

## *Turkey and its neighbourhood*

Turkey's new assertiveness in its neighbourhood is there for all to see, with new initiatives proceeding seemingly at a rate of about one a week. One can readily understand why this has happened, the combination of the natural weight of a large and dynamic economy, a strong military, and a unique position as a democratic Muslim state in a region with few other political models that compete for emulation; plus, not the least of reasons, frustration over its EU accession chances. If accession were foreseeable over a politically relevant time horizon, then the idea of virtual integration with EU foreign and security policy would have been a natural direction to take. But that is not the case, so explicit have been the objections to Turkish membership coming from Berlin and Paris. Yet Turkey is still a NATO member state, the implications of which we will turn to in a moment.

So Turkey's new assertiveness can be considered both legitimate and understandable as a general proposition. But that still leaves open the question whether its actual initiatives are to be greeted with approval, or disapproval, or just no comment.

The latest initiative has seen Turkey's foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, architect of the new foreign policy, in Astana discussing with Kazakhstan the idea of concerting their assistance to Kyrgyzstan. The two foreign ministers said that they had agreed a joint action plan, but declined to reveal its content pending consultations with other concerned states. Turkey has recently taken over from Kazakhstan assumed the chair of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence building Measures in Asia (CICA), which indeed implies responsibility for responding to the Kyrgyz crisis. Turkey's first foray into the newly independent Central Asian states in the early 1990s was not a success, with excess ambitions being interpreted by the Central Asians as a re-assertion of the Ottoman Turk. Maybe Turkey now tries again with more sensitivity. At home the Turkish government has been subject to some criticism that they had been neglecting Central Asia, given the conspicuous and even spectacular initiatives in the Middle East.

Much of the past year's Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East has been reasonable and commendable, notably its bonding with Syria and Lebanon, attempting to mediate a peace deal between Syrian and Israel, and putting pressure on Israel to adopt policies more conducive to a real peace process. With both the EU and US constrained politically by well-known factors from adopting a strong policy towards Israel, one can appreciate Turkey choosing a high profile, asserting a leading role among the Islamic world.

But, but ... Is Turkey's new foreign policy under sound management and control? The Gaza flotilla affair seems to have thrown up tendencies questioning its role as would-be regional leader and G20 member. What were the links between the Turkish Islamist NGOs and the government in the launching of the flotilla? Manifestly the Turkish government was in the picture. If it had chosen a policy to break the blockade by peaceful means that would have been quite understandable, and even admirable. But in that case Turkey should have informed Israel that it was sponsoring the deliveries and at the same time guaranteeing by inspections of their own security services that the vessels had no weapons on board. Israel may have responded with predictable excess use of force, killing nine innocent civilians, but this does not mean a pass mark for Turkish diplomacy. On the contrary the risks were all the more reason why official Turkey's implication, or non-implication should have been absolutely clear. As it is the observer is left with the impression that the Turkish government was willing to leave all the risks with the NGOs.

The Iran deal with Brazil, with Erdogan, Lula and Ahmedinejad raising their arms in Tehran on 17 May as if in triumph at having won a world cup a few days before the UN Security Council (with both Brazil and Turkey currently temporary members) was due to vote new sanctions, is open at best to very serious questions, if not harsh criticism.

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*editorial continued...*

"The accord with Tehran was a diplomatic victory and those countries that criticize us are merely envious," Erdogan said. Here was Turkey, NATO member state, undercutting the laborious efforts of the so-called E3+3 (France, Germany, UK + China, Russia and US) to bring Iran's nuclear programme to order. This prevailing interpretation is however somewhat confused by reports that Obama had been encouraging the deal. But in this case how could the process have got so grossly uncoordinated and mismanaged into becoming a major diplomatic disagreement, deepening the confusion over what this Turkey now stands for. The new assertiveness of emerging world and regional powers may be understood to be part of the new multi-polarity. But this seems to have been an impetuous diplomatic ego-trip, without responsibility towards real global concerns, from a supposedly loyal NATO ally. Moreover the E3+3 initiative was so much more than the old West trying to run the show, with China and Russia having finally come to the conclusion that there were truly global concerns and responsibilities at play.

Turkey is a democratic society and political system. There is unease apparent at home over some of these manifestations of the new Turkish foreign policy. And in Europe too.

*by Michael Emerson*

**EP on political agreement on EEAS**

EP press service.

Brussels, 21 June 2010. [Link](#)

The deal struck on the European External Action Service (EEAS) on Monday in Madrid lays the basis for a strong EU diplomatic service, Parliament's negotiators told Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs on Tuesday. The service's Community identity will be strengthened and its political and budgetary accountability to Parliament is guaranteed.

Two of Parliament's EEAS negotiators – Elmar Brok (EPP, DE) and Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, IT) – briefed MEPs on the political agreement they reached on Monday with the High Representative, the Council and the Commission on the setting up of the service.

The agreement reached is on amendments to the proposal for a Council decision, on which Parliament was consulted, establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. The negotiators also reached an agreement on two declarations by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the political accountability of the service and on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration.

Commenting on the deal, Elmar Brok said “we have reached an agreement which doesn't bind us under the legislative procedure but which is a good one. We now have to work on the prerequisites for a Council decision”, adding that “whether my report can be endorsed before the summer depends very much on the groups' chairs”. Mr Brok also said that on Wednesday he would propose a draft report based on the agreement reached at Monday's four-party meeting.

On the timetable, Mr Brok said that the Foreign Affairs Committee could discuss the report at the Strasbourg part-session (Monday 5 July) and vote on it on the morning of Tuesday 6 July. The plenary could endorse the report on Thursday 8 July. Changes to the Financial Regulation and the Staff Regulation would not be put to a vote before the summer break, he added.

The operational part of the EEAS budget will be integrated in the Commission's internal budget. To make this budget more transparent and to facilitate Parliament's scrutiny of the spending, the Commission has said it would provide Parliament with a document clearly accounting for the external action parts of the Commission budget. In addition, the EU's main missions, such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo, would become budget lines of their own, thus further increasing transparency.

Even though the EEAS's administrative budget would constitute a separate, tenth, part of the EU budget, MEPs would, according to the agreement, be guaranteed the same right of scrutiny as for the Commission budget.

“The discharge procedure will be specific to this budget - it will not come under the general discharge of the Commission. This means that everything that so far was subject to the ‘gentlemen's agreement’ with Council [which said that MEPs should not amend the Council's budget]... will now be fully transparent”, said Roberto Gualtieri.

**Statement of the EP, the EU HR, the Council and the Commission on the EEAS**

EU Council press release.

Brussels, 21 June 2010. [Link](#)

The Presidency of the Council of the EU (Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos and Secretary of State Lopez Garrido), the High Representative (Catherine Ashton), the Commission (Maroš Šefcovic) and the European Parliament representatives (MEPs Brok, Verhofstadt and Gualtieri) met on 21 June 2010 in Madrid. This meeting has been preceded by a number of contacts with the European Parliament, in particular on 14 April, 27 April, 10 May, 27 May and 8 June 2010.

1. The parties reached today political agreement on the proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. In addition to the Decision, parties reached agreement on the text of two Declarations by the High Representative: on political accountability and on the basic structure of the central administration.
2. On the basis of the agreement reached, the participants committed themselves to seek endorsement of the package by their respective institutions as soon as possible in order to proceed to formal adoption of the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service and the related Declarations, once all the procedural steps would have been completed.
3. In addition, the participants agreed that they have now to work constructively for the solution of the remaining questions in particular the adoption of the Financial Regulation and the Staff Regulations.

**Related Documents:**

- **Revised Draft (21 June 2010) of the Council Decision establishing the EEAS.** [Download here.](#)
- **Draft Declaration by the EUHR on Political Accountability (8 June 2010).** [Download here.](#)
- **Draft on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration (8 June 2010).** [Download here.](#)
- **Verhofstadt/Brok Non-Paper on the EEAS.** [Download here.](#)
- **Verhofstadt/Brok EEAS architecture organogram.** [Download here.](#)

### President Medvedev instructions to Gazprom to limit gas deliveries to Belarus

Kremlin press release  
Gorki, 21 June 2010. [Link](#)

Dmitry Medvedev instructed Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller to limit gas deliveries to Belarus as from June 21, and to continue talks on settling the debts for earlier deliveries of Russian gas.

Mr Miller briefed the President on Gazprom's talks with its counterparts in Belarus on settling debts for Russian gas supplies delivered between January and April 2010.

\* \* \*

PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Mr Miller, I asked you to sort out the situation with Belarus' gas debts. What are the results?

CHAIRMAN OF THE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF GAZPROM ALEXEI MILLER: We have held talks with our Belarusian colleagues. Belarus recognises its debts for Russian gas supplies, but proposes making payment in kind – with vehicles, equipment and other surrogates. The talks have thus failed to produce results so far.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Payment must be made in accordance with the terms of the contract, and the terms stipulate payment in foreign currency. To act otherwise would be in breach of our currency laws. Gazprom cannot accept anything other than what the contract states. We cannot accept any other form of payment - not pies, butter, cheese or pancakes – and our Belarusian partners need to understand this. Of course you must continue talks with them, but some decisions will have to be taken it seems. What does Gazprom propose doing?

ALEXEI MILLER: In accordance with the contract we will be forced to start limiting gas supplies in proportion to the size of the debt.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: When will this happen? As I understand it, this will start very soon?

ALEXEI MILLER: Yes, we are forced to start limiting supplies as from 10:00 this morning.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Very well. Set about going through the necessary procedures in that case. But keep communicating with our Belarusian partners too, and encourage them to start fulfilling their side of the contract.

In accordance with Gazprom's rules regarding communication with other counteragents within the European cooperation framework, you will need to inform them of the decisions Gazprom has taken. You will need to do this and to get in contact with all counterparts in any way involved with these supplies.

And as I said, consultations with the Belarusians must continue. Every effort should be made to ensure that this contract is carried out in accordance with the terms to which we all agreed.

ALEXEI MILLER: The restrictions will be introduced gradually, with daily supplies ultimately cut back to an amount in proportion with the size of the debt.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Act in accordance with the contract. Act with a partner's understanding of the problems that have come up, while at the same time, standing up for Gazprom's interests and, ultimately, the interests of our own consumers and country.

ALEXEI MILLER: It will be done.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: We are agreed then.

### Belarus President Lukashenko meets Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov

Belarus presidential press service  
Minsk, 22 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

President Lukashenko:

"I would not like you to take what I am going to say as a rebuke, but I want to inform you about the conflict that is unfortunately growing into a gas war between Gazprom and Belarus.

"They say that this dispute is purely a dispute between economic entities, but I do not understand how a dispute between economic entities can rise to the level of the country's top officials. This is no longer a dispute between economic entities. When we are humiliated by references either to cutlets or sausage, butter or pancakes, we take it as an insult to the Belarusian people. It does not behove the president of our neighbouring, ally state with which we have friendly relations to behave this way. The premier is echoing him as well.

"Do you know what hurt Belarusians the most? It was the statement that overstepping Belarus is nothing, but what is really important is to make sure that customers in Europe do not suffer. We have never expected such cynicism from the Russian leadership.

"What makes me so indignant? That debt that Gazprom is trumpeting about right now, \$192 million (we believe it is \$187 million), was accumulated in January-April. All this time we were trying to reach an agreement with the Russian government, because Gazprom gave us clear directions whom to address on this matter, saying 'We will leave last year's price for you if we are instructed to do so'.

"We have just started to recover from the world crisis, and it is not an easy time for us, but still little by little we have finally started to sell our unsold stockpiles of ready-made products, the trade with Russia has picked up (we have increased trade by 51 per cent over this period in comparison with the same period last year). It is not an easy time for us, and we would like Russia to support the Belarusian economy now by not increasing the gas price. We are not asking you to reduce it as you did for Ukraine (a 30 per cent reduction), you have also

promised Hungary to reduce it or have already done it. There is no need to reduce it for us. But give us this year, let us have last year's prices so that we could rebuild our economy. You know very well that our economy is a replica of your economy; it is a final-stage production shop for Russia. Today our companies receive parts and units and raw materials for the final-stage production from your companies (nearly 15 million people in Russia are employed in this sector). So Belarus is a part of the economy of Russia. Therefore you cannot say that Belarus is a different country, a different economy, and that 'we know nothing'."

### **EU strongly condemns Russia-Belarus gas dispute**

EU press release

Brussels, 23 June 2010. [Link](#)

Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger is strongly concerned about today's cuts in gas supply to Lithuania, following the Russia-Belarus gas dispute. Lithuanian authorities confirmed that Russian gas supplies via Belarus decreased by around 50 percent on 23 June.

Günther Oettinger, Commissioner responsible for Energy said: "International commitments on gas supply must be respected unconditionally. Gas cuts as some of our Member States are witnessing now are not acceptable. This is an affront against the whole European Union."

This afternoon, Lithuanian authorities have confirmed that gas supplied via the national Belarus gas pipeline system has been cut by around 50 percent. On Monday, the Russian gas company Gazprom decided to cut gas supplies to Belarus claiming an outstanding debt of USD 190 million.

In the past few days, the Commission has repeatedly recalled that contracts have to be fulfilled and the dispute between Russia and Belarus must not have any negative impact on EU Member States.

Yesterday, Commissioner Oettinger talked to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Belarus First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko. Meetings on expert level have also been held. Today, the Commissioner discussed the situation with Lithuanian Energy Minister Arvydas Sekmokas.

The Commission is in close contact with national authorities to monitor the situation.

Three countries can be potentially affected by the gas dispute: Lithuania, Poland and Germany. In the case of Poland and Germany, Russian gas could be delivered via Ukraine. This is not possible for Lithuania which depends 100 percent from Russian gas delivered by Belarus. Latvia is expected to be able to deliver gas to Lithuania without any problems for one week.

6.25 percent of gas consumed in the EU is delivered via Belarus and could potentially be affected by the dispute.

### **Interview with Belarus President Lukashenko**

Transcript of exclusive television interview with «Euronews»

Minsk, 26 June 2010. [Link](#)

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"You can see we paid our debt here, in dollars and roubles, on June the 23rd. Yes, we paid yesterday, and said please to Gazprom, please lift your supply restrictions. Lithuania and it seems someone else, Germany, were annoyed their gas had been cut off. They shouldn't be complaining to us, but to Gazprom. They closed the valves by 60 percent, leaving us only with 40 percent. Where is our guilt in this?"

euronews:

"Several recent events, Belarus not recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, refusing to join the customs union, giving exile to the former Kyrgyz president; have all been against Russia's will. Is this gas war all about politics?"

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"The question goes deeper. Russia is casting covetous eyes on our public sector, which is not privatised in Belarus, and they want to buy it on the cheap, plus they don't like Loukachenko because he fiercely defends Belarus's independence. 100 percent. There are other personal reasons, you know what I'm talking about, many other things. Russia doesn't like our policies, and wants us to toe the line. It's a fundamentally imperialist position, as journalists have said, intended to keep Belarus in Russia's sphere of influence. It's an imperial mentality that is all about pressure, bending someone to your will, strangling dissent."

euronews:

"So you think gas has been used as an instrument of political pressure in this conflict?"

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"That was just opportune. They say it's a disagreement between economic entities, but what sort of argument? After I met Medvedev we agreed to study everything, including gas and oil, and he'd phone me back to discuss the results. Two days later I can see the script, just a few scenes, Medvedev sitting down with Gazprom's boss and issuing instructions... but it was all staged. Then there's the five day ultimatum to pay up. Why five days when you owe us more than we owe you? Why don't you pay us? In other words, there was no need for this conflict, absolutely none. They owe us 260 million, as we've already stated, and we owe them 187 million. So there was no reason for this conflict."

euronews:

"So it was just political pressure?"

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"It's all about getting us to toe the line, to punish us. I've already seen on television and in the media that Belarus's presidential campaign is beginning. It's all very clear. Pressure is building ahead of the vote. Our opposition, and the Russians believe that to hang onto power and ensure the support of

the Kremlin Mr. Loukachenko is ready to flog off Belarus at a bargain price. I'd like to underline one more time that I don't need any support or recognition today that isn't from the Belarus people. If they choose John, Smith or Brown he will be president here."

euronews:

"What does Russia gain from this conflict?"

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"They've managed to persuade Europe once more that they have to more actively look for an alternative energy provider, and that they can't count on Russia. But the Russians know what to expect!"

euronews:

"So tell me Mr President, if it is harder and harder for you to get compromises with Russia on such a range of issues, why don't you turn full circle and take the road towards European integration?"

Alexandre Loukachenko:

"You know Alexei, first of all most politicians don't like U turns, and huge policy swings even less. That's the first thing. Secondly, let's stay objective. Is Europe waiting on us? Today in the EU of 27 members there are so many problems that there's no interest in Belarus or Ukraine or anyone else joining. I don't want to say that Belarus doesn't like Europe, or we don't understand it, or want to live like Europeans, no, it's not that. But our people want to live in their country, we're not going to swing round 180 degrees, we're going to stay on our own land living without problems with anyone, especially our neighbours, Russia on one side and the EU on the other. We have never looked to cause problems, unless someone forces us. We are going to stay where we are, a sovereign and independent state, without creating problems for anyone."

### *EU HR, Catherine Ashton, on constitutional referendum in Kyrgyzstan*

Brussels, 28 June 2010. [Link](#)

I welcome the peaceful conduct of the Constitutional referendum in Kyrgyzstan on 27 June, which marks an important step towards the re-establishment of the constitutional order and democratic process in the country. It testifies to the resilience of the citizens of Kyrgyzstan and their desire to build together a stable foundation for the sustainable development of their country. The European Union stands ready to assist Kyrgyzstan in that process.

In that context, I call on the Kyrgyz authorities to build on the progress achieved and take immediate and resolute measures to remedy significant shortcomings identified by OSCE/ODIHR before the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

### *EU Council Conclusions on Kyrgyzstan*

Luxembourg, 14 June 2010. [Link](#)

The Council expresses its serious concern over the violent confrontation in the south of Kyrgyzstan, which has already led to a significant number of casualties. It expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the victims.

The Council underlines the need to restore public order and respect for the rule of law, insists that all violence and provocations should cease immediately and calls on all sides to show restraint. Dialogue must be restored as a matter of priority.

The Council insists on the need to pursue the political process to build democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, notably through the referendum on a new constitution and early elections as announced by the provisional government. This process represents the best chance to ensure peace, institutional stability, open dialogue, rule of law and democracy for the people of Kyrgyzstan.

The Council confirms the EU's readiness to respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs of the affected population. An emergency financing decision will be taken by the Commission. It calls on all parties concerned, as well as neighbouring countries, to take appropriate measures to safeguard access to vulnerable populations and to contribute, where appropriate, to humanitarian support points and corridors, in full accordance with international law.

The Council welcomes the close co-ordination between the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations and the efforts of the three special envoys. It also asks the High Representative to maintain close contact with the OSCE and the UN and other appropriate actors.

### *Turkish MFA on Recent Events in Kyrgyzstan*

Turkish MFA press release

Ankara, 12 June 2010. [Link](#)

Following the events that broke out in April in brotherly Kyrgyzstan, Turkey took all the necessary steps bilaterally as well as in international fora with a view to contributing towards maintaining stability and welfare in this country. We will continue to extend our support to the brotherly people of Kyrgyzstan.

The recent events escalating and gaining an ethnic character in the southern part of the country is a deep cause of concern. It is our sincere belief that these events would be taken under immediate control and the constitutional referendum scheduled for June 27 would be peacefully held. This will be the start of the process of founding a legitimate and democratic government in the country.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Davutoglu has made phone calls to the Chairperson in Office of the OSCE, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, Mr. Kanat Saudabayev, and First Vice President of

the Interim Kyrgyz Government, Mr. Almazbek Atambayev, and assessed the current situation in Kyrgyzstan.

Meeting the concerns of Turkish nationals in Kyrgyzstan is a main priority for Turkey. We have already extended an official request to the competent Kyrgyz authorities for taking the necessary steps in terms of providing security to Turkish nationals and the Turkish institutions in the Kyrgyz Republic.

In the coming week a Special Representative accompanied by the representatives of the relevant institutions will pay a visit to Kyrgyzstan to address the current situation in the country, the bilateral relations in the transition period and assistance to be provided to Kyrgyzstan. The Special Representative will also meet with Turkish nationals residing in Kyrgyzstan.

### *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on events in southern Kyrgyzstan*

Tashkent, 20 June 2010. [Link](#)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is expressing deep concern in connection with the tragic events in southern Kyrgyzstan which have resulted in numerous human casualties and cruel acts of violence.

The SCO member states are appealing for an end to the rampant crime, chaos and lawless actions being instigated by the forces that aim to provoke a confrontation between nationalities and ethnicities who have for centuries been living side by side in Kyrgyzstan in a spirit of friendship and understanding.

While expressing hope for the earliest possible stabilisation of the situation, restoration of law and order as well as interethnic harmony, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is confident that the wise people of Kyrgyzstan will secure a peaceful and prosperous future for their country.

While underlining the importance of normalisation of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan for the sake of maintaining peace and security in the whole region of Central Asia, the SCO member states note the need to provide emergency humanitarian aid to the victims, including the refugees, most of whom have been staying on the territory of Uzbekistan.

### *President Medvedev on situation in Kyrgyzstan*

Kremlin press service

Moscow, 12 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

As Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), President Medvedev gave directions to hold consultations of secretaries of security councils of the CSTO member states in the nearest future to come up with joint response measures.

The Russian leader also had a series of meetings devoted to the situation in Kyrgyzstan with President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha.

Dmitry Medvedev receives detailed briefings on the crisis in Kyrgyzstan and is aware of communications being addressed to him. Nevertheless, at the moment Russia does not intend to send any peacekeepers to Kyrgyzstan to participate in settling the situation in Osh.

### *Statement of Uzbek compatriots on tragic events in the south of Kyrgyzstan*

«Ferghana.ru»

14 June 2010. [Link](#)

*On June 14 the Uzbek compatriots, living in Europe, USA and Uzbekistan, made statement on the tragic events in the South Kyrgyzstan. Below is the full text.*

On the night of 9 June 2010 mass killings, pogroms and ethnic cleansing started in Southern Kyrgyzstan, with mostly local Uzbek population falling victims. Bands of pogromists attacking Uzbek communities, use automatic weapons, armors, and all this is happening with connivance and sometimes even complicity of the police and armed forces of Kyrgyzstan. There are hundreds of those killed, thousands wounded, dozens of thousands of refugees. Murders of civilians are especially intricate and unprecedented in cruelty. The data at our disposal lets us speak of mass genocide of Uzbek population in the south of Kyrgyzstan.

We express our deepest condolences to the families of the deceased. We are also urging the international community, first of all the UN Security Council, to immediately interfere and put an end to killings and violence. Lingering with intervention the Security Council might share responsibility for new victims of the violence.

The information provided by the monitors from the south of Kyrgyzstan testifies to the fact that the central power has no control whatsoever over the situation. Taking advantage of this aggressive and armed crowds commit mass murders of civilians, at that as a rule victims are chosen on ethnic grounds. Small arms and armors are widely used, the crowd is looting and setting on fire whole villages and suburban districts of the cities of Osh and Djalalabad, where Uzbek population is concentrated. According to official data as of 14 June the number of corpses received at mortuaries has reached 138. However, taking into account bodies not taken away from the streets, as well as burials by-passing mortuaries, the number of the killed amounts to hundreds, and of those wounded — to thousands. Armed extremists do not let take the bodies away, attack emergency ambulance staff rendering assistance to the victims and firemen who are trying to put out fires. The authorities manage to maintain relative order only in the central quarters of the central cities of the regions. The military and police can't defend even their own objects to prevent plundering of guns, ammunition and military machines. There are cases of complicity of police officers, security structures and army in pogroms and killings of civilians, as well as in instigation of youth to pogroms.

At the moment it is impossible to objectively ascertain who exactly started the massacre and why. The facts at our disposal testify to a well-thought of provocation aimed at playing off some ethnic groups against others, at instigating hatred of the titular ethnic group towards ethnic minorities. We will still need to find it all out. But the main thing now is to promptly stop the killings and violence, restore law and order, guarantee the safety for citizens, improve people's living conditions and supplies.

**We are urging the UN Security Council to call an emergency session** and suggest one of the permanent members, probably Russia, with the participation of other countries, sending peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the UN to the region to stop the genocide and ethnic cleansing. We understand that the government of Kyrgyzstan, the leading Kyrgyz politicians, and the local population itself are expecting this sort of intervention from the UN, OSCE and Russia with humanitarian purposes and to stop the massacre. The peace-keeping mission should be accountable to the UN Security Council and OSCE, which should formulate the conditions under which the peace-keeping mission will be implemented, and provide for the mechanism for its control.

We are welcoming the decision of Uzbekistan to open the borders for refugees, but we are appealing to the government of Uzbekistan with a request to restrain from armed intervention, which might only aggravate the situation. We are urging the government of Uzbekistan to act in tight interaction with the UN, OSCE, International Red Cross and other international structures.

We are urging the UN, OSCE and European Union to set up an investigation commission and immediately send its representatives to the region to collect and register the data on the massacre. This is necessary to counteract deliberate distortion of the facts and manipulation of information around the events in the name of propaganda. Those guilty of the villainy, both organisers and executors, should be detected and brought to justice. Conditions should also be created both in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for the work of humanitarian missions, to obtain and distribute assistance.

Signatures (129).

### *Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon*

Turkish MFA press release  
Istanbul, 10 June 2010. [Link](#)

We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Lebanon,

Recognizing that the relations among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon are characterized by increased political dialogue, growing economic interdependence and enhanced cultural interaction, based on the will of their peoples who are bound together with exceptional ties of common history, culture and geography.

With a view to strengthening their cooperation further within a multinational and institutionalized framework and to develop a long-term strategic partnership and with a view to enhancing solidarity among us and moving towards economic integration,

Have decided to establish a "Quadripartite High Level Cooperation Council" (HLCC) and to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons among our countries.

The HLCC will be based on the existing bilateral agreements and practices on free trade and visa exemption, which constitute a solid foundation to move forward for enhanced cooperation on all issues of common interest and concern. In this context, Turkey has already put in force visa exemption agreements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Turkey has also concluded free trade agreements with Syria and Jordan, and currently negotiations are underway to finalize an FTA with Lebanon as well.

In this respect, Turkey and Lebanon declare that they have jointly committed themselves to actively pursue their negotiations in order to conclude the FTA between them as soon as possible, which will be essential for full participation of the countries in the process.

This quadripartite mechanism will not replace the bilateral commitments between the parties and will be open to the participation of all other brotherly and friendly countries in the region.

The Quadripartite Council will be coordinated by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Council will convene at least once a year for consultations at the level of respective Prime Ministers to be hosted by participating countries on a rotational basis.

Ministers responsible for other areas, such as energy, trade, customs, agriculture, health, investments, internal affairs, water, environment, transportation and others depending on the agenda, may also participate in the Council. With the development of cooperation to cover areas of mutual interest, the Council may be modified to include ministers responsible for such areas in their respective countries.

Coordination of the work of the Council and finalization of its agenda for each meeting will be undertaken by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the participating countries.

The Ministers attending the Council will also meet with their counterparts on a quadrilateral basis at least once a year and will develop action plans in their respective areas of responsibility in order to designate concrete steps and to submit them to the Council.

We hereby announce our commitment to follow up the swift implementation of this Declaration.

#### Related Media: "New Turkish Foreign Policy"

- Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to CNN, 6 June 2010. (in particular, part 2, starting from 5'). [Access here.](#)

*Joint Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU-Central Asia Strategy*

Council, European Commission, European Council  
Brussels, 28 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

### Overall Assessment

Over the past two years, intensified engagement between the EU and the countries of Central Asia in the framework of the Strategy has raised the level of mutual understanding and trust. Contacts between governments and civil societies have visibly increased. The EU's rapid response to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, in close concert with the UN and the OSCE, has proved the importance and effectiveness of this strengthened network. The decision by the EU, in November 2008, to extend the mandate of the European Investment Bank to Central Asia has opened a new avenue of direct financial support for key development projects in the region. Moreover, Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship in office in 2010 has created an historical opportunity to bring Europe and Central Asia closer to each other through the commitments and values they share.

On the other hand, the experience of the last two years has also confirmed the magnitude of the challenges before both regions and the need for a continued endeavour on both sides in the long term. In particular, regional cooperation between the countries of Central Asia has made little progress. The EU will continue its efforts to encourage closer cooperation among Central Asian states since problems such as the management of cross-boundary water resources or border management pose a threat to regional security and need urgent solutions. Despite the initiation of regular human rights dialogues with all Central Asian countries and a limited number of reforms, there has not been a consistent and sustainable improvement in the human rights situation.

In this context, the EU's readiness for cooperation signalled by the end of the restrictive measures against Uzbekistan in November 2009 has yet to receive a substantial response. In the field of energy, there continues to be significant potential for progress. The Nabucco pipeline project remains of paramount importance for the diversification of energy supplies in both regions.

There has been a good level of implementation of the Strategy across the board, both in terms of increased regional activities and strengthened bilateral relations with the EU for all five countries.

There is now an unprecedented level of engagement between the EU and Central Asia. In the priority areas of education, rule of law, the environment and water, the EU has become engaged in Central Asia by investing and sharing the experience of the EU and EU Member States, promoting good-neighbourly relations and the reform processes in the region. The bilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation will be reinforced by the entry into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Tajikistan and the Interim Agreement of the PCA with Turkmenistan, as well as by initial consideration of the next generation of contractual relations with Kazakhstan.

The EU has become more present in the region, with the opening of fully-fledged EU Delegations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and additional Member State embassies in several countries.

The increased interaction between the EU and Central Asia has confirmed a mutual interest in deepening ties especially in areas of common concern such as promoting economic development, including in global crisis conditions, poverty alleviation, and combating increasing levels of drug trafficking and developments in Afghanistan. The Central Asian countries made a substantial contribution to the elaboration of the Strategy itself and are playing an active role in its implementation.

EU assistance to the region has increased significantly, making the EU one of the leading donors in the region when combining European Commission assistance and EU Member States bilateral assistance. An additional and very positive new development is the increased engagement in the region of European development banks, including the EIB, EBRD, the German Development Bank Group (KfW), and the French Development Agency (AFD), supporting the EU's growing role in Central Asia. Furthermore, Central Asian countries are invited to participate in regional programmes under the European Neighbourhood Policy in priority areas such as energy, transport, education, environment and water.

One important aspect, which in many ways is a novelty, is the direct role played by EU Member States in implementing the Strategy. France and Germany, with the support of the Commission, act as 'lead coordinators' for the Rule of Law Initiative, while Italy has taken on the same role for environment and water, supported by the Commission and Romania as Presidency of the Working Group on Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia for the EU Initiative for Water. In the area of education, where the Commission is the 'lead coordinator', Latvia has taken on the role of local coordinator in Tashkent, while Poland does the same in Ashgabat. The transition experience of those Member States having most recently joined the EU has proven to be of particular relevance for the Central Asian countries and the implementation of the EU Strategy.

Poverty remains a major challenge in the region, in some parts increasingly so in the light of the recent economic and financial crisis (via remittances), particularly in rural areas, and needs to be addressed with renewed vigour, also as a means to combat the dangers of radicalization.

In the fields of human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy, reflection is needed on how to support positive trends and tangible results through our human rights dialogues and cooperation. Overall progress on the ground has been limited and in some instances regression can be observed. The situation in areas such as freedom of expression and of the media, freedom of assembly and association, fairness of the judicial systems, or adequate space for civil society and political participation have not improved significantly.

Against this background it is clear that while in some areas there has been significant progress, there is still much to do

in order to see the full implementation of the Strategy. In particular, more work is needed:

- To further define key EU interests, means and constraints in the quickly evolving regional context as well as ensuing priorities and expectations;
- To increase the visibility of EU action and understanding of the EU;
- To further improve coordination within the EU on Central Asia (EU institutions and Member States), building on the improvements since 2007, as well as coordination with other international donors and organisations active in Central Asia.

While work in all areas of the Strategy remains important and will be pursued, it has become clear that reinforced efforts will be needed in the following key areas:

- Human rights, rule of law and democracy;
- Security broadly speaking;
- Water and energy;
- Afghanistan.

#### *Statement by EU HR Catherine Ashton on Israeli Gaza decision*

Brussels, 20 June 2010. [Link](#)

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission said: "I am very encouraged by the announcement of the Government of Israel. It represents a significant improvement and a positive step forward. Once implemented, Israel's new policy should improve the lives of the ordinary people of Gaza while addressing the legitimate security concerns of Israel."

The High Representative Catherine Ashton reiterated the EU belief that the situation in Gaza remains unsustainable and the blockade is counterproductive, hurts ordinary people, prevents reconstruction and fuels radicalism.

"We need to enable people to reconstruct their homes, to build schools, to improve infrastructure, allowing business to revive so that people in Gaza can get on with their ordinary lives," High Representative Catherine Ashton added.

As stated by EU foreign ministers last week, the EU is ready to support Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the opening of land crossings. The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access and UNSC resolution 1860 should remain the key framework. "I would also like to reiterate that Gilad Shalit must be released immediately," Catherine Ashton said. "More work remains to be done. Implementation is key. We want to work in partnership with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to find a satisfactory solution – I am in contact with the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet partners. We will continue discussions and examine the details of the proposed changes and their implementation. I hope that current efforts will not be undermined. To make progress, an atmosphere of calm, restraint and responsibility is of paramount importance," Catherine Ashton concluded.

#### *Israel announces new Gaza guidelines*

Israeli MFA press release

Tel Aviv, 20 June 2010. [Link](#)

Israel's policy is to protect its citizens against terror, rocket and other attacks from Gaza. In seeking to keep weapons and war materiel out of Gaza while liberalizing the system by which civilian goods enter Gaza, the Government of Israel has decided to implement the following steps as quickly as possible:

1. Publish a list of items not permitted into Gaza that is limited to weapons and war materiel, including problematic dual-use items. All items not on this list will be permitted to enter Gaza.
2. Enable and expand the inflow of dual-use construction materials for approved PA-authorized projects (schools, health facilities, water, sanitation, etc.) that are under international supervision and for housing projects such as the U.N. housing development being completed at Khan Yunis. Israel intends to accelerate the approval of such projects in accordance with accepted mechanisms and procedures.
3. Expand operations at the existing operating land crossings, thereby enabling the processing of a significantly greater volume of goods through the crossings and the expansion of economic activity.
4. Add substantial capacity at the existing operating land crossings and, as more processing capacity becomes necessary and when security concerns are fully addressed, open additional land crossings.
5. Streamline the policy of permitting the entry and exit of people for humanitarian and medical reasons and that of employees of international aid organizations that are recognized by the GOI. As conditions improve, Israel will consider additional ways to facilitate the movement of people to and from Gaza.
6. Israel will continue to facilitate the expeditious inspection and delivery of goods bound for Gaza through the port of Ashdod.

Israel welcomes cooperation and coordination with its international and regional partners in implementing this policy and will continue to discuss with them additional ways to advance this policy.

The current security regime for Gaza will be maintained. Israel reiterates that along with the U.S., EU and others, it considers Hamas a terrorist organization. The international community must insist on a strict adherence to the Quartet principles regarding Hamas.

Hamas took over Gaza and turned it into a hostile territory from which Hamas prepares and carries out attacks against Israel and its citizens. The Israel Defense Forces will continue to prevent the flow into and out of Gaza of terrorist operatives, weapons, war material and dual use items which enhance the military capability of Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza. Israel calls on the international community to stop the smuggling of weapons and war materials into Gaza.

Gilad Shalit is approaching four years in captivity. The international community should join Israel in strongly condemning those who hold him captive and in redoubling their efforts to secure his immediate release.

#### Related Documents:

- "Ending Gaza's Dangerous Isolation", by Catherine Ashton. [Access here.](#)
- "Averting Another Gaza", by Bernard Kouchner, Franco Frattini and Miguel Angel Moratinos. [Access here.](#)

#### *EU signs visa facilitation agreement with Georgia*

EU press release

Brussels, 17 June 2010. [Link](#)

Today, the European Union and Georgia signed a visa facilitation agreement with Georgia, opening the way for easier travel and people-to-people contact across Europe. The signature of the readmission agreement negotiated between the European Union and Georgia in parallel will be organised very soon.

"The conclusion of a visa facilitation agreement is a concrete step forward in EU-Georgia relations. It is EU's message of openness to the Georgian citizens." said Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs. "The visa facilitation and readmission agreements are very tangible result of the Eastern partnership and will promote interaction between citizens of the EU and Georgia and strengthen our cooperation in the fight against irregular immigration."

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated: "This is part of our commitment to bring Georgia closer to the EU, not only at institutional level but also at peoples' level".

The visa facilitation agreement aims at making it easier for Georgian citizens, in particular those who travel most, to acquire short term visas for the EU. It provides a reduced visa fee of EUR 35 instead of EUR 60 for all Georgian citizens and a total exemption from the visa fee for certain categories of applicants (e.g. children below the age of 12, pensioners, disabled persons, students, close relatives and representatives of civil society organisations). Furthermore for certain persons (e.g. businesspeople, students and journalists) the necessary documents requested for supporting a visa application are simplified. Bona fide frequent travellers will be issued multi-entry visas with long periods of validity. Finally, the holders of diplomatic passports are exempt from the visa obligation. The agreement also obliges the Consulates to take a decision within 10 days on whether or not to issue a visa.

The negotiations of the readmission agreement have been finalised and the text was initialled between the negotiators on the same day as the visa facilitation agreement. The formal

signature of the readmission agreement will be organised once the Council finalises the necessary procedures. Both visa facilitation and readmission agreements will enter into force on the same day.

The agreement on readmission sets out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of both Georgia and EU Member States as to when and how to take back people who are illegally residing on their territories. The draft agreement covers not only the illegally staying nationals of both parties but also third country nationals and stateless persons being in an irregular situation provided they have a clear link with the requested Party (e.g. visa or resident permit).

Full respect of Human Rights as provided by the European Convention of Human Rights will also be guaranteed during the application of the readmission agreement.

EU citizens are already exempt from the visa obligation by Georgia.

#### *EU Council conclusions on relations with the Southern Caucasus*

Luxemburg, 14 June 2010. [Link](#)

1. The Council recalls its Conclusions of 8 December 2009 welcoming the expressed commitment of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to enhance their respective relations with the EU within the framework provided by the Eastern Partnership, as a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

2. The Council looks forward to the launch of negotiations for future Association Agreements in the course of July 2010, with a view to establish political association and achieve gradual economic integration of these countries with the EU, including the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, once the countries have met the necessary conditions.

The negotiating processes will be guided by the principles of inclusiveness, differentiation, conditionality and joint ownership. The Council underlines that active engagement of the partner countries and their commitment to shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and good governance are essential to make the negotiations and the implementation of these ambitious agreements a success. The EU is committed to assist the partner countries in this regard.

3. The Council notes that the recent decision on the establishment of the new subcommittees under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements currently in force with the countries of the South Caucasus will considerably broaden the sectoral dialogue and contribute to advancing the implementation of the ENP Action Plans.

4. The Council recognises the high importance attached to mobility of citizens by the countries of the South Caucasus. Bearing in mind the importance of a secure environment, and in accordance with the Stockholm Programme and the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, the EU stands ready to promote mobility of citizens of the South

Caucasus countries and other Eastern Partnership countries through visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and once these are successfully concluded and implemented, move towards a controlled process taking gradual steps towards visa-liberalisation as a long-term goal, on a case-by-case basis, as well as describe the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility. In this context, the Council has invited the Commission to develop before the end of 2010 a plan on how to take cooperation forward in this area.

5. The Council recognises that conflicts hamper not only the political and economic development of the partner countries but also the regional cooperation and the stability of the European continent. In this context, the Council reiterates its commitment to support the processes aimed at peaceful and lasting settlement of conflicts in the region and calls on all parties to fully commit themselves to these processes.

6. The EU will continue to promote stability, prosperity and cooperation, throughout the South Caucasus, building also on the opportunities provided by the multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership, and reaffirms its commitment to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to this end.

### *EU Council conclusions on the Western Balkans*

Luxembourg, 14 June 2010. [Link](#)

#### THE SARAJEVO MEETING

The Council welcomes the outcome of the High Level Meeting on the Western Balkans, organised by the Council Presidency and chaired by the Foreign Minister of Spain, Mr Moratinos, which took place on 2 June 2010 in Sarajevo to mark the 10th anniversary of the Zagreb summit and appreciates the participation of all partners. The Council looks forward to appropriate follow up to the meeting.

Recalling its conclusions of 7/8 December 2009, the Council reaffirms the EU's unequivocal commitment to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries in line with the Thessaloniki Agenda and in accordance with the renewed consensus on enlargement and looks forward to moving to the next stages of the process. The Council reiterates that each country's progress towards the European Union depends on its individual efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The Council welcomes the commitment of the Western Balkans to intensify the pace of reform in key areas. It stresses the importance of addressing the challenges ahead, in particular related to the rule of law, including the fight against corruption and organised crime.

The Council welcomes the commitment of the Western Balkans to further strengthen regional cooperation on the basis of the principles of inclusiveness and regional ownership. It welcomes recent commendable initiatives regarding reconciliation and encourages further efforts to this effect.

The Council recalls the importance of regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations and encourages all parties concerned to address outstanding issues with neighbouring countries.

Recalling its previous conclusions according to which the EU strongly supports the goal of the abolishment of the visa regime for all the countries of the Western Balkans, as well as the joint statement of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 November 2009, the Council welcomes the progress achieved by Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina in reaching the criteria of visa liberalisation, as stressed in the Commission proposal of 27 May 2010 for a European Parliament and Council decision to amend Regulation 539/2001, as it applies to Member States. The Council and the European Parliament will take a decision as soon as the Commission assesses that all the outstanding benchmarks are met and in the light of such assessment.

#### SERBIA

Following the latest report of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, the Council notes that Serbia has maintained its cooperation with the Tribunal with a view to delivering further positive results. The Council encourages Serbia to follow the recommendations of the Prosecutor.

Recalling the Council conclusions of 29 April 2008 and 7/8 December 2009, Ministers agreed to submit the Stabilisation and Association Agreement to their parliaments for ratification.

The Council underlines that full cooperation with the ICTY remains an essential element of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.

The Council took note that Serbia applied for membership of the European Union on 22 December 2009 and welcomed Serbia's commitment to EU integration. The Council decided to return to the membership application.

#### ALBANIA

The Council continues to be concerned about the political situation in Albania following the general elections on 28 June 2009. It welcomes the return of the opposition to the parliament in connection with the facilitation initiative by MEPs Daul and Schulz, on behalf of their political groups, which was supported by the High Representative and by Commissioner Füle. It is high time to find a solution to the current crisis on a basis which will stand the test of time.

The Council regrets, however, that the facilitation initiative has not yet found sufficient support to enable the Albanian Government and the opposition to overcome their differences. The Council reiterates that it is the responsibility of the Government of Albania together with the opposition to promptly find, in a transparent manner and in full respect of the Albanian constitution, solutions and ways forward which will be required for the country on its EU path.

The Council encourages Albania to actively continue with the necessary reforms for the smooth and timely implementation

of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, taking into account the European Partnership priorities, and it reiterates its support for the European perspective for the country.

The Council recalls that Albania's application for EU membership, submitted in April 2009, will be assessed according to the principles set out in the EU Treaty and the criteria defined by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, as well as the December 2006 European Council conclusions on the renewed consensus for enlargement. The Council agrees to return to the matter when the Commission has presented its opinion.

### *Common Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty Fudge: No common strategic culture, no major progress*

Vasilis Margaras

EPIN Working Paper, No. 28, 10 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

With the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU achieved considerable progress regarding the institutionalisation of its foreign policy. Various innovations were included in the Lisbon Treaty to address the cohesion and effectiveness problem of the EU. The renamed Common Security and Defence Policy has not found it easy to establish a common policy, however, and the strategic actorness of the CSDP has so far been mostly limited to relatively small missions. But such cautiousness risks rendering the EU a repository of small symbolic humanitarian missions with little impact on the global geopolitical agenda, argues Vasilis Margaras, a visiting Research Fellow at CEPS.

### *The Baltic-Russian History Controversy: From War to Diplomacy*

Viktor Makarov

CEPS Commentary, 8 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

It is routine for countries to send their heads of state to participate in important celebrations in neighbouring states, but there was nothing routine about the Latvian and Estonian presidents going to Moscow to take part in Victory Day events on May 9.

These pragmatic moves towards rapprochement on both sides cannot bridge the genuine gap of identity and historical memory between Russians and the Balts overnight, but they could bring closer reconciliation over history a little closer. Much effort will be required for both societies to stop stereotyping each other, avoid blowing up perceived differences and learn to live with the real ones. Now that even Russia and Poland are groping their way towards reconciliation, it is not inconceivable that the Balts and Russians do the same.

The author of this Commentary, Viktor Makarov, is an Adenauer Fellow and visiting Researcher at the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels.

### *Time for a Tripartite Gas Pipeline Consortium for Ukraine*

Michael Emerson

CEPS Commentary, 8 June 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

The future of Ukraine's gas transit pipeline is back on the agenda, and it is time for the European Union to come up with constructive ideas on what to do. Ukrainian President Yanukovich has signalled his interest in the idea of a tripartite Ukrainian-Russian-European consortium for the gas pipeline; the basic mechanism for which is clear enough, although many details would need to be negotiated, such as the distribution of shares between Ukrainian, European and Russian partners. The main question is whether it is worthwhile for the EU to pick up the issue and make a proposal. In this new Commentary, CEPS Senior Research Fellow Michael Emerson argues that there are four reasons why the EU should do so.

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