

### *Time for a Tripartite Gas Pipeline Consortium for Ukraine*

The future of Ukraine's gas transit pipeline is back on the agenda, and it is time for the European Union to come up with constructive ideas on what to do.

Immediately after his election, on 21 April President Yanukovich agreed with Moscow a deal in which Ukraine would get a price discount on gas supplies for ten years, alongside an extension of the lease for the Black Sea fleet for another 25 to 30 years.

In addition Moscow has proposed a full merger between Gazprom and the Ukrainian gas distribution company Naftogaz, which given the disproportionate size of the two parties would mean a takeover by Gazprom. Russia is offering to pay for the modernization of the transit pipeline, which indeed will be an expensive refit costing maybe around \$10 billion. But to the merger proposal President Yanukovich has said no – it was a bridge too far in ceding control of strategic assets to Russia. He has however signaled his interest in the idea of a tripartite Ukrainian-Russian-European consortium for the gas pipeline, which has been discussed on and off since the days of President Kuchma. At that time, in 2002, the idea was for the German gas importing company, Ruhrgas, to join an essentially Russian-Ukrainian scheme.

In January 2009, at the time of the crisis when Russia interrupted gas supplies to Ukraine and through it to EU markets, CEPS published a paper advocating that the tripartite consortium idea be reconsidered in a revised form that would see a full involvement of the EU itself as well as some European energy corporations.<sup>1</sup> There would be a new corporation that would secure a long-term lease of around 20 to 30 years for use of the trunk gas pipeline, and undertake its renewal and maintenance. There would be Ukrainian, Russian and European shareholders. In particular there would be equity investment by the EBRD and loan financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) in addition to the participation of European energy companies. Crucially, the participation of the EBRD and EIB would be tasked to oversee the corporate governance of the consortium.

However in 2009 the Yushchenko government was not interested in bringing in Russia. The European Commission followed Yushchenko's line and convened in February 2009 a conference in Brussels on the modernization and governance of the Ukrainian gas distribution infrastructure.

The Ukrainian side produced complex plans for the reform of the governance of Naftogaz, and the conference adopted a lot of recommendations and plans for useful but hardly strategic projects. While the Russian minister of energy was invited, this was essentially a bilateral European-Ukrainian affair, to the point that the Russian minister walked out before the end, feeling that Russia had not been treated as an equal partner.

The European Commission does not seem to have reacted so far to the latest show of interest by Yanukovich in the tripartite consortium proposition. The basic mechanism for a tripartite consortium is clear enough, although many details would need to be negotiated, such as the distribution of shares between Ukrainian, European and Russian partners. The main question is whether it is worthwhile the EU picking up the issue and making a proposal. There are four reasons why the EU should do so.

First it is a necessary and bankable project. It is necessary because the pipeline network is old and badly depreciated, and in need of expensive refurbishment. With a long-term lease of 20 to 30 years on the trunk transit pipeline, supported by a tripartite Treaty to give the project the highest level political and legal basis, the corporation would have a guaranteed source of income from transit revenues. The EBRD and EIB could supply a critical mass of initial financial pledges alongside Gazprom and some European energy companies, and thence the foundations for securing further bond funding in international financial markets.

Second, it is a project that would enhance European energy security. The project would separate (technically, politically and legally) the gas transit function of the trunk pipeline from the domestic Ukrainian gas distribution network, with proper taps, meters and above all managerial control to separate gas flowing to Europe and that going to the Ukrainian distribution network. This would exclude recurrence of the crises of 2006 and 2009 when bilateral Russian-Ukraine payment problems resulted in the cutting of supplies to the EU.

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<sup>1</sup> Elena Gnedina & Michael Emerson, "The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine: A Cost-Benefit Analysis", CEPS Policy Brief, No. 180, January 2009.

## Table of Contents

<b>Russia</b> .....	<b>3</b>
EU-Russia Summit Joint Statement.....	3
European Council President remarks at EU-Russia Council.....	3
Russian Foreign Policy in the Long Term .....	4
Yanukovich at Ukraine-Russia Economic Forum.....	6
Medvedev at Ukraine-Russia Economic Forum .....	7
<b>EU Neighbourhood</b> .....	<b>9</b>
Stefan Füle on five years of ENP .....	9
Progress Reports on ENP implementation .....	11
Ukraine not ready to join NATO .....	11
EU proposes visa facilitation for Georgia .....	11
EU Association Agreements for South Caucasus .....	11
EU Strategy for the South Caucasus?.....	12
EU on Nagorno-Karabakh «parliamentary elections» .....	12
EU on Israeli military operation against Flotilla.....	12
Turkey on Israeli military operation against Flotilla.....	13
Israel on military operation against Flotilla.....	13
Stefan Füle addresses UfM «For'UM» Meeting.....	14
EU-Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee .....	15
<b>EU Enlargement</b> .....	<b>16</b>
Stefan Füle on Enlargement Policy .....	16
Visa free travel for Albania and B&H .....	16
«The Balkans deserve this».....	17
<b>CEPS Publications</b> .....	<b>18</b>
Russia and the ECHR.....	18
President Yanukovich's dubious deal.....	18
EU Foreign Policy in the Palestinian Territory .....	18

### European Neighbourhood Watch Index

#### *editorial continued...*

Third, it could be an action demonstrating the EU's capacity for rapid strategic action in foreign and security policy, so far sorely lacking. This is an initiative that Mr Guenther Oettinger, the new energy chief at the European Commission, could advance in association with Mr Stefan Fuele, his colleague responsible for neighbourhood policy, and High Representative Catherine Ashton, inviting the EBRD and EIB to a working group to outline an operational proposal.

Fourth, and most important on top of these already important merits, the project would create political synergies between the EU, Russia and the common neighbourhood of which Ukraine is the core. This would be signaling a switch of paradigm in the affairs of the wider Europe. It would be a step away from the competition for primacy over spheres of influence between the EU and Russia in their common neighbourhood, towards a cooperative regime with synergetic benefits for all parties. The EU typically argues that it does not want a primitive geopolitical competition over its Eastern neighbourhood, and yearns for a more enlightened and inclusive pan-European order. It has not been doing so well in achieving this. Here is a concrete chance to take a major step in the desired direction. For the moment the Commission is silent, missing the chance.

*by Michael Emerson*

### *Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation*

EU-Russia Summit, Rostov-on-Don, 31 May & 1 June 2010.  
[Link](#)

Meeting at Rostov-on-Don for their 25th Summit on May 31-June 1, 2010, the European Union and Russia launched a Partnership for Modernisation to the mutual benefit of their citizens.

In a world in which peoples and economies are ever more closely connected and interdependent, modernising our economies and societies becomes ever more important and necessary.

The European Union and Russia, as long-standing strategic partners in a changing multipolar world, are committed to working together to address common challenges with a balanced and result-oriented approach, based on democracy and the rule of law, both at the national and international level. The New European Union - Russia Agreement, which is currently under negotiation, will also provide the basis for achieving these objectives. In this context, the Partnership for Modernisation will serve as a flexible framework for promoting reform, enhancing growth and raising competitiveness, and will build on results achieved so far in the context of the four European Union - Russia Common Spaces, complementing partnerships between European Union Member States and the Russian Federation. The sectoral dialogues will be a key implementation instrument for the Partnership for Modernisation.

The European Union and Russia have a common interest in enhancing bilateral trade and investment opportunities and in facilitating and liberalising trade in the global economy as well as strengthening and developing competition, including through Russia's early WTO accession.

Priority areas of the Partnership for Modernisation will include: expanding opportunities or investment in key sectors driving growth and innovation, enhancing and deepening bilateral trade and economic relations, and promoting small and medium sized enterprises; promoting alignment of technical regulations and standards, as well as a high level of enforcement of intellectual property rights; improving transport; promoting a sustainable low-carbon economy and energy efficiency, as well as international negotiations on fighting climate change; enhancing co-operation in innovation, research and development, and space; ensuring balanced development by addressing the regional and social consequences of economic restructuring; ensuring the effective functioning of the judiciary and strengthening the fight against corruption; promoting people-to-people links; and enhancing dialogue with civil society to foster participation of individuals and business.

This list of areas for cooperation is not exhaustive. Other areas for cooperation can be added as appropriate. The European Union and Russia will encourage implementation of specific projects within the framework of the Partnership for Modernisation.

The Partnership for Modernisation will be the subject of continuous monitoring and exchanges at all levels of the European Union - Russia dialogue. The co-ordinators of the Partnership and the co-chairs of the European Union - Russia sectoral dialogues will closely interact in the Partnership's implementation. The European Union and Russia have exchanged concepts on the European Union's and Russia's visions of the main areas for cooperation within the context of the Partnership for Modernisation. Leaders have tasked coordinators of both sides to develop a work plan.

### *Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, at the EU-Russia Summit*

Rostov-on-Don, 31 May & 1 June 2010. [Link](#)

Good afternoon - Dobri Dien

This summit has been held in a defining time both for the EU and Russia. In the EU we have the new treaty and new institutional actors. We are manoeuvring our way through the economic and financial crisis, with the aim of coming out stronger than before. Our response to the recent public debt crisis has shown the world that the European Union is capable of acting decisively. We will continue to do so.

The EU has to work hard on financial consolidation and competitiveness, and on strengthening our economic structures and growth in the framework of EU 2020 economic strategy. This is vital for our position on the world stage.

Russia is also at crossroads. President Medvedev's ambition to base Russia's modernisation in the 21st century on democratic values, by building a modern diversified and dynamic economy, and by encouraging the active involvement of civil society, is a significant development for Russia.

We want to be Russia's partner in modernisation. That is why I am glad that we are launching the Partnership for Modernisation, and that we have agreed on its scope and priorities. I believe this will promote reform and give renewed momentum to our relationship, develop our cooperation on trade, economy and energy security. It will also contribute to the global economic recovery.

However, for the partnership to bear fruit, the Russian modernisation needs to become a reality, and it needs to follow a certain path and to avoid protectionism. In the light of this, I welcome the renewed momentum in Russia to join the WTO.

In this context, we also talked about the long term goal of visa free travel. In my view, contacts between Russian and European business, students, professors and others would enormously strengthen the forces of modernisation. We therefore remain committed to making concrete progress, as soon as possible, on the ground.

On the G20 summit in Toronto. I'm happy to see that there is a broad consensus with Russia on a lot of issues. However, as regards the reform of the financial system in particular, this is a top priority for the EU and we as the EU expect the summit in Toronto to discuss ways to reduce systemic risk, and to agree on the principle that the financial institutions should contribute

to the costs of any future financial crisis. In Toronto we have to achieve concrete results. We need the same stepwise approach in the climate conference in Cancun in December.

We have also signed an agreement on protection of classified information, which represents a significant step forward in our relations. This will facilitate cooperation in a wide range of areas, including crisis management, and justice and home affairs.

We also reconfirmed our interest to continue to explore possibilities for cooperation in the field of crisis management, justice and home affairs. We want to build further on our successful cooperation in Chad and in the fight against piracy on the coast of Somalia.

On human rights, I expressed our appreciation for recent legislative developments in Russia – the ratification of Protocol 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the expansion of jury trials nationwide, and the confirmation of the moratorium on the death penalty.

However, the situation for human rights defenders and journalists in Russia is of great concern to the European public at large. Another matter of concern - which I noted was shared by President Medvedev - is the climate of impunity, in particular in Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus.

We had the chance to discuss a number of international issues. We also welcome the new START agreement on reductions of nuclear weapons with the US. On Iran, EU and Russia fully agree: the nuclear program of Iran remains a source of concern. The purpose of the restrictive measures is to bring Iran back to the negotiating table.

We are very happy that the Russian Federation has played a constructive role in the shaping of the draft United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iran.

We also discussed yesterday's tragic incident in the Middle East and issued a joint statement by High Representative Ashton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, this statement enjoys my full support also on behalf of the EU. We regret the loss of lives during the Israeli military operation against the flotilla sailing to Gaza. We demand a full and impartial inquiry, and call for an immediate opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and people to and from Gaza.

Finally, the EU and Russia share a common interest in improving the security, stability and prosperity in our common neighbourhood. History and geography have made us different but also neighbours. We are dependent on each other and on the well being of our neighbours. This has become a common spirit of our continent. In this respect, we would like to see a more constructive role played by Russia, including the implementation of all its earlier commitments, especially with regard to Georgia.

To conclude: Russia is a real strategic partner to the EU. With you we have a most intensive and dynamic dialogue. With Russia we do not need a "reset". We want a "fast forward". Spasiba (thank you).

### *The Programme for Effective Use of Foreign Policy in the Long Term Development of Russia*

Unofficial Kremlin Strategy Paper

First published in Russian, in Newsweek, 10 May 2010.

[Link.](#)

[No official translation available - Unofficial translation using online automated translation tool]

**ECONOMIC CRISIS:** However, the crisis has given the acceleration of important deep processes, and the outcome of which will form a new image of the system of global governance. There is a turning point in world development, the materialization of the approval process for a multipolar reality. The tendency to build up new centers of economic growth and political influence, and desire of these states to agree action to defend common interests, including through the mechanisms of power diplomacy, predetermine the further transformation of the global management system on a polycentric basis. He received additional impetus to the process of regionalization of global politics that will determine the modality of the next phase of globalization.

**UN:** In general, world politics and economics are creating a new competitive environment for the multipolar diplomacy, in which the criterion for success is the ability to consider the interests of medium and small countries which are not represented in the G20 and other exclusive clubs. In this regard, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the UN as a world organization with its unique legitimacy. An important basis for the preservation of the UN's central role in resolving the most pressing economic problems of world development was laid in New York in June 2009, when the Conference of the World Summit on global financial and economic crisis and its implications for development was held.

Carry out an active line within the UN, which remains the most universal and authoritative international organization within which the multilateral framework of cooperation of member countries in all areas of the global agenda. To achieve the consolidation of Russian influence in the UN system, based on the status of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the Security Council.

**RUSSIAN Foreign Policy – General Outline:**

5. The principal means of ensuring Russian interests in a rapidly changing world are consistent and effective implementation of the modernization agenda, the equal involvement of Russia in the process of adopting key international decisions, strengthening the interaction with our associates and partners.

It will be important to support our positive change in world politics, strengthening the relationship of interdependence with the world and regional powers on the basis of the interpenetration of economies and cultures, the involvement of external sources of modernization, including the creation of modernization alliances with our key Western European partners and with the EU as a whole. The need to seek the possibility of using American technological capabilities and overcome the remaining U.S. restrictions on the transfer of Russian high technologies. At the same time demand for

technology partnerships with a number of other rapidly developing countries - such as Brazil, India, South Korea, Singapore and possibly China.

Particular attention should be paid to monitoring the growing role of China in international affairs, including the angle of impact of the activity of Beijing for our global and regional interests. At the same time to proceed from the fundamental importance of consolidating China's position on joint action with us - with due regard to the evolving situation - in the G20, the BRIC and the SCO and the United Nations Security Council (where, in modern terms, our support is often more useful to the Chinese than theirs for us).

As part of the worldwide trend of strengthening regional governance it is important to actively use the imperatives of overcoming the global crisis to consolidate the CIS. To focus on the creation of objective competitive advantages for all participants in the integration processes within the Commonwealth, whose nucleus is the Eurasian Economic Community and, above all, the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and the prospect of entering the single economic space. On this basis, to actively oppose attempts by extra-regional forces to "dilute" our country.

Ensuring the security interests of the country, preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a strong and influential position of Russia in the international community needed to increase its economic, scientific, technological and intellectual potential.

(Modernization: Providing access to external sources of modernization (energy, environment, transport corridors, agro- and medical technologies, information and communications, high technology, manufacturing, finance and investment markets).)

Promoting the objective perception of Russia as a democratic state with a socially oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy, a long-term cooperation partner.

To seek to facilitate the visa regime or the introduction of visa-free regime of mutual trips of citizens of the Russian Federation and a number of foreign countries, especially in relations with the EU, including as a condition for the development of communication and cooperation in the fields of business, tourism, scientific, technological and other forms of cooperation.

ARCTIC: Use of political and diplomatic opportunities to support the Russian proposal to clarify the outer limits of the continental shelf of Russia in the Arctic.

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS:

Ensure close coordination between the SCO and the CSTO.

To assert the role of key structures with Russian participation in the formation of a global network architecture - the BRIC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, focusing on strengthening and harmonizing the positions of their member states. Together with partners in the BRIC pursue the development and consolidation in the G20 of clear rules and procedures to ensure equality of all its members in decision-making.

Carefully monitor the impact of changes in the alignment of forces in the world economy and monetary system on the status of the issue of UN reform, especially its Security Council.

To expand the dialogue with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to seek Russia's accession to the OECD.

Analyze the feasibility of bringing the Russian Federation into free trade agreements with foreign governments for the medium and long term in terms of improving the structure of Russian exports, protect the interests of domestic producers, replenish the state budget.

#### ENERGY:

Continue efforts towards the formation of a stable and predictable environment for international trade in energy resources, development of new industrial and energy-saving technologies. Use the potential of international organizations in order to ensure the most favorable conditions for Russian energy, financial and industrial groups and companies abroad, as well as the economic operators of the Russian regions.

Ensure the effective use of the competitive advantages of the Russian Federation in the energy sector through the development of regional and bilateral cooperation in the CIS space, transit initiatives, the establishment of mechanisms for coordinating gas-producing countries, cooperation with OPEC and key-exporting countries, building long-term cooperation with the leading states to develop and introduce energy saving technologies, energy efficiency and new energy sources. Continue promoting Russian proposals to create a new legal framework for international energy cooperation in the post-crisis agenda.

#### SERBIA

-Strengthen cooperation with Serbia in the energy sector, primarily in the construction project the main gas pipeline South Stream, as well as bilateral ties through the PTS.

#### CROATIA

- Expand the use of Croatian territory as a corridor for the transit of Russian energy.

- Back to project oil pipeline system integration of the Druzhba and Adria.

#### ROMANIA

- To promote the consolidation of Russian business in the strategic sectors of the Romanian economy, especially in the energy sector, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, including through participation in the ongoing privatization of state enterprises in Romania.

- Enhance cooperation in the gas sector, including Russian gas transit through the territory of Romania, the construction and use of underground gas storage facilities on Romanian territory.

- Promote the realization of joint projects in energy,

#### TURKEY

- Promote the Russian-Turkish cooperation in the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant at the site "Akkuyu" (Province of Mersin).

#### CIS

- Support the activities of the Russian economic operators in the CIS

- Foster an effective system of state support for investment in the CIS countries and trade with them, adjusting the current system of state support for exports in view of the importance of Russian geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the CIS.
- To build a balanced relationship with key non-regional powers
- Promote the practical establishment and improvement of the Customs Union (CU), the deepening of political cooperation between Member States TA.
- Promote the formation of a single economic space in the tripartite (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan) format.
- Ensure the implementation of the agreements with the EU on the complementarity of regional integration processes, to handle questions about the establishment of contacts between the EU-CIS and the implementation of the tripartite (Russia-CIS-EU) cooperation projects. To promote the fullest possible accounting rules and standards of WTO and EU integration processes in the CIS.
- As an additional tool to strengthen Russian influence in the CIS space used to promote products of the Russian language and culture (including through the UN system, where the Russian language has official status), establishment of human relationships (including scientists, educators and student exchanges), training for public authorities of the Commonwealth.

#### UKRAINE:

- Actively involve Ukraine into the orbit of economic cooperation with Russia
- Considering Russia's participation in the operation of the transmission system of Ukraine a strategic objective. For this purpose, seek agreement from the Ukrainian side on the establishment of the International Consortium for Management and Development of a Ukrainian gas transportation system.
- Support the efforts of Russian oil companies to lobby for the use of an oil pipeline Odessa - Brody oil pipeline in the reverse direction, thus limiting the access of Ukraine to the Caspian oil.
- Expand cooperation with Ukraine in the field of nuclear energy.
- Increase the presence of Russian investment in Ukraine and Belarus.

*President Yanukovich addresses Ukrainian-Russian Economic Forum*  
Kyiv, 18 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

We, of course, regret the lost time and opportunities. But thanks to lessons learned, we became pragmatic and focused.

I would like to dwell on some of these lessons.

Lesson One. The global crisis has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of even the strongest and most developed economies.

The United States, European Union, Japan, Great Britain are all through strength test. All the countries of the "big twenty" are experiencing losses.

The crisis has again demonstrated that the positive outcome is possible only with mutual responsibility and support.

Being strategic partners, Ukraine and Russia at the same time are large and reliable partners of the European Union.

In the current very difficult circumstances for the European Union, we must maintain the stability of relations, particularly in the crucial energy sector.

I am certain that our agreements in this area will be an additional guarantee for all EU countries and allow Ukraine to consistently conduct deep reforms in the energy sector.

Lesson Two. High level of interdependence of national economies in a globalized world requires us to elaborate new approaches to long-term national development planning.

It is critical for Ukraine that our bilateral agreements on economic cooperation "worked" for national development projects that we are preparing in the framework of the program of reforms. And our actions will always be open, clear and predictable for our partners in the West and the East.

Lesson Three. Economic processes are directly affecting the state of affairs in security area.

Old stereotypes often prevent us from reaching a new level of relations. I am sure that new approaches to security must be associated with guaranteeing security of development, rather than with preservation of the so-called "old order".

Ukraine conducts non-aligned policy to prevent appearance of new dividing lines in Europe, as well as to strengthen and enhance development of the whole European space.

Our task is to elaborate new mechanisms of interaction in the area of security with the member countries of military alliances, non-aligned countries and countries with neutral status.

This algorithm can be the basis for a modernized architecture of united and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The principle of collective solving geopolitical and security issues will be decisive in the future post-crisis world.

With Dmitry Medvedev, we have offered new initiatives on security in the Black Sea region and settlement of the Transnistrian problem. In these incentives we proceed from the principle of collective and concerted action by all the interested parties.

Lesson Four. The European choice of Ukraine remains just a dream until deep social-economic reforms are realized.

We have wasted much time because of the instability and ineffectiveness of government in the past years. Now we must catch up and it is not easy.

Ukraine has a real chance to conclude negotiations and sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in a short time and solve the problem of visa regulations and expanded free trade area establishment.

I created the Committee on Reforms, which involves leading Ukrainian and foreign experts, representatives of regional authorities and national science.

In early June we will present a program of economic reforms in Ukraine. The “new wave” of reforms will promote a new quality of economic growth, efficiency of competitive market mechanisms, economic attractiveness of Ukraine for investors.

The package of Ukrainian reforms is aimed at long-term perspective and is designed to reach an ambitious goal – to create modern competitive economy, new infrastructure, efficient social-oriented state, high quality of life.

We have set a goal to conduct systematic modernization of the country, turn it into a strong and prosperous republic.

[...]

Without a doubt, deepening and broadening of relations with our strategic partners will promote effective development of Ukrainian economy.

First of all, it refers to the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, last year the trade turnover between our countries fell by more than 35%.

However, now, when the new government is responsible for the situation in the country, the trade turnover has almost doubled compared to the same period last year. And the primary task for our governments is at least to return it by the end of the year to the level we had before the crisis hit. And we believe it is quite possible.

We are optimistic about the prospects of economic cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The main thing is that we returned to strategic partnership, provided by the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. New opportunities for transition to a qualitatively new stage of interaction between our countries are now opened. I mean upgrading the whole spectrum of trade and economic relations, development of innovative and investment directions and bilateral cooperation in economy.

Yesterday, the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia chaired the third meeting of the Ukrainian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission. The work of this important institution has been resumed after almost a two-year break.

We created atmosphere of partnership and trust that provided necessary conditions for constructive and effective work to address the entire range of important issues of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation.

Following the meeting, together with President Medvedev, as Co-Chairmen of the Commission, we instructed the Governments of Ukraine and Russia to elaborate a number of practical steps to fill our bilateral relations with substance

and develop “roadmaps” of mutually beneficial initiatives in priority sectors of economy.

In our opinion, this applies to:

- Development of Ukraine’s capabilities of oil and gas transportation to the European Union. Long-term strategy and mechanisms of its joint implementation, coordinated with the Russian and European partners, must be developed;
- Cooperation in energy sector;
- Cooperation in high-tech industries, in which both Ukraine and Russia have experience and achievements, such as space exploration, aircraft building, biological and information technology, production and service cooperation, joint actions at markets of the third countries;
- Creation of favorable conditions for trade cooperation through synergy of customs and tax authorities, joint technical and legal support of trade-flows, combating smuggling, unfair competition and “laundering” of proceeds;
- Regulation of labor migration and provision of social protection to our citizens working abroad.

In our opinion, these and other promising areas should be the basis for long-term comprehensive ten-year Program of Economic Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the Program of Bilateral Interregional and Border Cooperation.

In addition, we agreed to hold the Russian-Ukrainian Interregional Economic Forum under the patronage of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine in 2010 in Krasnodar Krai and another, in 2011 in Donetsk region, as well as Russian-Ukrainian Business Forum on infrastructure projects and modernization issues in October 2010 in Kyiv.

Coordinated work of all departments of the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commissions produced a package of signed bilateral documents. In particular, we signed the agreement on demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian state border, which will enable us to proceed with practical delimitation of its land part.

The Intergovernmental Agreement on cooperation in utilizing and development of the Russian global navigation satellite system GLONASS and a number of interdepartmental documents on cooperation in education, science and culture were signed.

### *Medvedev speech at Russian-Ukrainian Economic Forum*

Kyiv, 18 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

But speaking about the future, I feel that Russia could become the number-one investor, and not because of any geopolitical

reasons, but simply because our economies are very close. And indeed, we are very closely connected. Therefore, as of January 1 the volume of Russia's direct investment, which currently stands at 2.7 billion dollars, is good, but at the same time, not that much. Here, I think we have another matter to discuss.

We agreed to develop joint projects in all areas, and we will do this. Ukrainian businesses are also working on the Russian market, and they, too, are quite active and aggressive. Direct investments may not be as high as they should be; based on our calculations, they make up about 165 million dollars. Nearly half of that money goes toward the manufacturing sector and one third is directed toward the financial sector, which demonstrates the same distortion I spoke about. I think that if we had taken the right steps to develop cooperation between our economies in recent years, if we had not wasted any opportunities, then these investments would have been bigger.

What should be done to make them bigger? We need to clear the logjams of the past. I have already spoken to Mr Yanukovych about this today. I said that we are ready to work on it, because claims are always mutual. But if I am to speak absolutely sincerely (taking into account the size of our investments and what is being cautiously referred to as political instability in Ukraine) it is nevertheless clear that Russia has had some rather significant risks and claims associated with that period. Incidentally, the President of Ukraine and I agreed that I will prepare a special memorandum on this matter and pass it on to him. I think that our Ukrainian partners can do the same with regard to the Russian market. Here, we really need to act directly and openly, without shying away from anything, especially since we are truly partners and we currently have friendly relations. Thus, I'm addressing all Russian business representatives present here today. I have some information, but I want to update it and pass it on to my colleagues.

We still need to do a great deal to improve the investment climate in Russia and here in Ukraine. Clearly, what's most important is to minimise the risk for investors. We know what to work on, we know our weak spots; we are aware of the flaws in our economy, the problems with our law enforcement and judicial systems. If we are able to structure all of this properly, we will have fewer of these problems. No one can promise that they will disappear immediately, but there will certainly be less of them. And specific suggestions can be made to improve tax, customs, banking, and insurance legislation – in other words, the legal framework we need to develop full-fledged economic ties. We will certainly work on this.

As for the question of how to do this work: we have our commission, we have a business forum, we have ministries and departments, and we have other platforms that can be used, including the interregional forums mentioned by the President of Ukraine. It is true that we have agreed to meet in Krasnodar Territory this year and later in Donetsk region.

I would also like to say that we are open to the most sincere and direct dialogue with our Ukrainian partners and business representatives. We understand what we are looking at. We are all working in Europe. Mr Yanukovych said that Ukraine is ready to develop relations with the European Union, including

associate membership. Naturally, this is Ukraine's sovereign decision on how to develop its contacts with the European Union.

Our relations with the European Union – I mean the Russian Federation's relations – in some areas are even more serious than just association, because trade turnover between Russia and the European Union is approximately 250 billion dollars. I would like to point out that unfortunately, Ukraine's turnover with the EU is only 23 billion, but I hope that this year, it will grow to 35 or 40 billion. Still, you can see the difference.

What does this mean? It means that we must jointly think about the integration mechanisms in our relations with the European Union, which is very important to us, given that both our economies are oriented toward Europe and given the European identity of our nations. But at the same time, we must look at cooperation options along other integration tracks – naturally, with due regard to volumes and conditions that our nations deem acceptable. And so, I would like to say that Russia is ready to discuss cooperation with Ukraine on other integration platforms, including the Common economic space and the Customs Union – again, if this is appealing or necessary.

[...]

To answer the question about cooperation with Central Asian nations, including Uzbekistan, and the options of subsequent transit of gas purchased [from Central Asian countries] through the Russian territory, – you know, this is an on-going issue, but it's never a bilateral topic – it's always trilateral. Ultimately, it rests upon our agreements with our Uzbek partners or other colleagues, for example, Turkmenistan. This is one thing. And second, we have had a whole set of arrangements on this issue. Not all of them withstood the test of time, and as President, I will not support all of them, but we can certainly discuss this issue. It is not closed yet. I just want to note though that this must be mutually beneficial. It must fit into Russia's current strategy for developing gas sector and gas exports.

[...]

Speaking about gas cooperation in general, I do not think that this is the right place to look into these matters. Our companies – namely, Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine – will certainly continue their discussions. Naturally, there will also be discussions between the energy ministries. But at the same time, I do not think that I will reveal anything new, since you were talking about so-called bypass routes, South Stream and Nord Stream. But, colleagues, these decisions have been made, and this is not a matter of liking or disliking on our part, or any other political issues. These decisions have been made, and they are being implemented, both in the north and in the south. Therefore, there's certainty, though someone here spoke about uncertainty; still, this does not mean that alternatives are no longer possible. Neither I nor my colleagues have ever gotten hung up on anything or stated that if we have a pipeline in one place, it is impossible to discuss any other alternative. Indeed, they certainly can be discussed. The world is changing, and the power industry is changing too. We now have shale gas, LNG [liquefied natural gas] is developing at full force, and facilities are being built. Five years ago, nobody was really even thinking about it, but now, people are. And the energy mix will change as well. So let's continue discussing these issues.

*Stefan Füle, EC for Enlargement and ENP on five years of ENP*

EU Commission press release

Strasbourg, 17 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

On 12 May, the Commission adopted a new Communication accompanied by country and sectoral reports on the implementation of the ENP. As the new Commission is at the outset of its term, we used this opportunity to take stock of the first five years of implementation of the ENP from 2004 to 2009, rather than limiting ourselves to a one-year perspective.

Our assessment is that the European Neighbourhood Policy has transformed relations between the EU and its neighbours. Since its launch in 2004, political contacts have increased in profile and intensity.

Trade has increased at double digit rates, aided by a steady process of liberalisation and regulatory convergence. During the last five years exports were rising by 63% and imports by 91%. Market opening thus benefits both the EU and the partners.

Legislation on human rights and fundamental freedoms has also improved. However, as we all know, implementation still raises concerns. The need to encourage further governance reforms remains pressing, as it is crucial for the well-being of the citizens, for political stability and for economic growth in our neighbourhood.

There is progress on mobility issues, but more needs to be done. The issue of mobility, including visas, hampers cooperation with our partner in all other areas, be it trade and investment, people-to-people contact or sectoral cooperation. In the Communication we point to what we think could be done to make progress with both our Eastern and Southern partners, in full respect of security and other constraints – I see this as a core issue for the credibility of our policy!

Overall, the Communication shows that the EU, despite the difficult context, has established a real partnership for reform with our neighbours. This has brought tangible results benefiting both sides. But more, much more, is needed to sustain reform, particularly in a context where EU accession is not on offer.

EU assistance has been tailored to partners' reform needs and its volume in the current Financial Framework has increased by 32 % in comparison with 1999-2006. Most of the financial resources (75%) are allocated to bilateral programmes, with the remaining funds going to regional, multi-country programmes and cross-border cooperation.

The country progress reports evaluate what our neighbours accomplished on the basis of their ENP Action Plans – their "reform menus" - in 2009, and highlight what they should have done, or done better.

This "annual check-up" is far from being a technical exercise. It is politically very important to monitor reforms, not least to keep up the momentum.

We know how interlinked we are in a globalised world, and therefore, reforms in our partner countries impact on our mutual prosperity, stability and security.

As last year, the picture is very varied. Some of our partners have made considerable advances in sectoral reforms, whether in environment legislation or reform of tax and customs. But on human rights, democracy and governance, the pace remains much too slow.

I will not go into the detailed findings for each country today due to the limited time, but I stand ready to discuss them in bilateral meetings with you, if you wish so.

## ENP PRIORITIES 2010-2011

Let me turn to what are the priorities for the coming months. The pace of progress also depends on the benefits that the partners can expect from the ENP. Therefore, I strongly believe that the EU should provide partners with tangible incentives within a reasonable timeframe, notably in the fields of mobility of people and of trade liberalisation. These two areas will be my main priorities for 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, I will

- \* pursue upgraded contractual relations with our partners,
- \* ensure adequate allocation of funding to support political reforms and economic development and I will
- \* promote the development of the regional and multilateral dimensions of ENP.

## Mobility of people

Well-managed improvement in the area of mobility of people is mutually beneficial to the EU and to its partners because it facilitates business, tourism, people-to-people contacts and legal labour migration.

Together with the promise of trade liberalisation, it provides a strong political incentive for much-needed institutional and administrative reform in our neighbourhood.

I expect to make progress especially with the Eastern partners, based on the Eastern Partnership long term goal of visa liberalisation following a step-by-step approach provided that the necessary conditions in terms of security are met. It is my intention to develop the Eastern Partnership into a practical and useful vehicle of getting 6 of our partners closer to the European Union - as far as they are willing to go. For that purpose, I will focus both on substance (political association, economic integration, mobility) and on the instruments like the Comprehensive Institution Building for which half of the 350 million Euro, made available last year, will be dedicated.

I hope for clear progress as regards visa facilitation and readmission agreements with all Eastern partners, including Belarus, which will boost contacts between people. Based on the EU Visa Code, the Commission will also propose to Member States practical measures to improve visa delivery and consular coverage

I hope that we will have made substantial progress in the visa dialogue with Ukraine which will lead us to setting up a roadmap for visa liberalisation.

And I expect that we will soon start a visa dialogue with the same objective with the Republic of Moldova as well.

In the South of the neighbourhood, we also need to reflect on how we can put in place proper partnerships for migration management. Visa facilitation agreements with our most advanced partners should be part of these partnerships, as well as readmission agreements of course.

#### Trade liberalisation

On trade liberalisation, we will pursue the goal of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with our neighbours to expand the EU single market.

Negotiations are ongoing with Ukraine and we will also seek to launch negotiations on a DCFTA with the Republic of Moldova. DCFTAs with Armenia and Georgia will be part of the Association Agreements with these countries.

Furthermore, the EU continues to support Azerbaijan in its efforts to join WTO early so that it fulfils a key condition for us to be able to move towards possible negotiations as well.

But partners need to step up their efforts to prepare for such negotiations in order to be able to implement future commitments and sustain them.

In the Southern neighbourhood, we will be guided by the 'Euro-Med Trade Roadmap beyond 2010', which aims at deepening bilateral trade relations and ultimately also at negotiating deep and comprehensive free trade areas with our partners.

#### Upgraded contractual relations

In this context, it will be important to upgrade our overall contractual relations with our neighbours, which will symbolise our political commitment to strengthening relations and supporting reforms to bring our neighbours closer to us.

Besides the countries with which we will conclude new Association Agreements, the Council has also expressed its readiness, in principle, to upgrade the EU's contractual relationship with Belarus provided that this country demonstrates sustained commitment to democratic reforms.

As for our Southern partners, discussions are underway on the upgrading of relations with countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan. As regards Israel, the Commission is prepared to resume work on an upgrade as soon as the overall political context allows. Furthermore, I hope that the Association Agreement with Syria will be signed by Syria soon and that negotiations with Libya on the new framework agreement will be either concluded or nearing completion. As for the occupied Palestinian Territory, our future work together will aim at supporting the implementation of the Palestinian National Plan, and thus the PM's state-building plan.

With Morocco, we will give concrete shape to the 'statut avancé' with this country through the implementation of a new-generation, specific Action Plan tailored to this ambitious relationship.

#### Funding

In the next three years (2011-13) over EUR 5.7 billion will be allocated to reinforcing political cooperation and promote economic integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries. Funding will go to support political and economic reforms, regional and cross-border cooperation in the partner countries covered by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It will also support projects in areas like climate change, transport, energy and environment. EU neighbours will receive more than EUR 2 billion in 2013, compared with EUR 1.6 billion in 2010.

Over EUR 2 billion in 2013 is a substantial amount, but if we want to reinforce our relations with the ENP partners we will need a higher overall level of funding for the neighbourhood countries in the next financial perspective.

If we want our neighbours' economies to integrate effectively into the EU single market, we must support their economic development. We must also coordinate and mobilise funding from the international financial institutions and particularly from the EIB to support our policy goals in three main areas, namely (1) climate change, (2) social and economic infrastructure, and (3) local private sector development, including SMEs.

#### Regional and multilateral dimensions

In parallel to this commitment and to bilateral relations with our partners, we will continue to build up our regional and multilateral initiatives. We will continue to develop the institutional capacity of the Union for the Mediterranean, in particular its Secretariat that was established last March in Barcelona. We will help to give concrete shape to UfM flagship projects that will promote the economic development and help to protect the environment of the region, for instance on water management and fight against pollution in the Mediterranean.

Regarding the Eastern Partnership, we will hold the second Summit in Budapest in May 2011. We will also carry forward our flagship initiatives in the framework of the EaP, for example on integrated border management and support of SMEs.

I also intend to reflect on how best to support sub-regional co-operation in our neighbourhood, for instance in the Maghreb.

Let me make one final but very important remark on why we have chosen a five-year assessment for the ENP package. The main objective is that we want to use the findings as a basis for extensive consultations with Member States, with you here in the Parliament and with our partners in the neighbourhood to get your and their feedback

- \* if we have the right tools and instruments in place,
  - \* if the amount and the allocation of resources is appropriate,
- and

\* if speed and scope of our efforts are going in the right direction.

The results will be presented in the framework of next year's package which should make our policy more coherent and which will without a doubt lead to a higher degree of ownership by our neighbours. It will also be an ideal exercise to make our case for adequate resources to be provided by the next Financial Perspective very strong.

#### Related Documents:

Progress reports on implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 12 May 2010.

- Overall Assessment
- Sectoral Progress
- Individual ENP countries progress reports

[Access here.](#)

#### *Ukraine not ready to join NATO*

Ukraine presidential press service

Kyiv, 27 May 2010. [Link](#)

Our country is not ready to join NATO, however, we certainly must develop partnerships relations with the Alliance, said President Yanukovich in Lviv in the interview to journalists.

"If we speak about membership in NATO, today it is impossible for our country. According to NATO standards, we must have positive opinion of overwhelming majority of the people," stressed President Yanukovich adding that it is well understood in NATO itself. "So for now we envision our relationship as partnership. Ukraine cannot go some other way because it is a large state and it must cooperate with such bloc as NATO," – he said.

According to Viktor Yanukovich, there is a new bill on the foundations of domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine is being prepared now, which would correspond with the mood of the majority of citizens. "We will be conducting the policy that suits the Ukrainian people," said the President.

Viktor Yanukovich once again repeated that Ukraine will be conducting an open policy of non-aligned state. He also said that our country will be taking active part in collective security system in Europe.

#### *EU proposes visa facilitation for Georgia*

EU Commission press release

Brussels, 5 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

The European Commission today proposed the conclusion of visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Georgia. The draft agreements result from recent negotiations between the EU and Georgia. They aim at enhancing EU-Georgia relations

by facilitating short-stay travel of Georgian citizens to the EU while jointly tackling risks of irregular migration.

[...]

Today's draft visa facilitation and readmission agreements are the result of recent negotiations between Georgia and the EU. Once in force, they will make it easier for Georgians to apply for visas, making procedures faster, reducing paperwork and lowering visa fees. At the same time, the readmission agreement will ensure the return of those who illegally stay in the EU.

The visa facilitation agreement provides for, among other things:

- simplification of documentary evidence to be submitted in support of the visa application,
- issuing multiple-entry visas with a long period of validity to certain categories of applicants needing to travel frequently to the EU such as businesspeople, journalists and family members of Georgian citizens residing in the EU,
- reducing visa fees to EUR 35 for all citizens and waiving fees for specific categories such as children, family members of Georgian citizens residing in the EU, representatives of civil society organisations, etc.,
- setting deadlines for processing visa applications
- exemption from the visa obligation for holders of diplomatic passports.

The European Commission has today adopted the proposals for Council decisions on the signature and conclusion of the agreements. The Commission calls on the European Parliament and Council to endorse the visa facilitation and readmission agreements so that they can enter into force as soon as possible.

#### *Background*

In September 2008 the Extraordinary European Council called for visa facilitation measures. In November 2009 negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements were concluded (IP/08/1406) and the EU and Georgia signed a mobility partnership aiming at promoting a better framework for cooperation on all aspects of migration policy.(IP/09/1853).

Since 2006, the EU has concluded visa facilitation agreements with Russia, Ukraine, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and the Republic of Moldova. Negotiations are ongoing with Cape Verde.

#### *Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*

Statement by EUHR Catherine Ashton on adoption of negotiating directives

Brussels, 11 May 2010. [Link](#)

I welcome the adoption by the General Affairs Council on 10 May of the negotiating directives for the future Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The adoption of these negotiating directives is a clear sign of our strong commitment to further deepen the relationship between the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus, on the basis of shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Eastern Partnership, launched at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009, provides an ambitious framework for taking the relationship with the countries of the South Caucasus to a new level. In this context, Association Agreements are an important instrument to upgrade our relations beyond existing commitments with a view of political association and gradual economic integration with the EU.

The negotiation process will be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and differentiation, as well as joint ownership. Successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership with the active engagement of the partner countries both in its multilateral and bilateral track will strengthen relations on the basis of shared values and will help advancing political and economic reforms, consolidate governance and foster regional stability, prosperity and confidence building.

I look forward to the launch of negotiations on these ambitious and comprehensive agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

### *A strategy for the South Caucasus?*

European Parliament press release  
Brussels, 20 May 2010. [Link](#)

The EU must pursue a strategy to promote stability, prosperity and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, argues a resolution adopted by Parliament on Thursday. The region is central to the EU's energy interests as it hosts the South Caucasus Pipeline, which transports gas from the Caspian to the Black Sea.

Although Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been partners of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy since 2004, a comprehensive regional strategy is still lacking for the region, says the resolution, which was drafted by Evgeni Kirilov (S&D, BG). MEPs want the EU strategy for the South Caucasus to concentrate on three areas: conflict resolution; promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; economic cooperation and social development.

Europe faces a complex geopolitical situation in its dealings with this region, with conflicts in the Nagorno Karabakh area and Georgia as well as tensions between Armenia and Turkey. The situation of conflict in the region is neither acceptable nor viable, say MEPs, who express concern at the recent increases in military spending and call for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Another obstacle to economic and social development is the persistence of "frozen conflicts".

### Energy security

Lastly, MEPs highlight the importance of the region for the EU's energy security and supply. They express support for the strengthening of EU-South Caucasus cooperation in energy

projects and urge the EU to work firmly towards completion of the Nabucco pipeline.

Background - upcoming elections in Georgia  
Ahead of local elections in Georgia to be held on 30 May, MEPs insist that measures be taken to ensure that international electoral standards are respected. The EP's Foreign Affairs Committee will send an ad-hoc delegation of seven MEPs to observe these elections.

### *EU on Nagorno-Karabakh «parliamentary elections»*

Statement by EUHR Catherine Ashton  
Brussels, 21 May 2010. [Link](#)

I would like to recall that the European Union does not recognise the constitutional and legal framework within which the "parliamentary elections" in Nagorno Karabakh will be held this Sunday. This event should not prejudice the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I reiterate our firm support to the OSCE Minsk-Group, and the work of the three Co-chairs and their efforts towards a settlement of the conflict, and call on the parties to redouble their efforts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. I recall the EU's readiness to offer further support to this end.

### *EU declaration on the Israeli military operation against the Flotilla*

Statement by EUHR Catherine Ashton  
Brussels, 31 May 2010. [Link](#)

The EU deeply regrets the loss of life during the Israeli military operation in international waters against the Flotilla sailing to Gaza and offers its condolences to the families of the victims. The EU condemns the use of violence that has produced a high number of victims among the members of the flotilla and demands an immediate, full and impartial inquiry into the events and the circumstances surrounding them.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains a source of grave concern. The EU does not accept the continued policy of closure. It is unacceptable and politically counterproductive. We need to urgently achieve a durable solution to the situation in Gaza.

The EU underlines its call for an immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from Gaza. The EU calls on Israel to urgently provide Member States with consular access to and information about their citizens.

The EU calls upon all parties and relevant actors to prevent a further escalation of tensions and underlines the need to continue the proximity talks with a view to the resumption of direct negotiations.

### Turkey on the Israeli military operation against the Flotilla

Address by Turkish MFA at the UN  
New York, 31 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

I am distraught by the fact that the Israeli Defense Forces stormed a multinational, civilian endeavor carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza in international waters, 72 nautical miles off the coast to be exact, killing and wounding many civilians. This action was uncalled for. Israeli actions constitute a grave breach of international law.

In simplest terms, this is tantamount to banditry and piracy. It is murder conducted by a state. It has no excuses, no justification whatsoever. A nation state that follows this path has lost its legitimacy as a respectful member of the international community.

[...]

The multinational civilian flotilla composed of a few ships and a total of around 600 people from 32 countries, carrying humanitarian aid to the impoverished Gaza was unlawfully ambushed early today. The sole aim of this civilian mission was to provide much needed relief to the children of occupied Gaza who have been under illegal and inhumane Israeli blockade for years. The ships were hardly a threat to the State of Israel or any other state for that matter.

[...]

Today we have observed through live coverage an act of barbarism where provision of humanitarian aid has been punished through aggression in high seas, 72 miles from international waters.. Today many humanitarian aid workers go back in bodybags. And Israel has blood on its hands.

[...]

The use of force was not only inappropriate, but also disproportionate. International law dictates that even in wartime, civilians are not to be attacked or harmed. The doctrine of self-defense does not in any way justify the actions taken by the Israeli forces. High-seas freedoms constitute one of the most basic rights under international law of the sea, including customary international law. Freedom of navigation is one of the oldest forms of international norms, dating back centuries.

[...]

After the act of aggression, I have heard official statements claiming that the civilians on the ships were members of a radical Islamist group. It saddens me to see that officials of a state stoop so low as to lie and struggle to create pretexts that would legitimize their illegal actions. However, the flotilla consists of citizens of 32 countries. All of them civilians, representing many faiths; Christianity, Islam, Judaism and people from all creeds and backgrounds. It represents the conscience of the international community. It is a model of the United Nations.

No state is above the law. Israel must be prepared to face the consequences and be held accountable for its crimes. Under the conditions, any slim chance that existed regarding peace and stability in the region has suffered a serious setback.

[...]

Turkey would like to see that the Security Council strongly reacts and adopts a Presidential Statement today strongly

condemning this Israeli act of aggression, demanding an urgent inquiry into the incident and calling for the punishment of all responsible authorities and persons. I call on this Council to step up and do what is expected of it.

We hereby expect for the following to be included in the decision.

- Israel must apologize to the international community and to the families of those who have been killed and wounded in the attack.
- An urgent inquiry must be undertaken.
- Appropriate international legal action must immediately be taken against the authorities responsible for and perpetrators of this aggression.
- A severe sense of disappointment and warning must be issued by the United Nations. Israel must be urged to abide by international law and basic human rights.
- The countries concerned must be allowed to retrieve their deceased and wounded immediately.
- The ships must be expressly released and allowed to deliver the humanitarian assistance to its destination.
- The families of the deceased, wounded, NGO's and shipping companies concerned must be compensated to the full extent.
- The blockade of Gaza must be ended immediately and all humanitarian assistance must be allowed in.
- Gaza must be made an example by swiftly developing it, to make it a region of peace. The international community must be invited to contribute.

### Israel on military operation against the Flotilla

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release  
Tel Aviv, 31 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

Early Monday morning (31 May), IDF naval forces intercepted six ships attempting to break the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. This happened after numerous warnings from Israel and the Israel Navy that were issued prior to the action. The Israel Navy requested the ships to redirect toward Ashdod where they would be able to unload their aid material which would then be transferred over land after undergoing security inspections.

During the boarding of the Mavi Marmara, the demonstrators onboard attacked the IDF naval personnel with live fire and light weaponry including knives and clubs. Additionally two of the weapons used were grabbed from an IDF soldier. The demonstrators had clearly prepared their weapons in advance for this specific purpose.

As a result of this life-threatening and violent activity, naval forces first employed riot dispersal means, followed by live fire.

Update on injuries and casualties in today's incident in which IDF naval forces were met with extremely violent resistance on board the Mavi Mamara:

A total of seven soldiers were wounded - four soldiers were moderately wounded, of which two were initially in critical condition, as well as an additional three soldiers who were

lightly wounded. Among the violent activists, there were nine casualties as a result of the soldiers defending themselves. Reports from IDF forces on the scene are that it seems as if part of the participants onboard the ships were planning to lynch the forces.

The IDF naval operation was carried out under orders from the political leadership to halt the flotilla from reaching the Gaza Strip and breaching the naval blockade.

*Stefan Füle, EC for Enlargement and ENP addresses Union for the Mediterranean “For’UM” meeting*

EU Commission press release  
Marseille, 27 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

The Union for the Mediterranean is an attempt to tap the vast and still partly unexploited human and economic potential of our region. It is about renewable energy, de-pollution, better transport, increased trade, stronger regional education centres, and many other endeavours that can create the growth and, more importantly, the jobs that our region needs. The key to our shared stability and prosperity lies precisely in this attempt to champion innovation in all its forms, for the greater benefit of the 500 million people living in this region. When my friend Ahmed Masa’deh was offered the position of Secretary-General for the Union for the Mediterranean, we discussed this very issue and we came to the same conclusion on what the Mediterranean region needs to move forward: projects.

Of course we do not live and work in a political vacuum. The situation in the Middle East, the recently started proximity talks, the postponement to November of our Heads of State Summit all remind us of the importance, indeed the central character, of politics in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, what is essential is that concrete work continues. The Secretariat is now established and preparing its work programme. Work accelerates in all areas. In short: Euro-Mediterranean co-operation goes on. When our Heads of State gather for the Summit in November, our partnership, in practical, political and institutional terms, will be even stronger and ready to offer real support for the region against the background of hopeful political progress. When we turn back towards our work in a few years’ time and we look at this period, it will be clear what has made the difference: projects.

[...]

First of all, our financial framework: as you know the EU “financial perspectives” (as we call them) are set for seven-year periods and cover the entirety of the budget of the Union: not only our external action but also internal policies. The present financial perspective was agreed by Member States in 2006, well before the birth of the UfM, and it sets our spending framework until the end of 2013.

Naturally, while we cannot change the financial perspective, the Commission recalibrated its regional Mediterranean programmes, both bilateral and regional, to be in line with the priorities set by Paris and then here in Marseille in 2008. We spent EUR 94 million on regional projects last year alone and we have financing decisions worth another EUR 92 million this year. Among others, these decisions address UfM priority issues like the better management of the water sector (EUR 22 million) and transport (EUR 10 million). We have also ensured financing for other priority areas identified in Paris: EUR 4.4 million for civil protection, spent on the EU Programme

for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Man-Made and Natural Disasters in the Euro-Mediterranean region (PPRD); EUR 5 million in preparatory work and studies for the Mediterranean Solar Plan; EUR 1 million for the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia; another EUR 9 million on the project “Invest-in-Med” to support business development. Looking back from the early days of the Euro-Mediterranean process in 1995, the Commission has spent a total of EUR 1.66 billion on regional projects dedicated to the Mediterranean over the last fifteen years.

Second, our instruments. We have tried our best to be innovative in terms of the financing instruments we use. In a situation of budgetary and programming constraints, it is absolutely crucial to avail ourselves of all the instruments and new tools at our disposal. One tool that has proven of particular worth is the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), for at least three reasons:

- first, the amounts involved: the triggering and multiplying effects of grants put in circulation by the EC and Member States allow the mobilisation of considerable financing from European bilateral and multilateral financial institutions such as the EIB, the ADF and KfW: in just less than two years of activity, the NIF has aided investment in infrastructures in the Mediterranean region in the order of 5.5 billion Euros.
- second, the targeting: the large majority of these projects are numbered among UfM priorities, especially the Mediterranean Solar Plan, with the financing of solar centres and other renewable energies, as well as the Horizon 2020 initiative with the financing of sewage projects and the treatment of waste water.
- third, the flexibility: the NIF also allows the possibility of financing, in association with loans from European Financial Institutions, through a large variety of interventions: investments, technical assistance, studies, risk-capital operations, guarantees, etc. This is one of the innovative characteristics of the instrument, namely the advantage gained through its wide flexibility.

[...]

However, having said all the above, and even with all our efforts and instruments, the resources that can be mobilised by grants and loans by European public actors – the Member States, the European Commission, financial development institutions - cannot alone meet the considerable financial demands of the region. According to EIB estimations over the next ten years we are looking at EUR 100 billion for the energy sector ; EUR 110 billion for urban renewal (water, transport, sewage); EUR 20 billion for infrastructure (motorways, ports) and EUR 20 billion for support of enterprise development.

It is, therefore, necessary to attract the interest of private sector actors (be they the banks or investors in general) and to create the minimal indispensable conditions for their participation in this great scheme. In a time of economic crisis, on which I don’t have to elaborate any further, we urgently need them with us. In my view it is not merely a question of return on investments, but rather it is necessary to undertake more profound work on the security of investments, to clarify the legal framework and to work on insurance mechanisms for investments. It will also be useful to explore how to introduce local savings in the financial circuits in order to enhance the capacity of actors from the South in this effort.

I think that, in the above, there are real opportunities for the Secretariat to grasp which will be beneficial to all. Apart from its principal role in the validation and visibility of projects, the Secretariat brings a genuine added value in its own right, and the Commission is ready to support it in its endeavours. Of course the Secretariat will need broad support by all UfM partners to succeed and I believe we should all be

ready to provide them with good ideas. For instance, the “Conseil de coopération économique” is presently working for the Commission on identifying possible bankable projects for the Mediterranean, some of which could eventually become contributions to the work of the Secretariat as possible UfM projects.

There remains, evidently, the question of the financial framework after 2013. Discussions on the financial perspectives for 2014-2020 are starting and, for the EU and its Member states, this period is the moment to define strategies and priorities. It is the moment for the Union to establish and reinforce these priorities in its role as global actor and to define its strategy for each of the regions of the world.

[...]

I would like to finish my intervention by emphasising once more the role the Secretariat can play in this effort of mobilisation and imagination for the benefit of UfM investments.

In effect, the work programme that will be elaborated by the Secretariat should bring us speedily to a proposition including suggestions for projects to be validated. In order for this work to have a wider resonance, it should be accompanied by a significant visibility effort which can then also be of benefit to the identified investments. I know that our Secretary General, Ambassador Masa'deh, is fully aware of this heavy responsibility and will employ all possible efforts towards building a mechanism that will facilitate the legal and financial engineering of UfM projects. His success and the success of the Secretariat are of paramount importance to all of us. I hope he knows he can count on the Commission's full support, both financial and political, as well as on my personal commitment to his task.

### *Inauguration of the EU-Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee*

Speech by Stefan Füle, EC for Enlargement and ENP  
Brussels, 5 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

This inaugural meeting in fact marks a key stage in our partnership, the origins of which date back to the first Cooperation Agreement of 1976.

Our joint wish for close cooperation has led us to forge closer links on a sound basis, the Association Agreement, which came into force in 2000. In 2005, when the EU took the initiative of establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy, Morocco was among the first to realise that we were offering a considerably strengthened partnership, offering “more for more” on a constant basis — and developing our co-operation as far as our partners are ready to take it. Morocco responded to our offer by drawing an ambitious Action Plan providing for closer co-operation in all key elements of Morocco's reform process. Since the start of this partnership, we have made progress together in areas almost all areas covered by the Action Plan, such as enhanced political dialogue, promotion of human rights and economic and social reforms, in particular with a view to alleviating poverty and increasing women's rights.

We made another qualitative leap in 2008 when we agreed on a joint document granting Morocco ‘advanced status’ (“statut avancé”) within the ENP. Once again it was the first country in the region to have this status and, by taking this step, Morocco

placed itself in the vanguard in the Neighbourhood Policy. This also attests to the EU's recognition of the scale of the progress made by Morocco and its reiterated ambition of moving closer to Europe.

The ‘advanced status’ reinforces the partnership by setting out new ambitions for closer political relations, the gradual adoption by Morocco of the Community acquis, the integration of its economy to the internal market, deeper sectoral cooperation as well as enhanced consideration of the human dimension of our relationship. One of the major initiatives envisaged under the advanced status was the holding of an EU-Morocco Summit. It took place in Granada in March and was yet another demonstration of the political importance that both of us attach to our relationship. The Summit reaffirmed the extent of our ambitions and confirmed Morocco's privileged place and its position as a key EU partner in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world.

[...]

we have also worked together in order to encourage trade: we concluded as recently as last December our negotiation on agricultural products and on the Protocol for dispute settlement. Once we have made sufficient progress in our ongoing negotiation on trade in services, we will be able to take the next step and prepare for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.

Meanwhile, we are providing robust support to Morocco's gradual efforts to transpose the EU “acquis” into its own legal system in a number of areas. This is yet another demanding endeavour, but we share Morocco's belief that this process is the fastest road towards modernisation and that it will considerably strengthen the country's attractiveness and competitiveness.

And, last but not least, I should also mention our very dense co-operation on political matters: I am thinking of our enhanced consultations on Common Foreign and Security Policy matters, or of Morocco's remarkable co-operation with the Council of Europe, but also, more generally, of our strong support to Morocco's reform efforts on human rights and fundamental freedoms, justice reform, the role of women in society and many other essential areas.

[...]

The creation of this joint committee, the first in the Mediterranean region, represents real progress in our relationship by providing a forum for debates and exchanges on matters of common interest and strengthening the human, political and democratic dimension of EU-Morocco relations.

[...]

We consider the objectives of the partnership with Morocco to be highly ambitious. The EU will continue to extend its full political and financial support to the Moroccan government's reform priorities, as it has been doing for many years. In this regard I wish to underline that, two months ago, the European Commission decided a substantial increase in its annual grants in favour of Morocco. The allocation of EUR 580.5 million for the period 2011-2013 makes Morocco the first beneficiary of EU aid in the entire neighbourhood (Palestine excluded) and represents a 20% increase of our yearly aid. These funds serve the purpose of supporting the implementation of the ‘advanced status’, and in particular of addressing the challenge of bringing Morocco and the EU closer — including in the area of legislation by means of Morocco's gradual approximation to

the Community acquis. They will give us the means to turn the ambitious roadmap set by the advanced status into practical action.

*Stefan Füle, EC for Enlargement and ENP on Enlargement Policy*

EU Commission press release  
Strasbourg, 17 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

As regards the area of Enlargement policy, let me take a moment to give you my views of where we stand now and share with you where I hope to make progress in the coming months.

Over the coming months, the Commission will focus its attention on the 2010 Enlargement package, which will be adopted in November. It will contain a forward looking Strategy paper and the Progress Reports.

Furthermore, work on the opinions on the membership applications from Montenegro and Albania continues. This constitutes a considerable challenge both for the countries concerned and the Commission services. The opinions will be fair and balanced, taking into account the countries' achievements and own merits. It's a tall order, but I believe it is possible.

Following the Commission's positive Opinion on Iceland's application I hope that a decision to open accession negotiations can be made by the European Council in June.

With Turkey we have now reached a stage where opening chapters has become more demanding. We are looking in particular at the four chapters food safety, public procurement, competition and social policy and employment. Our aim is to open the chapter food safety under the Spanish presidency. However, the timing is extremely tight, especially as Turkey still needs to adopt legislation to meet a specific benchmark. The Commission will continue to provide necessary support, but the ball is in Turkey's court.

Following the Intergovernmental Conference on 19 April, more than half the chapters are now provisionally closed with Croatia. Concluding negotiations this year is however challenging. The Commission is working hard to advance, but quality must prevail over speed. There can be no shortcuts and this is in particular relevant for Chapter 23. I expect to submit soon to the Council a draft EU position for opening negotiations on this chapter, but progress in cooperation with ICTY will be the key to convince Member States to open the chapter.

We have recommended also the opening of accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but the June European Council would only follow on this recommendation if the name issue is solved. I understand the sensitivities of this question on both sides and I am following the UN-led mediation process closely.

We stand ready to prepare an opinion on Serbia's membership application as soon as the Council mandates us to do so. I furthermore hope that the June Council can decide on starting the SAA ratification process. I understand Prosecutor Brammertz's June report to UNSC will be pivotal in this regard and further progress in ICTY cooperation remains crucial.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the focus of much of my attention at the moment. I visited Sarajevo some weeks ago and had a good exchange with the Bosnian political leadership. The country needs to fulfil the requirements which will allow a reinforced EU presence. But the Constitution also needs to be brought into line with the European Convention for Human Rights. The political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are aware that it is up to them to move the country closer to the EU.

It is in the interest of all of us to make sure that Kosovo does not fall behind the rest of the region. The message I took to Kosovo ten days ago was that Kosovo shares the European perspective of the Western Balkans. We at the Commission are developing ways in which we can help its socio-economic development, in line with what we proposed last autumn. My aim is to launch the visa dialogue, and possibly proposing the negotiation of a trade agreement if the necessary progress is made by Kosovo. We are all aware that ICJ will issue its opinion this year and this looms large over relations between Kosovo and Serbia. I have urged all parties to demonstrate their willingness to be constructive and pragmatic in the run-up and following the ICJ opinion.

I hope, in this respect, that the upcoming EU Presidency conference in Sarajevo on 2 June can be inclusive, with all parties around the table with a common goal of bringing the whole region closer together.

On a final note, it is crucial that the process of European integration, which sometimes can appear long, has a direct impact on the citizens of the region. The visa liberalisation process has been very important in this respect.

The updated assessments on the visa liberalisation dialogue with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina were presented to the Council and the European Parliament on 26/27 April. The aim of the Commission is to present the proposal for visa liberalisation by the end of May. I count on your cooperation in ensure swift follow-up once this legislative proposal reaches the Parliament.

*European Commission proposes visa free travel for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina*

EU Commission press release  
Brussels, 27 May 2010. [Link](#)

The European Commission today adopted a proposal to enable citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to travel with biometric passports to the Schengen countries without needing a visa. The proposal is conditional on both countries fulfilling three outstanding requirements.

"I know how much visa free travel means to the people of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Granting visa free travel is a cornerstone of the EU's integration policy for the Western Balkans. Facilitating people to people contacts enhances business opportunities and gives the possibility for the people of the region to get to know the EU better", said Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs. She added: "Today's proposal is the result of intensive and hard work for the authorities and the people of these countries in meeting the conditions. I am certain that the two countries, building on the good results already shown, will be able to fulfil the remaining criteria in due time in order to allow the European Parliament and the Council of EU Ministers to give the final green light to this proposal as soon as possible. Let me also stress that this freedom would come with responsibility. So I encourage national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue informing their citizens about the rights and obligations stemming from short-term visa-free travel".

Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, underlined: "This proposal for visa free travel is of the utmost importance for the citizens of the countries concerned, since it will bring them closer to the EU. The visa-free regime will contribute to making the European perspective more tangible. I am as confident as Commissioner Malmström that relevant national authorities in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon be able to fulfil all outstanding requirements and continue to guarantee consistent results in the implementation of the roadmaps."

The proposal aims at simplifying travel to EU countries (except the UK and Ireland, which do not take part in the common visa policy) and those associated to the Schengen area (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) for the citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing the obligation to apply for a short-term visa.

It is the result of more than two years' intensive work in the framework of the visa liberalisation dialogue, which started with these two countries during the first semester of 2008: on the basis of roadmaps presented by the European Commission, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have made important progress in improving passport security, strengthening border controls and reinforcing the institutional framework to fight organised crime and corruption. Substantial progress has been done also in the field of external relations and fundamental rights.

Despite these good results, both countries still have to make progresses in some areas where shortcomings have still been identified (for more details see MEMO/10/218). The European Commission will continue to monitor the efforts put in place to effectively tackle the outstanding issues and will report timely to the EP and the Council on the findings. The monitoring exercise could take place over the summer in order to allow the Council and the Parliament to take a final decision in autumn.

The proposal follows last year's Council Decision exempting from the short-term visa obligation the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

It will be now up to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union to take a final decision on the Commission proposal.

### *The Balkans deserve this*

Op-Ed by Hillary Clinton, Catherine Ashton, Miguel Angel Moratinos

First published in «The Guardian», 30 May 2010. [Link](#)

Almost a century ago, a war that changed European history began in Sarajevo. Nearly 20 years ago, the city was the centre of another violent conflict that ended only with the 1995 Dayton accords. And 10 years ago, with the memory of the Yugoslavian wars still fresh, the European Union affirmed the crucial role of Euro-Atlantic multilateral institutions in the security and stability of the Balkans. Today Sarajevo is at peace, a symbol of rebirth and reconciliation, representing all the opportunities and challenges of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

On Wednesday the EU Spanish presidency will host a ministerial meeting in Sarajevo attended by senior leaders from EU member states, the western Balkans, the US, Russia and Turkey to reaffirm our shared commitment to the security of the Balkans through integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Integrating the western Balkans remains one of the last challenges to building a democratic and unified Europe. In Sarajevo EU ministers will recommit themselves to the Balkans' place in Europe. Ministers from the region will reaffirm their commitment to implement the reforms necessary to meet the aspirations of their people and to move their countries on the path to the Euro-Atlantic community.

As we have seen in the past two decades, the perspective of integration into the EU and Nato is a powerful driver of reform, economic prosperity and the rule of law. It means a seat at the table in European decisions, free movement of goods and people and a guarantee of security. The reforms required are also transformative. The people of the region want and deserve transparency and accountability in their governments, a level playing field for business and the opportunity to raise their children in peace and security. This is also what we want for them. The pace of global change is such that none of us can afford stagnation and "business as usual". Commitments on both sides have to be real, not rhetorical.

The rationale for this new path is clear: to replace the old dynamics of disintegration with the new dynamic of European integration. The Lisbon treaty embodies the ambition of the EU to become a more effective global actor, and the Balkans represent an important test for the success of this ambition.

The leaders of the Balkans will have our full support as they confront the challenges of reform. Beyond complying with the political and economic Copenhagen criteria, they must commit to reconciliation among ethnic and religious communities and political groups to build a new national consensus.

The EU and the US have spared no effort in the course of these months to tackle the many fronts in the process of stabilising and "Europeanising" the Balkans, and anchoring the rule of law and good governance. The Obama administration is committed

to remain engaged in the region through completion of our shared vision.

A little over a year ago, Joe Biden, the US vice-president, and Javier Solana, the EU high representative, visited Sarajevo with a message of hope: the doors to Euro-Atlantic institutions remain open to all the countries of the Balkans, once they meet the requirements for accession. The compact with the region, to which the EU and US will rededicate ourselves at Sarajevo on Wednesday, remains firm: we stand ready to assist the citizens and leaders of the region in building a better future together.

*Hillary Clinton is the US secretary of state; Catherine Ashton is the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy; Miguel Angel Moratinos is Spain's minister of foreign affairs.*

policy instruments, which induced substantial reforms. Yet the win by Hamas in the 2006 elections brought a halt to the EU's aid and diplomacy. This boycott proved detrimental, as it widened the rift between the main parties to the point of no reconciliation. Whether the Union for the Mediterranean proves any better than its predecessor policies in the region remains to be seen. This publication aims at providing a broad picture of the EU's policies towards the Palestinian Territory, in order to draw lessons from them and offer proposals for the way ahead.

### *Russia and the ECHR: Reform of the Court and of Russian judicial practice?*

Anton Burkov

CEPS Commentary, 10 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

On January 15th of this year, Russia became the last of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe to ratify Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which will now allow the long-awaited reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to begin. This commentary explores two basic questions: Why did Russia not ratify Protocol 14 for such a long time? And why has it now decided to ratify it after four years of delay?

### *President Yanukovich's Dubious Deal*

Michael Emerson

CEPS Commentary, 5 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

One of Viktor Yanukovich first actions after his election as President of Ukraine in February of this year was to negotiate a headline-grabbing but highly dubious deal with Russia, in which Ukraine extended the lease of the Russian Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol for 25 to 30 years in exchange for a 10-year discount off the price of gas. This CEPS Commentary finds the deal highly questionable on political, strategic and economic grounds.

### *The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory*

Rouba Al-Fattal

CEPS Working Document, No. 328, 4 May 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

Fifteen years after its launch, the impact of the Barcelona Process on the Palestinian Territory is in need of a reassessment. Despite some initial improvements in the political and economic structures, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership alone has failed to anchor a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. In response, the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched to bring out a number of new foreign

# European Neighbourhood Watch index

## *Issue 59 • April 2010*

- Editorial by Michael Emerson: "Yanukovich's dubious deal"
- Black Sea fleet - Gas deal with Russia
- Tymoshenko on Black Sea fleet - Gas deal with Russia
- EC Stefan Füle on EU-Ukraine relations
- EU Official on EU-Ukraine Association
- Addenda to the Contract on Supply of Gas to Ukraine
- Medvedev on Nord Stream pipeline construction
- Russia-Norway agreement on maritime delimitation
- EU council conclusions on the EEAS
- EP on EEAS organization
- Elmar Brok, MEP: «What we expect from the EEAS»
- Obama-Medvedev on new START treaty
- Russian Federation statement on Missile Defence
- EU council conclusions on Kyrgyzstan
- BRIC summit communiqué
- CEPS Publications:
  - Lisbon five months on
  - Turkey's genocide diplomacy
  - Pain in Poland
  - Russia in Europe and the West

## *Issue 58 • March 2010*

- Editorial by Michael Emerson: "Russia in Europe and the West"
- Proposals for Council Decision on EEAS
- Organogram of EEAS architecture
- HR/VP Ashton presents vision for EEAS
- MEPs give conditional backing to EEAS
- Verhofstadt/Brok non-paper and organogram on EEAS
- EC Stefan Füle Interview on Eastern Partnership
- EU increases ENP funding for 2011-2013
- EC Stefan Füle on Ukraine
- "Rethink Moldova"
- HR/VP Ashton on Belarus
- EC President Barroso on Georgia
- HR/VP Ashton on Abkhazia and S. Ossetia
- Visegrad Group joint statement on Eastern Partnership
- EC Stefan Füle on inauguration UfM Secretariat
- EU-Morocco Summit
- Middle East Quartet Statement
- HR/VP Ashton: «The EU and the Middle East»
- CEPS Publications
  - Remaking Europe's Borders through the ENP
  - Single Voice, single chair? How to re-organise the EU in international negotiations under the Lisbon rules
  - The Union for the Mediterranean - Evolution and prospects

## *Issue 57 • February 2010*

- Editorial by Michael Emerson: "Messages from Central Asia for the High Representative"
- Address by Van Rompuy, European Council Pres.
- Results of the Presidential Elections
- OSCE/ODIHR conclusions on Ukraine elections
- Statement of HR Catherine Ashton on Ukraine elections
- Russian President congratulates Yanukovich
- Ukraine and Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union
- EP President Jerzy Buzek on Belarus
- EU HR Catherine Ashton on Belarus
- Belarus MFA on conflict of Union of Poles in Belarus
- Main points of new Russian Military Doctrine
- Russian President on new Russian Military Doctrine
- Russian-Abkhazian Summit
- EU Council conclusions on Moldova/Transnistria
- EU-Moldova Human Rights Council established
- Budapest Energy Security Summit Declaration
- Kosovo President speech on independence anniversary
- CEPS Publications:
  - Into EurAsia - Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy
  - On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North
  - The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative

## *Issue 56 • January 2010*

- Editorial by Michael Emerson: "Sequel to the Lisbon Treaty for the EU's diplomatic representation"
- Foreign Policy Priorities of the Spanish EU Presidency
- EP Hearing of Catherine Ashton
- EP Hearing of Stefan Füle
- EP Hearing of Karel de Gucht
- Ukraine Presidential Elections: First round results
- ODIHR preliminary conclusions on Ukraine elections
- EU Commission on presidential elections in Ukraine
- EU-Moldova negotiations on Association Agreement
- Russia-Belarus agreement on crude oil deliveries
- Russian Duma end opposition to Strasbourg Court
- EU Conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina
- CEPS Publications:
  - EU Assistance to Central Asia: Back to the Drawing Board? "What to do with President Medvedev's draft European Security Treaty?"

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