

## *Russia in Europe and the West*

Two swallows don't make a summer, as the old saying goes. And so you are cautioned. But still one can catch sight of two swallows in the air, suggesting that maybe the time is coming for a new and positive turn to Russia's relations with Europe and the transatlantic community.

The first swallow is Russia's ratification of Protocol 14 of the Convention on the European Court of Human Rights. This may sound like just a technical detail, but it is more than that. Protocol 14 is about reforming some rules and procedures of the Court to make it capable of handling more easily the huge increase in cases that are being submitted to it, and foremost from Russia. Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, Russia has been the last to ratify, after four years of hesitation. The delay was widely interpreted as a blocking tactic, undermining the Court from functioning effectively, which would mean undermining the cause of human rights in Europe. In interpreting this successful ratification, some independent Russian lawyers are saying that this was a decision favoured at the highest level by President Medvedev in order to improve the rule of law within Russia, since the case law of the Court is mandatory upon national legal systems. Hallelujah!

The second swallow has come from Germany where Volker Ruehe (former defence minister) and General Klaus Naumann (former chief of staff of the German armed forces) published an article in *Der Spiegel* on 8 March, recommending that the question of NATO membership for Russia be put back on the agenda. The idea is not for a regular membership action plan, but rather that politically the perspective of future membership would be adopted as the frame through which to radically change the sense of thinking and debate about Russia's strategic security relationship with NATO and Europe. These authors are not naïve, and are quick to point out that the NATO alliance "is also an alliance of values and it will take some time before Russia fully satisfies these criteria".

Why should this bold proposition be taken up now? For an interesting accumulation of reasons.

First, it is clear that President Medvedev's draft European Security Treaty is not going to fly. It may be subject to endless talks in the OSCE's Corfu process, but the bottom line is that this is neither technically nor politically (for most NATO member states) a plausible proposition.

Second, Russia now seems understandably to be more preoccupied with its Asian flanks, given the risks of destabilisation in Central Asia, and the exposure of the thinly populated Russian Far East to the rising power of China, all notwithstanding the formalities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Under the circumstances, better then tidy up its much more benign Western front (those little Abkhazia and Transnistria affairs) and regroup with the West in NATO.

Third, Russia is increasingly alarmed at the failure of its 'modernisation' concept for the economy. To be successful, this is going to need a profound opening and confidence-building with the West and the EU in particular. Russia cannot conceivably become an EU member state, but it could with a big stretch of the imagination join NATO. Joining NATO as an alliance of values would go well with broad economic integration with Europe.

And finally, for Russia to come really closer to Europe there has to be some strong backbone to the proposition, rather than an endless succession of woolly strategy documents that mean little. A NATO membership perspective would be a game-changing move. And is this not what all parties, Russia, EU and US, basically want?

*by Michael Emerson*

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## European Neighbourhood Watch Index

### Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS

Brussels, 25 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

#### Article 1 - Nature and Scope

1. This Decision establishes the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service ("EEAS").
2. The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be a functionally autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council, with the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives.
3. The EEAS shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ("High Representative").
4. The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the Union delegations to third countries and to international organisations.

#### Article 2 - Tasks

1. The EEAS shall support the High Representative:
  - in fulfilling her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP") of the European Union and to ensure the consistency of the EU's external action;
  - in her capacity of President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council;
  - in her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.
2. The EEAS shall assist the President of the Commission, the Commission and the President of the European Council.

#### Article 3 - Cooperation

1. The EEAS shall work in cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, as well as with the diplomatic services of the Member States, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union external action and between these and its other policies.
2. The EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating to the external action of the Union. The EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to acts to be prepared by the Commission in this area. This paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with Article 205 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU").
3. The EEAS may enter into service-level arrangements with relevant services of the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council, or other offices or interinstitutional bodies of the European Union.
4. The EEAS shall extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union.

#### Article 4 - Central administration

1. The EEAS shall be managed by a Secretary-General who will operate under the authority of the High Representative. The Secretary-General shall take all measures necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the EEAS, including its administrative and budgetary management. He shall ensure effective coordination between all departments in the central administration as well as with the Union delegations, and shall represent the EEAS.

2. The Secretary-General shall be assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General.

3. The central administration of the EEAS shall be organised in directorates general. These shall include:

- a number of directorates general comprising geographic desks covering all countries and regions of the world, as well as multilateral and thematic desks. These departments shall coordinate as necessary with relevant services of the Commission and with the General Secretariat of the Council;
- a directorate general for administrative, staffing, budgetary, security and communication and information system matters under the direct authority of the Secretary-General;
- the crisis management and planning directorate, the civilian planning and conduct capability, the European Union Military Staff and the European Union Situation Centre, placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative in her capacity as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the specificities of these structures, as well as the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the status of the staff shall be respected.

The central administration shall also include:

- a legal department under the direct administrative authority of the Secretary-General which shall work closely with the Legal Services of the Council and the Commission;
- departments for inter-institutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and inspections, and personal data protection.

4. The High Representative shall designate from among EEAS staff members the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies that are chaired by a representative of the High Representative, including the chair of the Political and Security Committee.

5. The High Representative and the EEAS shall be supported where necessary by the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant departments of the Commission. Service level arrangements may be drawn up to that effect by the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant Commission departments.

#### Article 5 - Union delegations

1. The decision to open a delegation shall be adopted by the High Representative, after consulting the Council and the Commission. The decision to close a delegation shall be adopted by the High Representative, in agreement with the Council and the Commission.

2. Each Union delegation shall be led by a Head of Delegation. The Head of Delegation shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status, and for all its activities. He shall be accountable to the High Representative for the overall management of the work of the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union.

Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where this is appropriate for the implementation of the Union budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, Commission staff.

3. The Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative and the EEAS, and shall be responsible for their execution. In areas where the Commission exercises the powers conferred to it by the Treaties, the Commission may also issue instructions to delegations, which shall be executed under the overall responsibility of the Head of Delegation.

4. The Head of Delegation shall implement operational credits in relation to EU projects in the corresponding third country, where sub-delegated by the Commission, in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

5. The operation of each delegation shall be periodically evaluated by the Secretary General of the EEAS; evaluation shall include financial and administrative audits. The Secretary General of the EEAS may request to be assisted for this purpose by the relevant Commission departments.

6. The High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the host country, the international organisation or the third country concerned. In particular, the High Representative shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the host States grant the Union delegations, their staff and their property, privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations.

7. Union delegations shall have the capacity to service the needs of other EU institutions, in particular the European Council and the European Parliament, in their official contacts with the international organisations or third countries to which they are accredited.

8. The Head of Delegation shall have the power to represent the EU in the country where the delegation is located, in particular for the conclusion of contracts and being a party to legal proceedings.

9. The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. They shall, on a reciprocal basis, provide all relevant information.

10. The Union delegations shall have the capacity to, upon request by Member States, support the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to Union citizens in third countries.

#### Article 6 - Staff

1. The EEAS shall comprise:

- (a) officials and other servants of the European Union, including personnel from the diplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary agents;
- (b) if necessary, and on a temporary basis, specialised seconded national experts (SNEs).

2. The staff members of the EEAS shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the Union in mind. Without prejudice to Articles 2(1), third subparagraph, 2(2) and 5(3), they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government, authority, organisation or person outside the EEAS or any body or person other than the High Representative.

3. The Staff Regulations, the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants and the rules adopted jointly by the European Union institutions for the purpose of applying the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants shall apply to the staff of the EEAS referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a).

4. The High Representative shall adopt the rules, equivalent to those laid down in Council Decision 2003/479/EC of 5 December 2007, under which SNEs are put at the disposal of the EEAS in order to provide specialised expertise.

5. The powers conferred on the appointing authority by the Staff Regulations and on the authority authorised to conclude contracts by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants shall be vested in the High Representative, who may delegate those powers inside the EEAS.

6. All appointments in the EEAS shall be based on merit and on the broadest possible geographical basis. The staff of the EEAS shall comprise a meaningful presence of nationals from all the Member States.

7. All members of the staff of the EEAS covered by the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants shall have the same rights and obligations, regardless whether they are officials of the European Union or temporary agents coming from the diplomatic services of the Member States, and be treated equally, in particular as concerns eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent conditions. No distinction shall be made between temporary agents coming from national diplomatic services and officials of the European Union as regards the assignment of duties to perform in all areas of activities and policies implemented by the EEAS.

8. The relevant departments and functions in the General Secretariat of the Council and in the Commission listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. Officials and temporary agents occupying a post in departments or functions listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. This shall also apply to contract and local staff assigned to such departments and functions. SNEs working in those departments or functions shall also be transferred to the EEAS.

These transfers shall take effect on the day of the adoption of the amending Budget of the European Union providing for the corresponding posts and appropriations in the EEAS.

Upon their transfer to the EEAS, the High Representative shall assign each official to a post in his function group which corresponds to his grade.

9. The High Representative shall establish the selection procedures for EEAS staff, which shall be based on merit and on the broadest possible geographical basis, in conformity with the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, with due regard for gender balance.

10. The procedures for recruiting staff for posts transferred to the EEAS which are on-going at the date of entry into force of this Decision shall remain valid: they shall be carried on and completed under the authority of the High Representative in accordance with the relevant vacancy notices and the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants.

In the course of setting up the EEAS, representatives of the Member States, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission shall be involved in the recruitment procedure for vacant posts in the EEAS.

The staff of the EEAS central administration shall be made up of officials and other servants from, respectively, relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.

When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at

AD level. Each year, the High Representative shall present a report to the Council on the occupation of posts in the EEAS.

11. The High Representative shall lay down the rules on mobility so as to ensure that the members of the staff of the EEAS are subject to a sufficient degree of mobility. Specific modalities shall apply to the personnel referred to in Article 4 (3), third hyphen. In principle, all EEAS staff shall periodically serve in Union delegations. The High Representative shall establish rules to that effect.

12. In accordance with the applicable provisions of its national law, each Member State shall provide its officials who have become temporary agents in the EEAS with a guarantee of immediate reinstatement at the end of their period of secondment to the EEAS. Beyond two consecutive secondments, each Member State may decide to prolong such guarantee in accordance with the applicable provisions of its national law. EU officials serving in the EEAS shall have the right to apply for posts in their institution of origin on the same terms as internal applicants.

13. Steps shall be taken in order to provide EEAS staff with adequate common training, building in particular on existing national practices and structures. The High Representative shall take appropriate measures to that effect within the year following the entry into force of this Decision.

#### Article 7 - Budget

1. The High Representative shall act as authorising officer for the EEAS section of the General Budget of the European Union and adopt the internal rules for the management of the corresponding budget lines. These internal rules shall lay down which of the powers of the authorising officer are delegated to the Secretary-General and the conditions under which the Secretary-General can sub delegate these powers.

2. The EEAS shall exercise its powers in accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union within the limits of the appropriations allocated to it.

3. As regards operational expenditure arising from the implementation of the CFSP budget, the Instrument for Stability, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the Communication and Public Diplomacy as well as the Election Observation Missions, the Commission shall be responsible for their financial management under the authority of the High Representative in her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission.

4. The EEAS shall be subject to the procedures regarding the discharge provided for in Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in Article 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation.

#### Article 8 - Programming

1. In the framework of the management of EU external cooperation programmes, which remain under the responsibility of the Commission, the High Representative and the EEAS shall contribute to the programming and management cycle for the following geographic and thematic instruments, on the basis of the policy objectives set out in the said instruments:

- the Development Cooperation Instrument,
- the European Development Fund,
- the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights,
- the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument,

- the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries,
  - the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.
2. In accordance with Article 3, throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation of these instruments, the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and services of the Commission. All proposals for decision will be prepared through Commission procedures and submitted to the Commission for decision.
3. The EEAS shall in particular have responsibility for preparing the following Commission decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle:
- (i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each region (subject to the indicative breakdown of the financial perspectives). Within each region, a proportion of funding will be reserved for regional programmes;
  - (ii) country and regional strategic papers (CSPs/RSPs);
  - (iii) national and regional indicative programmes (NIPs/RIPs).
4. With regard to the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument, any proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents in paragraph 3 above, shall be prepared by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the direct supervision and guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and then jointly submitted with the High Representative for decision by the Commission.
5. With regard to European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, any proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents in paragraph 3 above, shall be prepared by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the direct supervision and guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood Policy and then jointly submitted with the High Representative for decision by the Commission.
6. Thematic programmes shall be prepared by the appropriate Commission Service under the guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development and presented to the College in agreement with the High Representative and other relevant Commissioners.

Related Document:  
Organogram of EEAS architecture. [View here.](#)

*HR/VP Catherine Ashton presents vision for EEAS*  
Brussels, 25 March 2010. [Link.](#)

I am delighted to be able to present my proposal for a Decision to establish the European External Action Service. This is a huge opportunity to deliver on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty: to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of EU's global role. The EEAS will be a joined-up service, which promotes comprehensive policies in a strategic manner.

I am presenting today – well on time – after having discussed with Ministers in the General and Foreign Affairs Council on Monday; in the European Parliament on Tuesday and with colleagues in the College yesterday.

These discussions have shown a lot of progress and support. I am especially pleased to have the strong backing of President Barroso and other Commissioners. These discussions will continue with the Institutions and capitals.

What we have are three legal texts which form a package. Yesterday the College agreed on the proposal of the revision of the Financial Regulation and the first step in the revision of the Staff Regulation.

Today I table my draft Decision. All elements are now on the table and we are well on track to get the EEAS in place. I am hopeful that agreement can be reached swiftly in the Council, supported by Parliament and the Commission. It's in everybody's interest to have EEAS up and running as soon as possible.

Europe needs the EEAS. Because we must adapt to a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts. We can only punch our weight if we bring together all our instruments – economic and political, development and security, crisis management and long term engagement – in support of a single political strategy. The Lisbon Treaty offers precisely the opportunity to build a modern policy for the modern world – moving beyond traditional “diplomacy”.

The EEAS I want is one that helps to build a distinct European response to the 21st century agenda. A Service that represents the best that Europe has to offer.

This cannot be done overnight. Sensitive and complex administrative and financial issues are involved. Meanwhile the world moves on and we must deal with it.

Ultimately this is about people. Our staff is our most precious resource. We must make sure that feel confident with the new structures. I will also see to it that colleagues from Member-States can find their place quickly in the EEAS and enrich it with their experience.

It is generally agreed that the EEAS should follow the principle of single geographic and thematic desks covering the whole world and key global issues. The Treaty clearly envisages the bringing together of the Commission's external assistance programmes with the Common Foreign and Security Policy to deliver a comprehensive and strategic approach to our relations with third countries.

At the same time, development policy remains a central EU policy that must be strengthened and safeguarded.

My proposal delivers both. It recognizes that our cooperation programmes are a key aspect of our bilateral and regional relationships and that other dimensions of those relations, for example on security and crisis management, are essential to making development work.

My last point: it is called a Service for a reason. It is there to work for the President of the European Commission and the other Commissioner, the President of the European Council and the Member-States and for the Members of the European Parliament too.

**MEPs give conditional backing to EEAS**

EP press release

Brussels, 23 March 2010. [Link](#)

Budgetary and political accountability are crucial to gain Parliament's support in setting up the diplomatic service, MEPs told Catherine Ashton on Tuesday. They also voiced firm opposition to the idea that the European External Action Service should have a secretary-general, calling instead for "political" deputies to be appointed to stand in for the High Representative when needed.

Most EP political groups backed what is now unofficially called the "Brok/Verhostadt model" for the European External Action Service (EEAS), as set out in an informal document by Parliament's co-rapporteurs, Elmar Brok (EPP, DE) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE, BE). Under this model, the EEAS would be an autonomous service linked to the Commission in administrative, organisational and budgetary terms, while being accountable to the Parliament in both political and budgetary terms.

During the debate, the two MEPs raised the issues of the secretary-general and which person or persons might stand in for Mrs Ashton, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, when needed. They stressed that "deputies must not be civil servants". "We want a political figure", said Mr Brok.

Mrs Ashton answered that she "got the message of the political side of representation" and added that it "should not be the pre-Lisbon formula". She has also promised to do her best "to be available" but did not answer MEPs' question as to how she would be represented in her absence.

Regarding the secretary-general, "we don't know which nationality he will be", she said, answering rumours that Pierre Vimont, the current Ambassador of France to the United States, would occupy the post.

Mrs Ashton did not answer MEPs' questions about the timeframe of proposals for the setting up the service. Bernhard Rapkay (S&D, DE), in particular, asked when an official proposal for a staff statute would be presented.

**Budgetary accountability and Community method**

"There can be no doubt about budgetary accountability of the EEAS to Parliament. The EEAS and the officials working in it will be subject to the same type of financial control as if they were working in the Commission", she told MEPs. "The service will fully respect the Community method and it will cooperate with the Commission services as if it was a directorate-general of the Commission", she added.

Guy Verhofstadt insisted that development and neighbourhood policies should be fully integrated inside the EEAS "to make it more ambitious" and to "avoid having two distinct and separate administrations". On development policy, Mrs Ashton said "I have made some concrete proposals for the EEAS that I believe keep development policy where it belongs - at the

heart of the EU's external action". Single geographical desks covering the whole world would be created.

Franziska Brantner (Greens/EFA, DE) asked the High Representative to create a strong crisis management and peace-building department. "I don't really want to set up a conflict prevention department. It is a horizontal issue", she said.

In line with the Brok and Verhofstadt proposals, she confirmed that "most senior heads of delegation could come here to AFET [the EP Foreign Affairs Committee] for an informal exchange of views once they are formally appointed and before they take up office". Moreover, delegations would give back up to official visits by members of Parliament.

Answering a question by Kristian Vigenin (S&D, BG) as to how she was planning to have "a proper geographical distribution of posts, which is important for new and small Member States", Mrs Ashton said she wanted "all Member States to be represented but it will take time".

**Related Documents:****Verhofstadt/Brok Non-Paper on the EEAS.**[Download here.](#)**Verhofstadt/Brok EEAS architecture organogram.**[Download here.](#)**EC for Enlargement and ENP Stefan Füle Interview**

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Brussels, 9 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

RFE/RL: Moving on to the specifics. The two major goals -- let's call them shared goals -- of the EU for the Eastern neighbors are free trade and the eventual lifting of visa restrictions. Do you have a clear idea when either of these objectives might actually materialize?

Fule: You are right in that these are the two basic pillars. There is another one, which is [concluding] association treaties, because at the end of the day it is all about deeper political association and economic integration. I think it is important to say two things. Talking in rather technical terms [about] a deep and comprehensive free-trade area, what we are talking about is not just another free-trade area. What we are talking about is actually trade and economic integration. This kind of agreement opens the road to the *acquis* [communautaire -- that is, EU legislation] related to the internal market. This is actually how these countries could make significant progress towards then later, eventually becoming members of the European Economic Area. This is the way how [while] not being an EU member you are still able to align yourself, your economy, your finances, your administration with most of the *acquis* we have -- as most of the [EU] *acquis* is related to the internal market [sector]. So, it is a rather complex exercise.

We hope that in the case of Ukraine [with which] we have already entered discussion on this deep and comprehensive

free-trade agreement, we think that it is possible within a year to conclude this agreement. We are now in the process of establishing the state-of-play with Moldova -- we sent very recently almost 250 questions to our partners in Moldova and are determined to start the discussions as soon as possible. In the Caucasus, the situation is a little different because you need to be a part of the WTO [World Trade Organization], [and] one country in the region is not yet [there] -- and with the rest of the countries in the region we hope that sooner or later we will start that process. And Belarus is a little bit different player, so we will come back to this issue later on.

Then once you conclude this treaty, it takes years for the country to do the work of aligning itself to the *acquis*. So we have a certain [idea] of the timeframe when we will be able to negotiate such an agreement, but then it will very much depend on the speed and the commitment of that country to reforms, the commitment of that country to adopting various [bits of] legislation. [There], it's very difficult to talk about a timeline.

The visas. There are two issues. Visa facilitation -- there are countries [with which] we have concluded the technical discussions, Georgia is a very good example. We hope to very soon to send both the readmission and visa facilitation agreements to the council and the European Parliament [for approval]. There are discussions with Ukraine, and we're starting the discussion with Moldova on this issue. For the first time, we're talking with the new Ukrainian president of the road-map approach -- and, who knows, *vis-a-vis* other countries, too -- taking our best experiences from the Western Balkans where we have three countries benefiting [from visa-free travel to the EU].

RFE/RL: In the Western Balkans, the most pressing problem is Bosnia. Is the EU prepared to see the country break apart, as seems increasingly likely? What would the EU do should that happen?

Fule: I think what we are now preparing [for] is not that scenario. What we are now doing is focusing on how we could help Bosnia-Herzegovina at this point in time to actually avoid such a scenario. It is true that we need to do a lot of things to put this country on a much more stable basis.

RFE/RL: Such as?

Fule: I think the key is the follow-up to [the 1995] Dayton [accord]. The key is in constitutional changes. The key is to come to the end of the OHR [Office of the High Representative] chapter and through the constitutional changes open the way for the country to run itself [with] a stable, effective administration, where the European aspirations are shared by, if not all, then most [participants]. In that environment, the community approach, the accession process, would hopefully anchor Bosnia-Herzegovina firmly in the European Union.

RFE/RL: Can you definitively rule out the possibility that the EU will accept the emergence of any further countries in the region?

Fule: No, we are not ready to accept increasing the number of countries in that region, and we are doing everything with the [existing] countries to avoid that situation.

RFE/RL: Switching to Moldova, which is in a strange situation of being a small country right on the border of the EU, very close to one of its member states, yet it remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. What can the EU do to make a difference to the lives of the people in the streets?

Fule: The Eastern Partnership [contains] a very structured "menu" which we are offering to our Eastern partners in the bilateral and multilateral sphere. What it offers in practical terms in addition to the macrofinancial assistance we are now finalizing [with Moldova] is as follows. We have started the discussion on the visa dialogue with Moldova. This is after Ukraine, [which is] actually the second country to start the discussion, which we started on January 12, on an association treaty. It is a country which we hope very soon to start [talks] on a deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement.

Moldova is very active in the program of institution building, where we are offering experience and expertise on how to build the institutions the country needs for getting closer to the European Union. We are just finalizing putting together a group of experts which will be assigned to the government of Moldova. We're talking about nine experts who will help Moldova with all these processes we're talking about in general -- getting the country closer to the European Union. Which, by the way, is fantastic, because we got more than 250 requests from various member states to have their experts helping Moldova.

Moldova is also very active in all the multilateral formats of the Eastern Partnership with its concrete flagship projects like the integrated border management, like the governance in the [area] of protection of the environment, like better governance of the energy [sector].

RFE/RL: So this is where the extra money allocated to the Eastern Partnership last year will go?

Fule: Yes, exactly. we're talking about 350 million euros for the period 2011-2013 for the Eastern Neighborhood, for the six countries. There are those saying it's a decent sum of money [while], of course, for some it is not enough. But I think it is a substantial contribution of the European Union to support this very extensive structure of the Eastern Partnership. Moldova is actually a very good country to show that if you have a pro-European government, [that] if you're active enough, you could actually get a lot [out] of the Eastern Partnership offer.

RFE/RL: I know that Russia is not part of your portfolio...

Fule: But still...

RFE/RL: It is the elephant in the corner when you're dealing with the Eastern Neighborhood. During the hearings in the European Parliament in January, you said the Eastern neighbors must build up good relations with both the EU and Russia. Do you think it is fair to ask the EU's Eastern neighbors to improve relations with a Russia where -- on the European Commission's own admission -- reforms have stalled over the past eight years,

which invaded Georgia in 2008, and has troubled relations with more than one Eastern EU member state?

Füle: I think it is fair for us to say that we would like to deepen our relationship with that part of Europe not at the expense of the relationships that part of Europe has with third countries. So, I think it is fair to say that no third country should feel threatened, for whatever reason, by the European Union's trying to upgrade its relations with these countries...

RFE/RL: But if Russia objects to the spread of democracy and reforms in these countries?

Füle: The relationship with Russia is not only focused on how, for example, the Russians see human rights. It is multifaceted, with energy playing a big role, for example. There [I have some] personal experience, because at one time, when the Czech Republic was about to join NATO and also, later on, the European Union, there were those telling us, "You have to choose between Moscow and Brussels." And we were saying, "Actually no, we don't want to be pushed into that decision." We were saying that actually, through joining NATO and the European Union, we could strengthen to a certain extent our relationship with Russia. And I think it is actually exactly what has happened. The relationship between the Czech Republic and Russia is not full of emotions as it was before. We feel more on an equal footing when talking to Russia. It's actually improved the relations because they are now more pragmatic. And this is also what we seek vis-a-vis the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

RFE/RL: So improving relations with Russia is fully compatible with seeking full membership in the EU and NATO?

Füle: I see absolutely no problems here. Of course, where I see a problem, is if someone at the beginning of the 21st century tries to change borders by military force. Then [there] is a problem. That is not compatible with our policy; it is not compatible with what we are offering to that part of Europe.

### *EU strengthens the ENP with increased funding for the period 2011-2013*

EU press release

Brussels, 2 March 2010. [Link](#)

Over EUR 5,7 billion will be allocated in the next three years to reinforce political cooperation and promote economic integration between the EU and its neighbours. Funding will go to support political and economic reforms, regional and cross-border cooperation in the partner countries covered by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 1 . It will also support projects in areas like climate change, transport, energy and environment. EU neighbours will receive more than EUR 2 billion in 2013, compared with EUR 1,6 billion in 2010.

Baroness Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy said : "We want to engage further in cooperation with our neighbours proving that EU remains a solid and reliable partner in current hard times. We offer

stronger links of political association and economic integration, adapted to our partners' wishes and capacities. Increased EU funding is an important tool to achieve these goals " .

Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) said : "If we want to make the neighbourhood policy a success, we must give ourselves the means to do so: greater mobility of people, more trade, more aid. This all comes at a price. However, I believe it would cost us even more to deal with the consequences of poor economic performance, instability and conflicts in our own neighbourhood".

Following the mid term review of existing programmes with the neighbourhood countries the College adopted today, on 2 March, 16 out of 19 ENPI programmes for 2011-2013, totalling EUR 4.2 billion i.e.:

- 13 new country programmes for Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine;
- For the first time, a country programme for Libya;
- A new regional programme for the Eastern Neighbourhood (covering also 2010) to support the Eastern Partnership, the new Eastern dimension of the ENP;
- A new Inter-Regional programme to finance students' exchanges, university and cultural co-operation, contacts between local and regional authorities and to support physical investments in transport, energy and environment. This programme also includes specific support for co-operation activities with the Russian Federation.

The mid term review of the country programme for Belarus, the multi-country programme for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Cross Border Co-operation programmes are under preparation and will be completed soon. All 19 programmes and the planned assistance to the occupied Palestinian territories will total over EUR 5,7 billion.

Annex:

#### European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

Country Programmes	Total 2011-13 in EUR million
Algeria	172
Armenia	157.3
Azerbaijan	122.5
Egypt	449.3
Georgia	180.3
Israel	6
Jordan	223
Lebanon	150
Libya	60
Moldova	273.1
Morocco	580.5
Syria	129
Tunisia	240
Ukraine	470.1
Multi Country Programmes	
Regional Programme – East	262.3
Inter-Regional Programme	757.7

**EC for Enlargement and ENP Stefan Füle on Ukraine**

Speech at the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee

Brussels, 22 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

Let me start by saying that Ukraine matters enormously to the EU. It is important not only for reasons of geography, demography and geo-politics. Ukraine has an enormous industrial, economic and agricultural potential. It also has a deepening democratic tradition. It is a leader in the region and consequently its development in the coming years will have a major impact on the countries in the neighbourhood.

Today Ukraine stands at a critical juncture in its development. It faces enormous political and economic challenges. Reform steps are urgently needed if it is to ensure future stability and prosperity for its citizens. While the onus for implementing reform measures lies with the new President and the new administration, the European Union has a part to play too.

In recent months confidence in Ukraine's democratic development has been boosted by the fact that the Presidential elections were conducted in accordance with international standards. This is a very considerable achievement which confirms Ukraine's democratic trajectory.

The leaders of the EU were also encouraged by President Yanukovich's visit to Brussels during which he expressed a strong commitment to European integration and above all to the reform agenda. Meetings with Prime Minister Azarov have also been very constructive with similar messages being delivered by the Prime Minister. Of course, as President Yanukovich himself has said, what is needed are concrete reform actions rather than encouraging words.

The challenges Ukraine faces are very substantial. Bringing the Standby Arrangement with the IMF back on track must be a first priority. This is no easy task as it involves addressing a range of related reform issues in the fiscal area including agreeing a budget for 2010 which brings expenditure under control without depressing the economy further.

At the same time there is an urgent need for further steps in critical areas such as the gas sector or through further action on the recapitalizing of the banking sector. Decisive action to combat corruption, including through judicial reform is also needed, as are greater efforts to improve the domestic business and investment climate – currently deeply unfavourable to the kind of outside investment Ukraine so desperately needs.

As you will be aware, underlying these priorities is the need to increase political stability through constitutional reform. On this issue it is vital that reform is carried out in an inclusive manner and that it achieves a lasting constitutional settlement – one which will stand the test of time.

I started by saying that Ukraine matters for the EU. In our meetings with President Yanukovich both in Kyiv and Brussels we placed great emphasis upon the EU's readiness to engage

with Ukraine. We explained that we would support Ukraine in carrying out necessary reforms in practical and tangible ways.

What does this mean in practice? Firstly, as Ukraine moves forward in implementing reforms, the EU is ready to respond by specific support measures. So for example, if Ukraine puts the IMF Standby Arrangement back on to track, then the EU will be ready – subject to the agreement of Parliament and Council – to provide additional macro-financial assistance to a total of EUR 610 million.

Similarly if Ukraine makes progress on gas sector reform, the Commission will work to make further progress on the gas support package that we discussed with the International Financing Institutions and the Tymoshenko government in March last year and again in July.

In the same vein, if Ukraine makes progress in carrying out sectoral reforms, the EU will be ready to respond through our substantial technical and financial support through ENPI and complemented today by the resources of the Eastern Partnership. This is not insignificant. The EU is the largest donor to Ukraine, having contributed EUR 2.5 billion through ENPI and its predecessor since 1991 alone. Funding for Ukraine from ENPI for the period 2007- 2010 amounted to EUR 494 million. An additional EUR 74 million is available through the Eastern Partnership for Ukraine.

At the same time we are committed to deepening relations between us still further. The centre-piece for this is the Association Agreement including its deep and comprehensive free trade area. This ambitious and forward-looking Agreement has enormous potential both to deepen our cooperation at a political level and to transform our economic relations.

The deep and comprehensive free trade area will in due course provide Ukraine with full access to the EU's market of 500 million consumers. It promises to double Ukraine's exports to the EU. It will also help anchor the domestic reform process so as to create a dynamic economy which can compete in both EU and global markets.

Turning to the very important issue of a future visa free regime between the EU and Ukraine, we have said to the Government that if it implements the Priority Measures which are currently being agreed within the context of the Visa Dialogue, we will take forward our discussions with EU Member States on a possible future roadmap approach. No decision on this has been taken, but we want to demonstrate our good faith and determination to move forward provided Ukraine undertakes reform steps.

**Rethink Moldova**

Commentary by Stefan Füle and Philippe le Houverou

First published in the EUObserver

Brussels, 23 March 2010. [Link](#)

With an average yearly income of only EUR 1,100, Moldovans have seen their country steadily grow in the past decade only to run into the headwinds of the global economic crisis.

The crisis has taken a toll on many countries in Europe but Moldova has suffered more than most. The country's output,

which grew at 6 percent between 2004 and 2008, shrank by an estimated 6.5 percent last year. The country's poverty fight stalled and foreign investment was at risk of being reversed, while a lengthy electoral process and difficult political transition left the public finances in crisis and delayed the necessary reforms.

Today, though, Moldova is coming back thanks to an ambitious reform programme. During the past eight months, a new government in Chisinau has moved decisively to tackle its political and economic legacies and lay the foundation for a more competitive economy and more transparent state. The country is also firmly anchored in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy and its regional platform, the Eastern Partnership.

The Moldova Partnership Forum, jointly hosted by the European Commission and World Bank, on 24 March 2010 in Brussels, aims to coordinate international assistance in support of Moldova's reform efforts.

Since October 2009, Moldova's economic reforms have been anchored on an economic stabilization and recovery programme. This programme has included difficult spending cuts and increased tariffs (including for energy and heating) but also significant increases in targeted social assistance to soften the effect on the poor, and efforts to improve the efficiency and quality of public spending. These fiscal measures have been flanked with an effort to deregulate and de-monopolize the economy and create new jobs.

Moldova has made further progress in reforming governance. The public administration is undergoing a review to reduce duplication of functions and lay the basis for the creation of a professional civil service. Public financial management is being upgraded and key elements of the system, including public procurement and internal and external audit are being reformed in line with European standards.

Moldova's crisis was precipitated by a difficult domestic political situation and the onset of the global economic and financial crisis. However, as in many other countries in the region, Moldova's vulnerability to external shocks was made worse by an economic growth model heavily reliant on remittance-financed domestic consumption.

Beyond managing the current crisis, the challenge for Moldova's leadership is to develop a new strategy of sustainable and more balanced economic growth. To do this, the government, supported by a multi-party coalition in parliament, has chosen integration and harmonization with the EU as the anchors for its strategy. The EU-Moldova Action Plan and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the Eastern Partnership and, when in place, the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, will help to guide these integration and harmonization efforts.

Moldova's leaders know that fulfilling the commitments under these programmes, e.g. reforming the justice sector, liberalizing the economy, fighting corruption, does not offer a short-cut to prosperity and they have demonstrated that through their early commitment to decisive reform actions. They have adeptly used the moment of crisis to launch a deep social, economic and governance reform process.

For their part, Moldova's international partners are supporting these efforts. The Moldova Partnership Forum taking place later this week in Brussels will ensure that the financial assistance available from International Financial Institutions as well as Moldova's multilateral and bilateral partners will be aligned with the government's reform programme. New donors such as China and Russia have also been invited.

Such broad support should be a reassurance and an incentive to deliver. A sustained reform effort will allow Moldova to steadily close the gap between the standard of living of its citizens and those of its European neighbours. The authorities in Chisinau need international support to move ahead with their ambitious reform plans.

*The writers are, respectively, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy and World Bank Vice-President for Europe and Central Asia.*

#### Related Document:

**Government of Moldova: "Rethink Moldova - Priorities for Medium Term Development"**

[Download here.](#)

#### **HR Catherine Ashton Declaration on Belarus**

EU Council press release

Brussels, 30 March 2010. [Link](#)

The European Union expresses grave concern over the recent harassment of representatives of independent media, civil society and opposition organisations, including restrictions on the freedom of assembly, association and expression, as well as regrets continued difficulties with the registration of NGOs and opposition parties. EU urges Belarus to address the concerns regarding the democracy, situation for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country.

The current trends are particularly worrisome in the run up to the 25 April local elections. The European Union attaches great importance to their good conduct and expects that the Belarusian authorities do their utmost to ensure the necessary environment for democratic elections that meet OSCE and other international standards. It regrets that the way of setting up local election commissions raises questions on adequate representation of democratic and independent NGOs. The European Union will follow closely the conduct of the local elections.

Recalling its firm opposition to the death penalty, the European Union deplores the reported execution of two men carried out in Minsk. EU urges the Belarusian authorities to release complete information on the matter. Belarus is the only country in Europe which still applies capital punishment. The EU calls on Belarus to establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty with a view to its abolition.

The European Union recalls its policy of engagement towards Belarus, including in the context of the Eastern Partnership. It reiterates that its readiness to further deepen relations with Belarus will depend on concrete steps in Belarus towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law. EU remains ready to assist Belarus in attaining these objectives.

**Statement of EC President Barroso on Georgia**

EU press release

Statement following meeting with Georgian PM  
Brussels, 17 March 2010. [Link](#)

Our relations with Georgia have gone into a higher gear.

Preparations for negotiations on the future Association Agreement are in their final phase and the negotiations could hopefully start soon. An important part of this Agreement will be the possibility to establish a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This calls for Georgia to fully address key trade-related recommendations made by the Commission. And today the Prime Minister had several meetings in the Commission where we have expressed to him exactly what points we believe should be addressed.

Let me underline that on the energy front, we appreciate very much the constructive role Georgia has played in developing transit routes for energy supplies to the EU and Western Europe and I look forward to our enhanced energy dialogue with the creation of the new Subcommittee on Energy, Environment and Transport.

I also welcome Georgia's recent adoption of the State Strategy on engagement with occupied territories. This testifies Georgia's efforts to ease tensions and solve the conflict through peaceful means and diplomacy. In this regard, the continuation of the Geneva talks is of key importance and all participants must deliver.

Our relations can be even more productive and rewarding if they are based on shared interests and shared values. And I want to underline the word "values".

Democratic reforms are crucial. Georgia has already made important achievements. I think of progress in eradicating corruption and reforming the justice sector, for example. We are hopeful that intensive work will proceed to consolidate democratic institutions, create an inclusive political culture and ensure full media freedom.

The upcoming local elections will be an opportunity for Georgia to demonstrate further its commitment to political pluralism and international standards for free and fair elections. I am confident Georgia will seize it.

And just after this meeting receiving the analysis of Prime Minister Gilauri I am even more confident and I really want to encourage him and the Georgian authorities on the path of consolidation of democratic reform in his country, so that we can even progress in a closer relationship between the EU and Georgia.

**HR Catherine Ashton Declaration on Georgian strategy on Abkhazia and S. Ossetia**Brussels, 11 March 2010. [Link](#)

The European Union takes note of Georgia's "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation", endorsed by the Georgian government on 27 January. The EU welcomes Georgia's commitment to solving the conflict only through peaceful means and diplomatic efforts. The EU welcomes the spirit of the initiative as a constructive step towards easing tensions, building

confidence and reaching out to the residents of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian regions.

We encourage the Georgian government to conduct consultations with all stakeholders regarding the preparation of an action plan on the implementation of the strategy. The EU welcomes Georgia's intention to elaborate a status-neutral framework for interaction with authorities in control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and calls upon all parties to establish it as soon as possible. A key priority for Georgia will be to ensure that the relevant legislative and administrative framework, including the Law on Occupied Territories and its implementation, is being brought in line with the opinions presented by the Venice Commission on this matter.

Finally, the EU reiterates its firm support for the security and stability of Georgia, based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law.

**Joint statement of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group on the Eastern Partnership**Budapest, 2 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

1. The foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia met in Budapest at a special meeting dedicated to the Eastern Partnership. The Visegrad ministers' meeting was followed by a conference with the participation of the European Commission, the Baltic States, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and the Eastern partners, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

[...]

4. The Visegrad Group promotes stability, good governance and economic development in the six countries of the Eastern Partnership (hereinafter the partner countries). The V4 therefore agreed to develop an increasingly close relationship with the Eastern partners.

[...]

8. The Ministers emphasised the need to take gradual steps towards visa regime liberalisation for individual partner countries and on a case by case basis provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place. The Ministers stressed the need to strengthen the energy security cooperation of all participants with regard to long-term energy supply and transit, including through better regulation and energy efficiency.

9. The Ministers agreed that launching of the informal "Group of Friends" of the Eastern Partnership, consisting of non-EU countries willing to support or participate in the implementation of the Partnership, would bring added value for the cooperation with the Eastern partners.

10. The Visegrad Group supported the idea of holding an informal meeting of Eastern Partnership foreign ministers in Poland in May of this year and expressed their hope that the meeting will allow for maintaining the momentum of the initiative and giving it a strong political impetus after the first year of its operation.

11. With the objective of carrying the Eastern Partnership forward and guaranteeing an appropriate attention to and engagement of EU Member States as well as partner countries within it, the Ministers agreed to continue the implementation of the initiative during the period of the Hungarian and the Polish EU Presidency with sustained dynamism.

### *EC for Enlargement and ENP Stefan Füle on Inauguration of UfM Secretariat*

Speech

Barcelona, 4 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

I am honoured to be here in Barcelona talking on behalf of the European Commission, in this historic event. Today, after several months of hard work, we celebrate the inauguration of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean. 43 partners representing more than 750 million citizens, and the European institutions representing more than 50 years of regional integration, are here to realise a common dream, a common ambition of regional cooperation.

[...]

The setting-up of the Secretariat represents both an opportunity and a hope for the whole region.

It represents an opportunity and a hope for all Mediterranean partners that wish to work together in the promotion and realisation of common projects.

It represents also an opportunity and a hope for Europe keen to see a vast economic area in the south of the Mediterranean, free from fragmentation, becoming a major trade and economic player in the region.

The European Union wants to work with its Mediterranean partners as real partners, to deal with common problems that no individual country can tackle successfully on its own. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean complement each other in the promotion of an emerging region close to Europe.

I would like to pay tribute to all those who have contributed to the creation of this secretariat and to those who have pushed forward the idea of a Union for the Mediterranean. We have a vision for the future of the region; there is the political will to transform this vision into reality, and now we have a joint institution to implement this vision into concrete projects. This is the great challenge for the Secretariat and for its Secretary General Mr. Ahmed Massadeh.

[...]

This institution will be the keystone of the Union for the Mediterranean. The place where the projects agreed in Paris, and hopefully many other future activities, take shape and deliver results for the benefit of people throughout the region. The focal point working with the private sector and with international financial institutions to promote and support

ambitious public-private partnerships. The engine generating the necessary synergies among the stakeholders in the region and developing major regional and transnational projects that can later be endorsed by Heads of State and Government. The place that will promote progress in regional co-operation throughout the Mediterranean – and indeed deliver a stronger regional component for the Southern neighbourhood of Europe.

The Commission has already stated its intention to provide financial support and people to the Secretariat: EUR 3 million have been earmarked for 2010 and a grant contract will be signed as soon as the conditions are met. We also intend to second one official to the Secretariat from the very start.

### *EU-Morocco Summit*

EU Presidency press release

Granada, 7 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

The Granada summit between the European Union and Morocco has concluded with a positive assessment of the development of their relations and with the commitment to build on their political, economic and social aspect, as well as to begin a process of reflection on their future 'contractual' form.

At the press conference that followed the summit, the President of the Spanish Government, José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, the permanent President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, and the Moroccan Prime Minister, Abbas El Fassi, underlined the momentous importance of this first summit between the EU and an Arab country.

They all reiterated the need, as the final statement says, for 'Morocco to reach optimum proximity to the EU', by means of political modernisation and opening up the economy, and for both sides to get involved in a coordinated way, more and more often, with matters of global interest. They also emphasised the value of this relationship as an example for the Mediterranean region.

With regard to the economy, both sides promised to step up negotiations on easing restrictions on trade in services and right of establishment; they also promised to develop trans-European transport and energy networks, and to cooperate in the development of renewable sources of energy.

Among the political matters dealt with, the Middle East question, the Union for the Mediterranean, the situation in the Sahel, immigration and the Sahara stood out. 'We have talked about almost everything,' the Moroccan Prime Minister said. The Western Sahara

Answering the numerous questions about the Western Sahara, Zapatero reiterated his support 'for the work and mission of the UN' and stated that 'a frank, positive and constructive' dialogue has always been kept up with Morocco on this matter, while Van Rompuy said the human aspect of the problem

should not be forgotten and appealed for a fair, lasting and mutually acceptable solution.

The Moroccan Prime Minister, for his part, stated that ‘the UN no longer has a plan’, but said that he was pleased that it had called on all parties, including Algeria and Mauritania, to seek a solution.

The Maghreb, the Middle East and Immigration

Apart from the matter of the Sahara, the summit addressed the situation in the Maghreb. The final statement supports integration in that area and regrets the difficulties which exist, both in the Maghreb and in Africa.

With regard to immigration, the leaders present at the summit stated that cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination should be strengthened, and a global approach should be taken to the problem, that is, also dealing with the causes of migratory flows.

The same point of view is argued in relation to the Sahel, where they advocate seeking a solution which combines security with development.

Regarding the Middle East conflict, the EU and Morocco called for both sides to resume negotiations in earnest and refrain from unilateral measures; they also underlined the need to support the Palestinian Authority economically and politically and protect ‘Jerusalem’s common heritage’.

### *Middle East Quartet Statement*

Moscow, 19 March 2010. [Link](#)

The Quartet—U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union Catherine Ashton—met in Moscow on March 19, 2010. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

Reaffirming the fundamental principles laid down in its statement in Trieste on June 26, 2009, the Quartet welcomes the readiness to launch proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians. The Quartet emphasizes that the circumstances which made it possible to agree to launch the proximity talks be respected. The proximity talks are an important step toward the resumption, without preconditions, of direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all final status issues as previously agreed by the parties.

The Quartet believes these negotiations should lead to a settlement, negotiated between the parties within 24 months, that ends the occupation which began in 1967 and results in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The Quartet reiterates that Arab-Israeli peace and the establishment of a peaceful state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza is in the fundamental interests of the parties, of all states in the region, and of the international community. In this regard, the Quartet calls on all states to support dialogue between the parties.

The Quartet reiterates its call on Israel and the Palestinians to act on the basis of international law and on their previous agreements and

obligations — in particular adherence to the Roadmap, irrespective of reciprocity — to promote an environment conducive to successful negotiations and re-affirms that unilateral actions taken by either party cannot prejudice the outcome of negotiations and will not be recognized by the international community. The Quartet urges the government of Israel to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth, dismantle outposts erected since March 2001; and to refrain from demolitions and evictions in East Jerusalem. The Quartet also calls on both sides to observe calm and restraint and to refrain from provocative actions and inflammatory rhetoric especially in areas of cultural and religious sensitivity. Noting the significant progress on security achieved by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank the Quartet calls on the Palestinian Authority to continue to make every effort to improve law and order, to fight violent extremism, and to end incitement. The Quartet emphasizes the need to assist the Palestinian Authority in building its law enforcement capacity.

Recalling that the annexation of East Jerusalem is not recognized by the international community, the Quartet underscores that the status of Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the parties and condemns the decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new housing units in East Jerusalem. The Quartet re-affirms its intention to closely monitor developments in Jerusalem and to keep under consideration additional steps that may be required to address the situation on the ground. The Quartet recognizes that Jerusalem is a deeply important issue for Israelis and Palestinians, and for Jews, Muslims, and Christians and believes that through good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem, and safeguards its status for people around the world.

Recalling that transformative change on the ground is integral to peace, the Quartet continues to support the Palestinian Authority’s plan of August 2009 for building the Palestinian state within 24 months as a demonstration of Palestinians’ serious commitment to an independent state that provides good governance, opportunity, justice, and security for the Palestinian people from the first day that it is established and is a responsible neighbor to all states in the region. The Quartet takes positive note of Israel’s steps to ease restrictions of movement in the West Bank and calls for further and sustained steps to facilitate the state building efforts of the Palestinian Authority. The Quartet endorses fully the efforts of the Quartet Representative in support of Prime Minister Fayyad’s state-building and economic development program which has seen significant improvement in the Palestinian Authority’s performance with respect to security and law and order and improved economic growth. The Quartet supports the Quartet Representative in his vital efforts to promote change on the ground in aid of the political negotiations.

The Quartet further calls on all states in the region and in the wider international community to match the Palestinian commitment to state-building by contributing immediate, concrete, and sustained support for the Palestinian Authority and, in this regard, looks forward to the upcoming meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLIC) to coordinate international support for the Palestinian state building effort.

The Quartet is deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration in Gaza, including the humanitarian and human rights situation of the civilian population, and stresses the urgency of a durable resolution to the Gaza crisis. The Quartet calls for a solution that addresses Israel’s legitimate security concerns, including an end to weapons smuggling into Gaza; promotes Palestinian unity based on the PLO

commitments and the re-unification of Gaza and the West Bank under the legitimate Palestinian Authority; and ensures the opening of the crossings to allow for the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods, and persons to and from Gaza, consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1860. The Quartet takes positive note that the Israeli government has just communicated its approval of a number of the UN Secretary General's civilian recovery projects, including a stalled housing project in Khan Younis and looks forward to their early implementation. The Quartet condemns yesterday's rocket fire from Gaza and calls for an immediate end to violence and terror and for calm to be respected. The Quartet reiterates its call for the immediate release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Recognizing the significance of the Arab Peace Initiative, the Quartet looks forward to closer cooperation with the parties and the Arab League and urges regional governments to support publicly the resumption of bilateral negotiations, enter into a structured regional dialogue on issues of common concern, and take steps to foster positive relations throughout the region in the context of progress towards comprehensive peace on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, and 1850 and the Madrid principles, including through the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.

The Quartet commits to remain actively involved on all tracks and to encourage and review progress. The Quartet commits to meet regularly and tasks the envoys to intensify their cooperation, to maintain contacts with the Arab League Committee on the Arab Peace Initiative, and to formulate recommendations for Quartet action.

The Quartet re-affirms its previous statements and supports, in consultation with the parties, an international conference in Moscow at the appropriate time concurrent with direct negotiations.

#### *HR/VP Ashton: «The EU and the Middle East»*

Speech

Cairo, 15 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Extract]

Europe is also ready to take its responsibility. The European Union will continue to support Palestinian institution building. But this must not come at the expense of the peace process.

Institution building must facilitate the peace process and not replace it. We are working in partnership with the Palestinian Authority to build the institutions they will need to have when the State is established.

The European Union is ready to step up its involvement by offering support in four areas.

Firstly, it is ready to support the parties in their negotiations. Our position was set out clearly in our statement of principles last December.

This could serve as the terms of reference for negotiations – for example, a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with agreed changes, including with regard to Jerusalem.

Secondly, the European Union is ready to extend its package of assistance. Such a commitment, however, will not be open-ended. We expect to see urgent progress by the parties towards the creation of a Palestinian state, along the lines I have already mentioned.

Thirdly, the European Union is ready to consider providing further political, financial and security guarantees to facilitate the peace process.

For example we contribute to security missions in the occupied Palestinian territory, in the Sinai and in southern Lebanon. We are the largest single donor to the UN agency working with refugees. And we have a range of activities supporting civil society in East Jerusalem.

Last but not least, the EU wants to develop a closer partnership with those that are key to the talks, including with the United States and a reinvigorated Quartet.

The current level of mistrust and animosity between the parties is high. The euphoria that surrounded the Oslo accords has largely disappeared. Scepticism and doubt are all-pervading.

*Remaking Europe's Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy*

Bohdana Dimitrovova

CEPS Working Document, 25 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

This Working Document explores the implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an ambitious EU foreign policy for the development of a European political community. It suggests that the ENP can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile two potentially contradictory processes. The first – ‘border confirming’ – is about confirming border areas of demarcation and division, in which borders are conceived as boundary lines, frontier zones or barriers that protect the European Union and its citizens. The second – ‘border transcending’ – consists of a challenge to open EU borders and involves the transformation of the EU’s external boundaries into zones of interactions, opportunities and exchanges, with the emphasis on the transcendence of boundaries. To unpick some of the contradictions surrounding the highly contested phenomena of mobility in the neighbourhood, this paper analyses three bordering strategies: state borders, the imperial analogy and borders as networks. Each corresponds to different forms of territoriality and implies a different mode of control over the population.

*Single voice, single chair? How to re-organise the EU in international negotiations under the Lisbon rules*

Piotr Maciej Kaczynski

CEPS Policy Brief, 24 March 2010. [Link](#)

[Abstract]

This paper by CEPS Research Fellow Piotr Kaczyński explores the possibilities offered to the EU as an actor in international negotiations as a result of the provisions and the ‘spirit’ of the Treaty of Lisbon and against the background of the complex internal political situation in the EU. Following a review of the previous decision-making system, which many stakeholders would like to see preserved, he examines the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. He then looks at how the system can be reformed in order to improve the EU’s leverage and effectiveness in international negotiations. The EU’s experience in the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen is used for purposes of illustration..

*The Union for the Mediterranean - Evolution and prospects*

Roberto Aliboni

Istituto Affari Internazionali. [Link](#)

[Introduction]

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was established by representatives of 43 governments and the European Commission on 13 July 2008 in Paris. The UfM substituted the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), previously established in November 1995 in Barcelona. The UfM represents a dramatic change from the past. To understand the significance of such changes, some principal issues must be examined: the political identity of the UfM, its relations with the EMP’s Euro-Mediterranean “acquis” and the functioning of its institutions.

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