities through which these returns have been carried out may give rise to tensions in light of the procedural guarantees foreseen by the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC)\(^{22}\) as well as fundamental rights. For a start, those migrants who are pending forced removal have been kept in provisional structures (such as gyms, harbour hangars, stations and other public places) whose compatibility with the safeguards provided by the Returns Directive on specialized detention facilities remains contested. Furthermore, it appears that the migrants have not been

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\(^{16}\) DPCM del 5 aprile 2011 – Protezione temporanea, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 81 dell’8 aprile 2011.

\(^{17}\) Dlgs 286/1998, Art. 20, states that “extraordinary measures for the reception [of third-country nationals] in case of exceptional events” establishes the possibility to adopt through a DPCM measures of temporary protection in instances of relevant humanitarian needs, conflicts, natural disasters or other events of special gravity occurring in countries that are not EU member states.


\(^{19}\) Refer to the article “Franco-Italian row over Tunisian migrants escalates”, EUobserver.com, 18 April 2011 (http://euobserver.com); refer also to “Italy accord with Tunisia, repatriation for new immigrants”, ANSA.IT, 6 April 2011 (http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2011/04/06/visualizza_new.html_1526558772.html).

\(^{20}\) On the basis of the agreement, Italy will also donate 6 motorboats, 4 patrol boats and 100 off-road vehicles to the Tunisian police force, to help re-launch regular patrols of the coast (http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/00006_5_2011_04_12_Audizione_Maroni_Commissione_Camera.html 661262205.html).


properly notified of the expulsion decisions and final destination of return (or ‘deferred pushback’) adopted by the quaestor. Finally, it is also apparent that they have not been offered the possibility to obtain legal advice and lodge an appeal against the adopted decision (Vassallo, 2011).

In any case, one of the most contested issues concerning these temporary residence permits has been the recognition by the Italian authorities of an automatic right of free movement for the holders and the issuance of travel documents to the applicants in addition to the residence permits.23

In a circular disseminated by the French Minister of Interior Claude Guéant on 6 April 2011,24 the French government implicitly challenged the legality of the temporary residence permits issued by Italy. The circular orders a strict interpretation of the Schengen rules underpinning free movement for third-country nationals (TCNs) in France, effectively blocking the settlement of Tunisian migrants holding the temporary Italian permits. The circular gives strict instructions to regional police authorities when carrying out checks on immigrants, stating that TCNs must hold a valid travel document and emphasizing that the inability of an immigrant to prove s/he has sufficient (financial) resources is a legitimate ground for return. Two weeks after the publication of the circular, the French authorities justified border controls and the blocking of a train carrying immigrants and political activists across the French-Italian border as a response to public order concerns resulting from an “undeclared and unauthorised” demonstration planned by activists to support the free circulation of these immigrants.25

As mentioned in the introduction, the contestation by France of the legality of the Italian permits was accompanied by expressions of concern by Germany and other northern European countries. The interior ministers of Germany, Belgium and Austria have all made threats to reinstate border checks.26 Austrian Interior Minister Maria Fekter warned that Italy’s actions risked the “collapse of the Schengen system”, while German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich called Italy’s actions “a violation of the Schengen spirit”, accusing Italy of “politicis[ing] the whole Tunisian immigration issue so that everyone in the EU is affected by it”.27 Similar accusations regarding the illegality of Italy’s actions have been echoed by the Belgian Secretary of State for migration,28 and more general fears over the potentially damaging impact on Schengen cooperation are shared by member states including the Netherlands, Finland and Slovakia. That notwithstanding, according to declarations by Roberto Maroni, “[w]e have given the migrants travel documents, and...everything [else] needed, and the European Commission recognized that, it has said that Italy is following the Schengen rules”.29

23 Art. 2.3 expressly states that the permit allows the concerned person, who is holding travel documents, to freely move across EU member states.
26 See Pignal and Chaffin (2011) op. cit. and Mara (2011), op. cit.
29 Quotation derived from Italy’s Sky TG24 TV.
In a press briefing on 18 April 2011, the Commission seemed to support the French position by confirming that while the Italian authorities are free to issue temporary residence permits for humanitarian considerations, the latter cannot grant an automatic right of free travel in the Schengen area. That, the Commission argued, is because the applicants must in any case comply with all first-entry conditions stipulated by the SBC, such as that alleged by France on sufficient financial means for subsistence.

Therefore, who is right in this dispute? Have the Italian authorities violated the SBC when issuing the temporary residence permits? The following three aspects need to be taken into consideration when assessing the legality of the Italian decree and the nature of the temporary residence permits for humanitarian protection: first, the significance of compliance with the first-entry conditions when moving within the Schengen territory; second, the nature and scope of the temporary residence permit; and third, the intended public goal pursued by the Italian measures.

2.1 The relevance of first-entry conditions

The abolition of internal border controls and freedom of movement are based on the obligation of the country that is the first point of entry to verify compliance by the individual with a series of criteria determining the legality of the act of crossing the common external border. According to Art. 5.1 of the SBC, the Italian authorities were required to examine the following entry conditions applying to TCNs “for stays not exceeding three months per six-month period”:

1) possession of a valid travel document or documents authorizing the crossing of the border;
2) possession of a valid visa, in light of the conditions stipulated in the Community Code on Visas;
3) justification of the purpose and conditions of the intended stay and “sufficient means of subsistence for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their country of origin”;
4) whether the individual is subject to an alert in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for the purpose of refusing entry into the Schengen territory; and
5) whether the person is considered a “threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of any of the member states”.

Art. 5.4(b) of the SBC states that those TCNs who fulfil all the conditions stipulated in Art. 5.1, except that concerning a visa, and who present themselves at the common EU external border “may be authorized to enter the territories of the Member States if a visa is issued at the border” in light of Council Regulation No. 415/2003 on the issue of visas at the border of 27 February 2003.

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30 See Pignal and Chaffin (2011) op. cit. and Mara (2011), op. cit.
31 Identifying a way for derogation, Art. 5.4(a) establishes that those TCNs not fulfilling all those conditions but who hold a residence permit or a re-entry visa by one of the member states “shall be authorized to enter the territories of the other Member States for transit purposes so that they may reach the territory of the Member State which issued the residence permit or re-entry visa”.
32 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 415/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the issue of visas at the border, including the issue of such visas to seamen in transit, OJ L 64/1, 07.03.2003. Art. 1 of the Regulation states that “[b]y way of derogation from the general rule that visas shall be issued by diplomatic and consular authorities...a third-country national who is required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, may exceptionally be issued with a visa at the border”.
When assessing the compliance of the Italian measures with the SBC, both France and the European Commission have agreed that the temporary residence permits issued by Italy cannot grant an automatic right of free movement to the holders, as they will still need to comply with the above-mentioned first-entry conditions stipulated in Art. 5 of the SBC.

It could be argued, however, that these conditions exclusively apply (and therefore can be verified by the competent national border/police authorities) at the first point of entry when crossing the common external border, and not when exercising the freedom of movement within the Schengen area. Thus there should be a legal presumption that those persons crossing the internal borders between Italy and France do comply with the rules provided in Art. 5.

As we point out in section 3, when examining the legality of the reintroduction of internal border checks by France, the SBC does allow member countries to exercise “police powers” in relation to internal borders as long as they do not amount to systematic checks of equivalent effect to the border checks carried out at the common external borders. In our view it is clear that EU member states cannot carry out systematic checks at internal border-crossing points in order to verify that persons on the move comply with first-entry conditions (on this point see a similar position taken by the Court of Justice in section 3 below).

Art. 5.4(c) of the SBC also emphasizes that TCNs who do not fulfil these conditions of entry may be authorized to enter “on humanitarian grounds, on [the] ground of national interest or because of international obligations”. The fact that the Italian residence permits have been issued for humanitarian considerations may shed light as regards the appropriateness of this last provision of the Code and the legality of the right to move by the holders of these permits while still not fully complying with the criteria stipulated in Art. 5 of the SBC. This possibility is also envisaged in the scope of the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC), which states in Art. 6.4 that “Member States may at any moment decide to grant an autonomous residence permit or other authorization offering a right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory. In that event no return decision shall be issued.”

2.2 Validity of the temporary residence permit

In view of the above-mentioned DPCM of 5 April 2011, a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons can be issued to “citizens of North African countries” who entered Italy between 1 January and 5 April 2011. The permit is free of charge and lasts for six months. It can be used to move freely in the Schengen area together with a travel document – either a passport or an ‘alien’s travel document’ issued by the police authorities.

This exception is nonetheless subject to satisfying certain conditions, including the inability of the TCN to apply for a visa in advance and assurance of his or her return to a non-EU country or country of transit.

33 Still, according to Art. 21(c), the abolition of border controls at the internal borders shall not affect “the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to hold or carry papers and documents”.

34 Moreover, this provision continues by saying, “[w]here a return decision has already been issued, it shall be withdrawn or suspended for the duration of validity of the residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay”. Refer to Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008.
The decree specifies that “socially dangerous persons” or those who had been notified of an expulsion order before 1 January 2011 cannot be granted the temporary permit.\(^{35}\) Despite the explanatory note issued by the Italian interior ministry, many doubts remain about the personal scope of the measure. First, it is clear that the scope goes beyond those individuals holding Tunisian nationality. But which countries fall under the definition of “North African countries”? Second, could individuals who arrived in Italy without being stopped and identified by the authorities have been granted the permit? If that were the case, how would they prove the date of arrival?

The decree stipulates that “foreigners who have not been issued the residence permit (or to whom it has been withdrawn) should be pushed back or expelled”.\(^{36}\) Individuals who arrived in Italy a few hours after midnight on 5 April sadly will fall in this category. It remains difficult to understand how the “state of emergency in North Africa” that justified the use of the temporary residence permit can cease to exist from that date onwards.

As stated above, the Commission has not contested the legality of the residence permits per se, but rather the granting of an automatic right of free movement in the Schengen area. With respect to the validity of the residence permits issued by Schengen member countries under EU law, following Art. 34 of the SBC, Italy was required to notify in advance the European Commission about the issue of the decree, especially given the potential repercussions that the latter could be expected to have on the entire Schengen membership, and most directly for neighbouring countries like France. It appears that Italy did comply with this obligation by informing the Commission about it. Furthermore, while Italy retains national competence in issuing residence permits,\(^{37}\) the latter must also comply with Decision 2006/688/EC on asylum and immigration information exchange. This Decision calls on member states to communicate national measures in the area of asylum and immigration “likely to have a significant impact on several member states or on the European Union as a whole”.\(^{38}\)

\section*{2.3 The intended public goal}

What was the intended public goal driving the adoption of the decree granting temporary residence permits to undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia? Was the purpose to grant humanitarian protection to these individuals for a period during which return to their country of origin was not practically possible? Or, was the intention rather a political strategy by Italian authorities to force (or plumb the depths of) European solidarity by delivering administrative documents encouraging their holders to leave Italy and travel to other Schengen countries such as France?

\(^{35}\) The limitations established in Art. 2.2 concern: a) “socially dangerous” persons according to Art. 1 of Law No. 27/1956, b) addressees of an expulsion order notified before 1 January 2011, and c) individuals denounced for a crime included in Arts. 380-381 of the penal code.

\(^{36}\) See Art. 2.8.


\(^{38}\) According to Art. 1, information must be transmitted “as soon as possible, and at the latest when it becomes publicly available”. See the Council Decision of 5 October on the establishment of a mutual information mechanism concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, OJ L 283/40, 14.10.2006.
As stated above, the adoption of the decree first needs to be understood in a national political context, in which the Italian ministry of interior has continually raised complaints concerning the lack of solidarity of other European countries and Brussels. In addition, Italian politicians close to the government have fuelled anti-immigration and xenophobic discourses, justifying the implementation of ever-more restrictive policy measures for immigration control. By way of illustration, two politicians from Maroni’s anti-immigrant Lega Nord party even suggested that weapons should be used in order to protect Italy against “the invasion”.

Beyond the façade of the residence permits for humanitarian protection, the primary goal pursued by the Italian authorities has been to promote the mobility of those TCNs holding the permits. This was initially made evident by the declarations of the interior minister when he presented the decree before the Chamber of Deputies: “A temporary residence permit will be given to those migrants who have expressed their intention to go to another EU Member State.” Moreover, the real objective of the decree emerges quite transparently when reading the text of act, which includes an express reference to the automatic right that it confers to the holder to circulate freely in all the EU member states. This goes along with the Italian practice of additionally issuing travel documents to those Tunisian immigrants who lacked them.

Can the Italian residence permits entail an automatic right to move freely in the Schengen area? The SBC recognizes a right of free movement for everyone in the EU’s Schengen area. While EU nationals and their TCN family members acquire this right directly from the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on citizenship of the Union, TCNs in the Union acquire it from those provisions of the EU Treaties dealing with the internal market. The SBC places restrictions on this internal market right, limiting the right of TCNs resident in any one member state to free movement for a maximum of three months out of any six in the territory of other member states. To enjoy this right the TCN must have been admitted at the common external frontier in accordance with the SBC and subsequently entitled to move from one member state to another for a maximum of three months out of every six (Guild, 2005). The SBC permits member states to issue residence permits to those who otherwise do not meet the requirements for entry at the external borders, but once the residence permit has been issued and the member state that issued it has notified the Commission under Art. 34 of the SCB, the document has the equivalence of a visa for automatic entry anywhere in the Schengen space.

Yet if indeed the main public goal intended by the decree has been to encourage North African immigrants to leave the country, it could be concluded that the decree does stand at odds with the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation enshrined in Art. 4.3 of the new version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which states that


40 See the full speech of the minister on the website of the ministry of interior (http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/20/0011_Informativa_Ministro_Lampedusa_Camera.pdf).

41 Art. 2.3 states that the residence permit allows the holder, who is provided with travel documents, to move freely within the EU member states, in conformity with the provisions of the Schengen Agreement of 14 July 1995 and of the communitarian law.

Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.

The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.

In the scope of the Schengen regime, and as we have highlighted in section 1 above, this principle is of fundamental relevance because of the high degree of mutual trust and close (and constant) cooperation that is supposedly required among member states for it to effectively function (and continue to be legitimate) in practical terms.\(^{43}\)

3. French reintroduction of internal border controls

In response to the Italian decree and the issue of temporary residence permits, France reintroduced internal border checks between the two countries. The controls have materialized in the ‘pushing back’ of several hundred immigrants holding the Italian temporary-residence permits to Italian territory, and lately also in the blocking of NGO representatives from crossing the French-Italian border.

Although, and as discussed below, France is not the first member state to temporarily reimpose internal border controls since the implementation of the Schengen regime at the start of the 1990s, the significance of the Franco-Italian affair has implications for the principles of solidarity and loyal cooperation, along with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. It likewise has a foreign affairs dimension and sends a ‘message abroad’ by the EU on its immigration and border policies in the post-revolutionary and war context of the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood.

Similar to the situation in Italy, the French practices are also taking place during a period in which the French national government has publicly announced (ahead of regional elections) a central policy priority to expel thousands of irregular immigrants from the country. An announcement that 25,500 irregular immigrants had been removed from French territory in the first three months of 2011\(^{44}\) preceded the passing of a new immigration law in April 2011, which included measures to strengthen the detection, detention and expulsion of undocumented migrants.\(^{45}\) It is against this background of increasingly stringent controls on irregular migration that the French government has reiterated in several declarations its refusal to accept undocumented immigrants from Tunisia.\(^{46}\)

43 Art. 16 of the SBC on “Cooperation between Member States” notes that “1. The Member States shall assist each other and shall maintain close and constant cooperation with a view to the effective implementation of border controls, in accordance with Articles 6 to 15. They shall exchange all relevant information.”


The issue of whether the French practices are consistent with EU border laws, and particularly the SBC, needs to be scrutinized from the perspective of the legality of reintroducing internal border checks with Italy. One of the core features substantiating (and giving an identity to) the Schengen regime is the absence of internal border controls. According to the SBC, the internal borders of the Schengen territory may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons “irrespective of their nationality”.47

The official dismantling of internal frontiers has gone hand in hand with the creation and further consolidation of the principle of free movement of persons, which is now stipulated in Arts. 67.2 and 77 TFEU and is recognized as a fundamental right in Art. 45 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.48

This general rule of free movement has nonetheless been accompanied by several exceptions and derogative clauses in the hands of EU member state authorities. The SBC still permits the exercise of some “police powers” by competent national authorities in relation to “checks within the territory”, as long as this exercise “does not have an effect equivalent to border checks”49 and the checks “do not have border control as their objective”.50 These police powers must not constitute systematic border checks either and should be carried out on the basis of ‘spot-checks’.51

The limits of the exercise of police powers by France when implementing the SBC were (by coincidence) subject to a recent ruling by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In the Melki case (C-188/10),52 the contested measure was French national legislation allowing policy authorities, within an area of 20 km from the land border of a Schengen member state, to check the identity of any person not ‘at the borders’ but rather circulating within its national territory. The Court ruled against France and considered these police checks disguised border controls. The Court held that the SBC precludes

national legislation which grants to the police authorities of the Member States in question the power to check, solely within an area of 20 km from the land border of that State…, the identity of any person, irrespective of his behaviour and of specific circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order, in order to ascertain whether the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and documents are fulfilled, where that legislation does not provide the necessary framework for that power to guarantee that its practical exercise cannot have an effect equivalent to border checks.53

It is evident that the French practices in the Franco-Italian affair go beyond sporadic police controls within the French territory or ‘spot-checks’ at the border with Italy. They rather constitute a systematic reintroduction of internal border checks with Italy, whose main objective is border control at the French-Italian border of Tunisian immigrants holding the Italian temporary-residence permit.

47 See Art. 20 of the SBC.
48 Art. 45 of the EU Charter states that “1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 2. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State.”
49 See Art. 21(a) SBC.
50 Ibid., paragraph (i) SBC.
51 Ibid., paragraphs (iii) and (iv) SBC.
52 Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-188/10 Aziz Meki and C-189/10 Sélim Abdei, 22 June 2010.
53 See paragraph 75 of the judgment.
Concerning the possibilities conferred by the SBC to national authorities to derogate from the general rule of freedom of movement, the Code does in fact offer the possibility to member states to reintroduce border controls “exceptionally” at internal borders, subject to a number of rules provided in Arts. 23-31. The temporary reintroduction of border controls is justified in those situations where “there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security…[and for] no more than 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds the period of 30 days”.

Art. 24 of the SBC provides for the procedure to be applied for “foreseeable events”. Art. 25 confers the possibility to Schengen member states to “exceptionally and immediately reintroduce border control[s] at internal borders” in those cases where considerations of public policy or internal security call for “urgent action”.

As the appendix to this paper illustrates, the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen territory is not peculiar to the Franco-Italian affair. Since the beginning of the 1990s, several EU member states have introduced internal border controls, for instance during large-scale sporting events as in the case of Germany for the 2006 football World Cup, and for international political meetings, including Italy’s reinstatement of border checks during the 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila. While sensitive political demonstrations, ‘terrorist threats’ and ceremonies of national importance have all been cited as grounds for reimposing border controls, only a small handful of cases since the 1990s have been linked to the desire to restrict the immigration of TCNs (Groenendijk, 2004).

It is striking to note that one such incident that occurred at the same place along the French-Italian border (Ventimiglia) bears a strong resemblance to the recent Franco-Italian affair. In March 1999 France closed the border to prevent the entry of large numbers of Italians and Albanians arriving by train with the aim of participating in a demonstration in Paris to support undocumented migrants. In this case, however, the French actions did not provoke the political tensions observed recently. Indeed, it is surprising that the Franco-Italian affair of April 2011 provides only the second example in the history of Schengen whereby the temporary reintroduction of border controls has elicited a negative response from another member state.

That notwithstanding, and as the SBC expressly states, “in an area where persons may move freely, the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders should remain an exception”. The legality of the French border practices needs to be determined with respect to compliance with the criteria established by the SBC on the exceptional reintroduction of systematic, internal border checks, especially in relation to the following four factors: i) public policy and state-of-emergency considerations; ii) the principle of proportionality; iii) procedural requirements; and iv) fundamental rights and non-discrimination.

54 See Art. 23(1) SBC; moreover, in accordance with Art. 23(2),

[i]f the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond the period provided for in paragraph 1, the Member State may prolong border control[s] on the same grounds as those referred to in paragraph 1 and, taking into account any new elements, for renewable periods of up to 30 days, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26.


56 Refer to the appendix of this paper.

57 The only other occasion stemmed from France’s refusal to lift its internal border controls in 1995, owing to its concerns about Dutch policy on drugs.

58 See Recital 16 of the SBC.
3.1 Public policy and the politics of emergency

The first factor to be examined is the appropriateness of the French view of the case as one requiring “urgent and immediate action”, as well as that of classifying it as a “serious threat to public policy and internal security”. Can the actual volumes of migratory flows at stake and the nature of the planned demonstration by civil society representatives be considered threats to public policy or internal security and in need of emergency action?

How many immigrants are we talking about? In 2011 fewer than 28,000 persons have landed in Italy, among whom 23,000 are Tunisians and 4,680 are asylum seekers from Libya. According to information provided by the media, the total number of immigrants subject to the French border controls have been a few hundred – no more than 400 individuals. When comparing this data with, for instance, the total number of entries by non-EU nationals across the common EU external borders through airports and other borders, the amount is insignificant.

Based on data gathered by the Council of the European Union, in one-week’s time the total number of entries (external border crossings) through the EU external borders is 1,955,178. When looking at these statistics on a yearly basis, and being aware of the caveats involved in making such calculations, it could be estimated that around 61 million TCNs with no visa and 44 million TCNs with visas entered the EU in 2009. This would amount to a total of approximately 105 million entries by TCNs during 2009.

Indeed, as the statistics offered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2011) reveal, the real ‘emergency’ has been that taking place not in Europe but rather on the other side of the Mediterranean, where 550,680 persons moved from Libya to neighbouring countries (and almost half of them went to Tunisia).

Doubts concerning the extent to which the migratory flows from Italy could constitute a “serious threat to public policy” for France were also raised by Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, at her press briefing on 1 April 2011. Following her visit to Tunisia, the Commissioner answered in the following manner the question of whether the French authorities were entitled to send people back to Italy: “There are no borders so they can’t. Schengen is there so you are not allowed to do checks at the border. Because there is Schengen, [internal border controls] can only be evoked if there is a serious threat to public security and for the moment that is not the case, so in principle no.”

The low number of entries from North Africa to Italy, and even more so those from Italy to France, justify the non-application of the EU Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC). This Directive, which has not been used since its adoption, provides common minimum standards “for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons

59 See the declaration by Interior Minister Roberto Maroni of 12 April 2011 on the website of the Italian ministry of interior (http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/000065_2011_04_12_Audizione_Maroni_Commissione_Camera.html).

60 Council of the European Union, Results of the Data Collection Exercise, 13267/09, Brussels, 22 September 2009.

61 Refer to the statement by Commissioner Malmström following her visit to Tunisia, in the European Commission Midday Press Briefing of 1 April 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/player/streaming.cfm?type=ebsvod&sid=177156).

from third countries”. The main reason it has not been applied is that so far the numbers of displaced persons coming from North Africa to the EU have not been large enough for the situation to be considered a “mass influx”.

The French minister of interior was said to have taken the decision to suspend train services on the basis of a request by the police chief of the Alpes-Maritime, who cited “risques de trouble manifeste a l’ordre public”. Here the French authorities appear to take a wide interpretation of (intentions of) civil disobedience or public disorder. Flyers circulated on the Internet ahead of the event, dubbed the ‘Train of Dignity’, called on French and Italian human rights activists, lawyers and media representatives to board the train from Ventimiglia in order to “accompany and protect” migrants as they crossed the French-Italian border. The demonstration, primarily organized by the association ‘Ya Basta’, a network of Italian pro-immigrant rights organizations, also called on activists to form “welcome groups” to meet migrants as they arrived in Nice and Marseille. Ultimately, the event gathered 200-300 French and Italian demonstrators to accompany 60-100 Tunisian immigrants. Upon the suspension of train services, the demonstrators attempted to march to the French consulate but were blocked by riot police. There were no reports of violence during the episode.

While France holds a certain margin of discretion to determine what constitutes ‘public policy’, French authorities are not completely free to put into practice any interpretation of this concept. The proportionality test, which we discuss in the next subsection, closely applies in this respect as well. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon implies an expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg to rule on public order measures/exceptions by member states concerning checks on persons at internal borders.

### 3.2 Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is of especial relevance when testing the adequacy, suitability and necessity of the French measures. Art. 23.1 of the SBC provides that “[t]he scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control[s] at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat”. (Emphasis added.)

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63 Art. 2(a) clarifies that this will be the case especially if “there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection”.


66 See the website ‘Ya Basta’ (http://www.yabasta.it/spip.php?article1510&var_recherche=train%20dignite).


68 Art. 68.2 of the former Treaty Establishing the European Community had stated that “[i]n any event, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule [on] any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62.1 relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. Moreover, Art. 5.1 of the Directive adds that “[t]he existence of a mass influx of displaced persons shall be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council”.
Here again, it is far from evident the extent to which the movement of a few hundred people and the planned demonstration by NGO representatives could actually constitute a “serious threat” to France’s public policy and internal security. Nor is it obvious that the systematic reintroduction of internal border controls on human movement from Italy was “strictly necessary” or whether there were other less restrictive (and onerous) options for the persons involved. A similar position concerning the disproportionate attention and concern raised by this affair was expressed by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, when he declared that “of course there’s a risk of migration, but we must not exaggerate it”.69 Warnings against inflating the scale of the migration have been echoed by Commissioner Cecilia Malmström.70

The note delivered by the French ministry of interior on 6 April 201171 argued that the reintroduction of border checks was based on the fact that the permit holders failed to meet the following conditions: first, being in possession of a valid travel document; second, being a holder of a valid residence permit notified by the issuing member state to the European Commission; third, having sufficient means of subsistence; and fourth, not being considered a threat to public policy and internal security. Among these requirements, that related to the financial means of subsistence has been of particular relevance for the French authorities.

According to some media reports, it appears that the financial subsistence condition is being applied at the French Italian border, with police demanding that holders of the Italian temporary-residence permit prove that they have €31 per day (a total of around €900 a month) for their entry into French territory.72 The concordance of this requirement with proportionality is also questionable. Does the SBC allow all Schengen members to apply different thresholds of financial coverage? We are of the opinion that this financial requirement is not lawful if Italy properly notified the European Commission about the issue of the temporary residence permits in accordance with Art. 34 of the SBC (see subsection 2.2 above).

3.3 Procedural requirements

The reintroduction of internal border checks equally needs to comply with a number of procedural requirements. In accordance with Art. 25.2 of the SBC, France was under the obligation to notify the other EU member states and the European Commission “without delay” about the reintroduction of internal border checks “requiring urgent action” and to supply “the reasons justifying the use of this procedure”. More specifically, the French authorities needed to provide the following information: the reasons for the reintroduction (giving details of the

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events said to constitute “a serious threat to public policy or internal security”), its scope and the names of authorized crossing points, as well as its date and duration.73

France (or the Council) is also under the obligation to inform the European Parliament “as soon as possible of the measures taken”.74 The French authorities will be required to present a report on the reintroduction of the border controls before the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission outlining “the operation of the checks and the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control[s]”.75

It is at present difficult to determine the extent to which France has complied with all these procedural steps, a majority of which are deemed central from the perspective of accountability and democratic scrutiny of the national measures derogating the principle of free movement of persons. The European Commission has declared that France is intending to send an official letter providing this information, which in principle will not be made public.76

3.4 Fundamental rights, non-discrimination and administrative guarantees

The border checks carried out by the French authorities at Ventimiglia have mainly targeted undocumented North African immigrants from Tunisia holding an Italian temporary-residence permit. The compatibility of this kind of control with the principle of non-discrimination constitutes another issue of concern from a legal point of view. The SBC highlights a number of obligations that national border guards must fulfill in the performance of their duties in the implementation of the SBC. In particular, Art. 6 of the Code (on the conduct of border checks) stipulates that

1. Border guards shall, in the performance of their duties, fully respect human dignity. Any measures taken in the performance of their duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures.
2. While carrying out border checks, border guards shall not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.77

The focus on this specific category of immigrants and the presumption that only they do not comply with the set of first-entry conditions (especially that of financial subsistence) stipulated in Art. 5 of the SBC reveals a tension between the French border practices and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, which is also enshrined in the EU Treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and secondary legislation.78

73 According to Art. 24 of the SBC, “Member States may even prolong border control at internal borders after having notified the Commission and the other member states”. See also Art. 26 of the SBC.
74 See Art. 27 of the SBC.
75 Refer to Art. 29 of the SBC.
76 According to Art. 31 of the SBC, “[a]t the request of the Member State concerned, the other Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission shall respect the confidentiality of the information supplied in connection with the reintroduction and prolongation of border controls”.
77 Refer also to Recital 7 of the SBC, which states that “[b]order checks should be carried out in such a way as to fully respect human dignity. Border control should be carried out in a professional and respectful manner and be proportionate to the objectives pursued.”
Furthermore, any assessment of the legality of the French reintroduction of internal border controls and the Italian decree granting temporary residence permits should not distract our attention from the impact of these national measures and practices on the fundamental rights (e.g. human dignity) and freedoms of those targeted by coercive measures – especially given the humanitarian considerations underlying their migratory background.

It is to be hoped that the French border checks have complied with the set of administrative guarantees envisaged by the SBC in the treatment of TCNs when refusing entry. Art. 13 of the SBC sets out the following obligations for national authorities in refusing entry: first, the issue of a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for refusal in a standard form; and second, the right to lodge an appeal (which shall have no suspensive effect on the decision to refuse entry), along with a written indication of the contact points able to provide information or representatives competent to act on the individual’s behalf.79

Nor should we forget the repercussions of the French measures on the rights and freedoms of the representatives from civil society groups who accompanied the migrants on the trains blocked by the French authorities during the events of 17 April 2011, and especially their rights to freedom of movement and freedom of assembly and demonstration as enshrined in Art. 12 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As noted above, the planned demonstration was of a peaceful nature and might be difficult to categorize as a threat to public policy and public security. Indeed, following the event, France’s primary justification for blocking the demonstration was that it had not been declared and authorized by the authorities in advance.80

4. A race against solidarity: Conclusions

This paper has tested the legality of actions taken in the Franco-Italian affair with respect to the Schengen regime and has found that neither Italy nor France are exempted from difficulties in justifying the compliance of their national measures and practices with EU border law and the general principles of the Schengen regime. The actions of both countries raise several concerns from the viewpoint of EU law and their obligations under the SBC.

As regards the temporary residence permits issued by Italy for humanitarian considerations, we have argued that their lawfulness depends not on the systematic verification of the conditions of first entry through the common external borders (such as that of sufficient financial resources for subsistence), but rather on their compliance with the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation. Their legality is conditioned upon the extent to which the intended public goal of the Italian decree has been to offer proper humanitarian protection and access to fundamental rights to those Tunisian immigrants who cannot be returned to their country of origin, and not to force ‘European solidarity’ through the back door by encouraging them to leave the country and exercise freedom of movement to other Schengen states.

It is evident in our view, however, in light of the political discourses backing up the enactment of the decree and the emphasis given by its wording to the granting of an automatic right to move elsewhere in the EU, that the decree constitutes a violation of the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation.

79 Art. 13.2 of the SBC continues by saying that “[w]ithout prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to correction of the cancelled entry stamp, and any other cancelations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry”.

Concerning the reintroduction of internal border controls by France, in our assessment the French authorities have practised systematic border checks targeting those North African immigrants holding the residence permits granted by Italy since the adoption of the decree in the first week of April. We have doubts as to whether this migratory flow and the planned demonstration in Ventimiglia provide appropriate grounds for France to label them as serious threats to public order and internal security, given the volume of human movement (a few hundred persons) and the pacific nature of the planned demonstration supporting the claims of immigrants. France would also have difficulties in properly justifying the urgency of the situation in order to use the emergency procedure envisaged by the SBC for the reintroduction of border checks.

The relation between the French measures and the principle of proportionality is also a difficult one. The kinds of border checks that have been carried out appear to us to be disproportionate and exaggerated when considering the actual nature of the events. It remains to be seen how France will provide convincing grounds for defending their ‘strict necessity’ or whether there could have been other less restrictive and intrusive options for the freedom of movement and access to solidarity by the persons involved.

The reimposition by France of internal border controls can be said to amount to an excessive burden upon a fundamental EU right and freedom, i.e. the free movement of persons, which should always prevail as the general rule over the application of very well justified exceptions by EU member state authorities.

Sadly, the French practices also send a clear message concerning the lack of solidarity, not only with respect to its neighbour Italy, but also and perhaps more importantly towards the fundamental rights and freedoms of those North African immigrants who are holders of Italian administrative documents and who seek to exercise their legitimate right of freedom of movement in the Schengen territory. A similar message is also being sent by the French authorities abroad to the countries and populations of the North African states in the midst of democratic reform or war. The targeting of the border checks against this particular group of people is problematic in relation to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin and nationality as well as the administrative guarantees envisaged by the SCB for the conduct of border guards while carrying out border checks.

The Franco-Italian affair therefore reveals a rather shameful ‘race to the bottom’ by two Schengen members (one of which belonged to the original five Schengen members, i.e. France) as regards the principles of solidarity, mutual respect, loyal cooperation and fundamental rights protection. One would not expect these sorts of policies 25 years after the kick-off of Schengen. It is not just the legal commitments of both EU member states that are at stake in this case, but also the overall consistency and legitimacy of Europe’s migration policy, both internally and abroad.

The democratic uprisings in the North African states and the subsequent war in Libya should instead constitute a unique opportunity for all Schengen member states and the EU as a whole to develop common policy responses that put solidly into practice the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility in migratory policy affairs. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has provided that opportunity by positioning these principles at the heart of the common EU immigration, asylum and border policies. Notably, Art. 80 of the TFEU now stipulates that

\[\text{the policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts}\]
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.\textsuperscript{81}

It is time for the EU and its member states to give practical shape to the principle and notion of ‘solidarity’ beyond formalistic political statements and nice words. While the EU Treaties do not provide a definition of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, nor of their goals or fundamentals (Vanheule et al., 2011), it is in our view central that their development should broadly transcend strengthening border controls and FRONTEX (the EU Border Agency), support in the return of undocumented immigrants and EU funding resources. The Franco-Italian affair (yet again) shows how ineffective and counterproductive security (border control)-focused measures and restrictive immigration policies are with respect to dealing with the management of human flows in way that fully complies with EU basic, general principles.

Freedom of movement and labour immigration should not be seen as ‘a burden to share’ for the EU and its member states, but rather as an opportunity for all the parties involved. A wider and multidimensional understanding of solidarity needs to encompass the consolidation and further development of a common EU labour immigration policy, which would be coherent with Europe’s labour market needs and competitiveness. Such a policy should be driven by a rights- and fair treatment-based approach, ensuring openness, flexibility, compatibility with other policies (such as employment, non-discrimination and social inclusion) and effectiveness (Carrera et al., 2011).\textsuperscript{82}

National measures and practices such as those witnessed between France and Italy undermine basic legal rules and principles of the EU’s AFSJ and the Schengen regime. They also exert negative repercussions on the EU’s relations with the non-EU countries whose nationals are being subject to repressive immigration policies and discourses at various governance levels, and more widely with Africa.

The European Commission should therefore react more strongly and ‘on time’ – by making swift use of current enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance with EU law and potentially devising new ones ensuring an automatic suspensive effect of contested national measures having an impact on European fundamental freedoms and rights (Carrera and Atger, 2010) – when disputes take place, such as those occurring at the Franco-Italian border. It should show stronger leadership and a communication strategy against populist and nationalist anti-immigration rhetoric (policies and practices) by European leaders. The promotion and scrutiny of the proper implementation of existing standards on fundamental human rights in other international and regional arenas across the EU member states should become a central priority. The EU should devise an appropriate monitoring system, ensuring the daily implementation of European border laws (and their compliance with fundamental rights and EU freedoms) across common external borders (air, land and sea), and meeting the principles of impartiality, objectivity and transparency (Carrera, 2010). The European Parliament should also be immediately and fully informed about all the details of such cases by the relevant parties involved, to ensure full democratic scrutiny and accountability.

The current version of the Schengen system as outlined by the 2006 SBC must not be revised following the nationalistic and opportunistic goals expressed by the French and Italian

\textsuperscript{81} Refer also to Art. 2 of the TEU, which identifies solidarity as one of the key values of the EU, and Art. 3.3 TEU, which stipulates that the EU “shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States”.

\textsuperscript{82} This would also be in line with Art. 67.2 TFEU, which calls for the development of a common immigration policy “based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third country nationals”. 
governments in their bilateral meeting of 26 April 2011. As an outcome of that summit, Silvio Berlusconi and Nicolas Sarkozy issued a joint letter to Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, calling for the upcoming June 2011 European Council to examine new measures to reinforce ‘security’ in Schengen, such as “the possibility to temporarily re-establish internal border controls in case of exceptional difficulties in the management of common external borders”.

This proposal is surprising. As discussed in this paper, the SBC already envisages the possibility for a member state to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls in cases where “there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security”. This possibility, however, is an ‘exception’ in the hands of national authorities and it is firmly subject to a number of procedural requirements and subject to the principles of proportionality, solidarity, accountability and fundamental rights. A new legislative reform exclusively destined to widen (even further) the room for manoeuvre by EU member state governments to abolish the current Schengen rules and the principle of freedom of movement (and evade their current legal commitments) would not just contravene these basic rule of law principles, and more generally, the EU Treaties. Such legislative reform would also constitute a major step backwards in European integration, the very foundations of Schengen and the principle of free movement, which has been correctly considered one of the “great success stories of the EU” (Groenendijk, 2009). It would also represent a strengthening of ‘intergovernmentalism’ in an area that currently falls under EU competence/law and endanger the sustainability of the EU’s AFSJ and the internal market.

As demonstrated in this paper, this affair not only concerns a formalistic ‘legal check’ of the application of one of the main components and general principles of the EU’s AFSJ, the SBC, but also has major implications for the fundamental rights and freedoms of many individuals in Europe as enshrined in the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is the very legitimacy of one of the EU’s political cornerstones that is at stake when EU member states engage in a race to the bottom in migration and border control standards.

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84 The full text of the joint letter is available from the website of the Italian ministry of foreign affairs (http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011/04/20110426_ItaliaFrancia.htm).
References


Appendix. Reintroduction of internal border controls

Methodological note
There is no systematic, official EU record of all instances involving the temporary reinstatement of internal border controls since 1995. Consequently, Table A1 is not exhaustive but aims at demonstrating, through the data available, a general overview of the member states involved and the grounds invoked when internal border controls have been temporarily reintroduced over the past 15 years.

Entries occurring from October 2006 onwards (since the entry into force of the Schengen Borders Code) are complete and are taken from the European Commission’s Report on the application of Title III (Internal Borders) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).  

Entries occurring between January 2000 and June 2003 are taken from the Statewatch European Monitor.  

The sources of all other entries are provided in the table or table notes, and are primarily derived from the individual, ad hoc notifications available in the public register of Council documents. Justifications relating to immigration control objectives are shown in green shading, and those relating (explicitly) to political activism/organized demonstrations are in blue.

Table A1. Instances of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders between 1995 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>July 1995–1998 (approximate)</td>
<td>Concerns about Dutch policy on drugs caused France to delay its lifting of internal border controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>March 1999</td>
<td>Demonstration in support of undocumented immigrants in Paris (controls reinstated at French–Italian border to prevent the crossing of Albanians and Italians to participate in the demonstration) (cited in Groenendijk, 2004, p. 158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>April 1997</td>
<td>Demonstrations of Kurdish and Turkish immigrants in Germany (concerns about violence spreading across the Dutch-German border) (cited in Groenendijk, 2004, p. 158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10–31 January 2000</td>
<td>Immigrant regularization programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Belgian restoration of border checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7–12 July 2000</td>
<td>Visit of the Iranian President Mohammed Khatami</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10–14 October 2000</td>
<td>Biarritz European Council meeting, 12–14 October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11–14 October 2000</td>
<td>Biarritz European Council meeting, 12–14 October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>25–29 November 2000</td>
<td>Visit of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar from Spain, 28–29 November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>26 December 2000–10 January 2001</td>
<td>Risk of a sudden, temporary increase in asylum seekers owing to new asylum restrictions from 10 January 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>25 June–3 July 2001</td>
<td>European economic summit, Salzburg, 1–3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14–21 July 2001</td>
<td>G8 meeting, Genoa, 20–22 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5–12 December 2001</td>
<td>Nobel prize ceremony, including Palestinian leader Yassar Arafat and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30 January–4 February 2002</td>
<td>Events scheduled by the Spanish presidency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1 February 2002</td>
<td>Checks among passengers on two planes from Copenhagen for members of a suspected organized crime group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>11–13 March 2002</td>
<td>Visit of the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, 11–13 March 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9–18 March 2002</td>
<td>Barcelona European Council meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21–23 March 2002</td>
<td>Informal meeting of EU defence ministers, Zaragoza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>7–16 May 2002</td>
<td>NATO meeting in Reykjavik, 14–15 May 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14–22 June 2002</td>
<td>EU summit, Seville, 21–22 June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9–17 September 2002</td>
<td>European economic summit, 15–17 September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19 October 2002</td>
<td>Batasuna meeting/rally, Bayonne (Pyrenees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1–10 November 2002</td>
<td>European Social Forum, Florence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6–12 December 2002</td>
<td>Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6–14 December 2002</td>
<td>Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20 December 2002–7 January 2003</td>
<td>Movement of eminent persons during the Christmas holidays to the area of the Arán Valley (Lleida)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>22 May–3 June 2003</td>
<td>Summit of heads of state or government of the G8 member states, Evian-les-Bains, 1–3 June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1–8 June 2004</td>
<td>Ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary of the D-Day landings b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15–24 May 2004</td>
<td>Wedding of Prince Felipe c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A1. cont’d

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9 July–9 August 2005 (Prolonged for successive one month periods until 9 February 2006)</td>
<td>Concern over potential terrorist attacks following the London bombings of 7 July 2005 e) and attempted terrorist bombings in London on 21 July 2005 f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16 August–14 August 2005</td>
<td>World Championship in Athletics held in Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9 February–28 February 2006</td>
<td>Olympic games in Turin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25 February 2006</td>
<td>Demonstration by Batasuna in Cibourne (France) b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1 June–10 July 2006</td>
<td>2006 Football World Cup j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>25 August–12 September 2006</td>
<td>ASEM summit, Helsinki, 10–11 September 2006 k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21 October 2006</td>
<td>Youth Days of radical young Basques in Saint Pée-sur-Nivelle and demonstration organized in Bayonne by the support committee of Philippe Bidart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9–21 October 2006</td>
<td>Informal meeting of heads of states and government, Lahti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>13–29 November 2006</td>
<td>EUROMED meeting, Tampere</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25 May–9 June 2007</td>
<td>G8 summit in Heiligendamm/Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, 6–8 June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2–3 November 2007</td>
<td>Participation of MC Hells Angels at the inauguration of the Icelandic Motorcycle club, Reykjavik, 1–4 November 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2 June–1 July 2008</td>
<td>European Football Championship Euro 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27 September 2008</td>
<td>Demonstration on 27 September at 16:00 in Bayonne, supervised by Batasuna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>24 November–5 December 2008</td>
<td>Meeting of OSCE Council of Ministers, Helsinki, 4–5 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>5–7 March 2009</td>
<td>Visit of MC Hells Angels to the Icelandic Motorcycle club, Reykjavik</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>30 March–5 April 2009</td>
<td>NATO summit, Strasbourg, 3–4 April 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28 June–15 July 2009</td>
<td>G8 summit, L’Aquila, 10–12 July 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19 September 2009</td>
<td>Demonstration by Batasuna in Bayonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>26–27 September 2009</td>
<td>Celebration of ‘Basque Warrior Day’ in the Basque Country and Navarra (ES) and in Pyrénées-Orientales (FR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27 September 2009</td>
<td>50th anniversary of ETA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>27 November 2009–12 December 2009</td>
<td>Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, Oslo, 10 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1–18 December 2009</td>
<td>UN Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, 7–18 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5–18 April 2010</td>
<td>Visit of Pope Benedict XVI, 17–18 April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>17–23 April 2010</td>
<td>Informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers, Tallinn, 22–23 April 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28 May–2 June 2010</td>
<td>Franco-African summit, Nice, 31 May–1 June 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>24 May–1 June 2010</td>
<td>NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Riga, 28 May–1 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>16–20 November 2010</td>
<td>NATO summit, Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification relating to immigration control objectives</th>
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<td>JUSTIFICATION</td>
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<tr>
<th>Justification relating (explicitly) to political activism/organized demonstrations</th>
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<td>JUSTIFICATION</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\[a\]  Schengen Annual Report 1996, SCH/C (97) 22; Council document 19846/1/99 REV 1.
\[b\]  Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border checks pursuant to Article 2.2 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement”, 10071/04, Brussels, 2 June 2004.
\[g\]  Council of the European Union, Note on the “Introduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 14823/05, Brussels, 24 November 2005.
\[h\]  Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 6825/06, Brussels, 28 February 2006.
\[i\]  Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border checks on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 8839/06, Brussels, 2 May 2006.
\[j\]  Council of the European Union, Note on “Border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 8543/06, Brussels, 2 April 2006.
\[k\]  Council of the European Union, Note on the “Reintroduction of border controls on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention”, 12349/06, Brussels, 30 August 2006.

Sources: Authors’ compilation based on the sources specified.
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