

## The wider neighbourhood is in not such good shape

As people depart for their summer holidays the European Neighbourhood Watch sees a wider neighbourhood whose condition ranges from the awkward to the disastrous.

Starting to the North the official season ends with the reciprocal expulsion of four diplomats each by the UK and Russia, as symbols of the deep dissatisfaction over the Litvinenko affair. Those packing their holiday bags may be including some light fiction, James Bond, Hercules Poirot and Sherlock Holmes for example. But the Litvinenko affair has it all. The perfect murder: an invisible, tasteless and (supposedly untraceable, but there they were wrong) dose of radio-active polonium dropped into a London cup of tea, or a bit of sushi, with ex-KGB agent Lugovoy, the person subsequently charged with murder, able to retreat fast to Russia, the haven of the unextraditable. But this is deadly serious, not light fiction. One may question whether to take the lead for the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats was the best way for the UK to respond. But that is a secondary matter. The primary issue is how did Lugovoy get the polonium murder kit? Is there a criminal black market in this product? Not that we have heard of so far. The polonium left a long and wide trail of contamination. Was this a first case of international nuclear terrorism, albeit on a miniature scale? The least the Russian side might be expected to do is a serious inquiry into how Lugovoy got his hands on the polonium, and publication of the results. Instead, watchers of Western television have seen Lugovoy enjoying being interviewed on the banks of the Moskva river, saying that the episode shows that Russia is a great power that cannot be pushed around. Maybe this ghastly affair just settles down into the file of unsolved mysteries.

But other Russia-related businesses are already on the agenda for the autumn. The summer break leaves completely unresolved the stand-off between the US and Russia over the proposed new missile defense facilities that the US proposes to install in Poland and the Czech Republic. To which is added Russia's announced withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990, which however has not been ratified on the Western side. On the missile defense proposals there is much to be done on the US side to explain the technicalities sufficiently for its political logic to be understood. (CEPS will hold a seminar on this on 18 October).

The Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo is blocked in the UN Security Council by Russia, which at least in public has come up with no real proposal except that the two parties would have to agree, which amounts to giving Serbia a veto on any proposal it does not like. Kosovo meanwhile plans independence day for 28 November. Is all this heading for a European version of a Taiwan solution? De facto independence

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with limited international recognition and no flag at the UN? Maybe, but that would hardly be a recipe for stability.

For the Middle East the quartet has met for the first time with their new special envoy, Tony Blair. The quartet continues to back President Abbas in Ramallah, but to blackball Hamas in Gaza. Many independent observers doubt this policy. A recent CEPS seminar saw contributions on the overlapping, criss-crossing crises of the so-called Greater Middle East, for which solutions can be designed maybe on paper, but which remain all so distant from the current realities. To this may be added information and on the return, or renewed energies of Al Qaida, such as with 'franchise' operations in North Africa. (See contributions below on these several themes).

*Michael Emerson*

*Russian Presidential decree "On Suspending the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements"*

Information note from the Russian Presidency Office  
Moscow, 14 July 2007.

[Link](#)

**Vladimir Putin signed a decree on suspending Russia's participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.**

**The document notes that this step was taken as a result of exceptional circumstances affecting the security of the Russian Federation and requiring immediate action.**

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 and came into force on 9 November 1992.

The CFE Treaty served as a viable and effective way to strengthen European security in the early 1990s. It created a balance between the conventional forces of two military and political alliances, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), by limiting their armaments and also providing for limits to prevent them from deploying conventional weapons in potential areas of conflict.

The Treaty's objectives included: establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.

However, almost immediately after signing the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, NATO members opted to delay this document's coming into force.

NATO countries decided that ratification of the Adapted Treaty is contingent upon Russia's complying with various unsubstantiated conditions. One such condition consists in implementing elements of bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation, Georgia and Moldova, bilateral agreements not linked to the CFE Treaty on withdrawing Russian troops from those countries' territories. These agreements were concluded in Istanbul before signing the Adapted Treaty in November 1999 (Istanbul Agreements). While Russia is implementing all agreements relating to the CFE Treaty, Russia considers that linking these two matters is wrong.

Exceptional circumstances surrounding the CFE Treaty have led the Russian Federation to consider suspending its participation in the Treaty until NATO members ratify the Adapted Treaty and begin to implement the document in good faith.

The need to suspend the CFE Treaty is a result of the following exceptional circumstances that affect the security of the Russian Federation:

1. The failure of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to make the necessary changes in the composition of group of states party to the Treaty on the accession of these countries to NATO;
2. The excessive parties to the CFE Treaty that belong to NATO, and the exclusive group that formed among CFE Treaty members as a result of the widening of the alliance;
3. The negative impact of the planned deployment of America's conventional forces in Bulgaria and Romania because of this

exclusive group mentality;

4. The failure of a number of parties of the CFE Treaty to comply with the political obligations contained in the Istanbul Agreements relating to the early ratification of the Adapted Treaty;

5. The failure of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to comply with commitments accepted in Istanbul to adjust their territorial ceilings;

6. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's failure to participate in the CFE Treaty has adverse effects on Russia's ability to implement its political commitments to military containment in the northwestern part of the Russian Federation. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's actions result in a territory in which there are no restrictions on the deployment of conventional forces, including other countries' forces.

At an extraordinary meeting of parties to the CFE Treaty, held in Vienna on 12-15 June 2007, the Russian Federation outlined the conditions necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty:

the return of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the negotiating table;

the reduction of the permissible amounts and stocks of Treaty-limited equipment for NATO countries in order to compensate for the widening of the NATO alliance;

arriving at a political settlement concerning the abolition of flank restrictions on Russian territory;

working out a common understanding of the term "substantial combat forces" and showing cooperation and restraint prior to coming to an agreement;

the coming into force or at least starting to apply the interim Adapted Treaty no later than 1 July 2008; and,

working out the terms of accession of new members of the CFE Treaty and the continuous upgrading of the Treaty.

The results of emergency meetings and consultations of the Russia-NATO Council demonstrate that NATO countries continue to link their ratification of the Adapted Treaty with Russia's fulfilling the Istanbul Agreements. They have also ignored Russian suggestions on how to prevent a CFE Treaty crisis in the run-up to the emergency meeting, limiting themselves to promising to discuss the suggestions later, once the Adapted Treaty comes into force.

The resulting situation makes it necessary to take measures to suspend the Treaty.

Suspension of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and parties to the CFE Treaty is in conformity with international law. The operation of the Treaty will be suspended in 150 days as of the date of Russia's notifying the depositary and other member states of its decision.

In accordance with the federal law "On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation", the suspension of the CFE Treaty, which was ratified by a decree 3243-1 of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation on 8 July 1992, is subject to federal law. Paragraph 4 of Article 37 of the federal law stipulates that in case of necessity, immediate action to suspend the CFE Treaty can be taken by the President of the Russian Federation, who must instantly inform the Federal Assembly of his actions and submit a draft federal law to this effect to the State Duma.

It is appropriate to suspend related international agreements including the Budapest Agreements and Flank Agreements along with the CFE Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 37 of the federal law "On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation", this decision is incumbent on the President of the Russian Federation.

### *NATO response to Russian announcement of intent to suspend obligations under the CFE Treaty*

Brussels, 16 July 2007. [Link](#)

1. NATO Allies place the highest value on the CFE regime. They participated actively in the CFE Extraordinary Conference called by the Russian Federation and held in Vienna from 12-15 June 2007. They listened carefully to the Russian Federation's concerns and responded by submitting elements for a final document that suggested a positive way forward. The announcement by the Russian Federation issued on the 14th of July 2007 to suspend as of the 12th of December 2007 its participation in the work of this landmark Treaty, including its flank regime and associated documents is deeply disappointing. The Allies are very concerned by this unilateral decision.

2. We regret that despite our best efforts it was not possible to achieve agreement on a Final document in Vienna although our proposals were supported by 25 of the 30 States Parties. We hope that dialogue among all States Parties can be resumed shortly.

3. We remain firmly committed to the CFE Treaty and wish to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation in a manner consistent with the Alliance's position of principle contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, recalling their views on the importance of all remaining commitments reflected in the Final Act of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annexes that was agreed at Istanbul in 1999.

4. We underline that the process of exchanging information on military forces and conducting on site inspections goes to the core of the Treaty's role in providing transparency regarding the forces of States Parties. We expect that all the States Parties will continue to implement fully all their obligations under the CFE Treaty and associated documents. NATO Allies are fully committed to do so.

5. We hope that the Russian Federation will join us in constructive and creative dialogue to ensure the continued operation and viability of the landmark CFE Treaty including its flank regime and not undermine prospects for entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. In this regard, we reiterate our view that this dialogue should include the opportunity for structured discussion of all parties' concerns including at an extraordinary conference.

### *EU Presidency Statement – CFE Treaty*

Brussels, 16 July 2007. [Link](#)

Following the recent decision announced by the Russian Federation to suspend the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Presidency of the European Union reiterates the importance of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of security and stability in Europe. The Presidency of the EU is confident that further engagement in a dialogue with all Contracting Parties will be instrumental in overcoming the present situation.

*President Vladimir Putin's speech at the Balkan Energy Cooperation Summit*  
Zagreb, Croatia, 24 June 2007. [Link](#)

First of all, I would like to thank the President of Croatia, Mr Mesic, for the invitation to take part in this important multilateral summit.

This is the first energy cooperation summit, the first at such a high level, in this region, in any case, and we hope that this meeting will not just lead to broader dialogue, but, most importantly, will outline practical prospects and priorities for future work together.

The subjects discussed at this summit are immensely important for today's world. Energy supply issues have become a primordial part of international economic policy today. The strategic objective our cooperation in this area pursues is to ensure access to reliable energy supplies for all countries of the region. Our policies take into account the Balkan countries' increasing involvement in the European integration process, and we are ready to develop our relations in cooperation with the European Union.

It is my conviction that we should draw on all the best in our experience of working with current European consumers of Russian energy supplies. I note that for four decades now, despite the serious and truly global changes in the world, Russia has never broken a single one of its contractual commitments.

Regarding the countries of southern and southeast Europe, Russia supplied 73 billion cubic metres of gas to this region in 2006 alone. This comes to almost half the total volume we supply to the EU countries. We also supplied 59 million tons of oil. These figures are eloquent proof of the solid base upon which we can continue to build our cooperation in the energy sector.

I am sure you will agree that Russia's relations with its partners in the Balkans have traditionally been based on mutual sympathy, common spiritual traditions, the closeness of our languages and cultures and a common history. Our economic ties are defined by the aim of turning the Balkans into a region of stability and security.

As one of the world's leading oil and gas producers, Russia is ready to do everything possible to resolve the region's energy problems. This, of course, must be based on a balance of interests and on equal responsibility of suppliers, transit countries and energy consumers.

As you know, this formula for ensuring energy security was first approved at the G8 summit in St Petersburg. We are strictly committed to applying this formula in implementing our future energy policy. Another of the main principles underpinning energy cooperation is that of transparent and fair business relations. I stress that long-term relations is also one of the fundamental principles of energy cooperation. We view this as an additional incentive for developing ties in other areas too, above all in investment. Based on these clear and straightforward positions we are ready to develop our cooperation with the Balkan countries in the energy sector.

The oil and gas sector is one of the main areas of cooperation. Russian companies are already involved in a number of major projects in the region, in particular projects to increase transport capacity from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia, Greece and Bulgaria signed an intergovernmental agreement on building and operating the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline in March 2007 in Athens. This pipeline will be able to

transport 35 million tons, and this capacity can be expanded to 50 million tons. I want to emphasise that this project will use the very latest technology and will conform fully to all the demands set by environmental protection organisations.

Gazprom, of course, is the company that has taken the lead in cooperation with the Balkan countries. Gazprom not only supplies gas to the region but is also involved in work to improve the energy infrastructure. In Greece, for example, six gas pipelines with outlets and the Florina electricity generating station have been brought on line.

The memorandum of understanding between Gazprom and the Serbian Government on building a gas pipeline across Serbian territory, signed last December, is an important step in strengthening the system for reliable energy supplies to the Balkans. Similar work is currently in a preliminary phase with other partners in the region, including Hungary. We are looking at options for future cooperation and for the most suitable and effective transport routes.

Russia is interested in continuing talks on gas sales and in making use of the region's transport possibilities. Russia is also interested in building underground gas reservoirs in a number of Balkan countries, which will not only improve the region's energy supply situation but will also make it more attractive and important in terms of resolving Europe's energy issues as a whole. Also of interest is the project to develop the gas network in Macedonia and expand the gas pipeline network into Albania, southern Serbia and Kosovo.

As you know, Gazprom and Italian company ENI signed a memorandum yesterday on the possibility of laying a new gas pipeline system across the Black Sea. We have held preliminary talks and consultations with our Bulgarian colleagues. I hope that we will continue this discussion today at the meeting with Mr Prvanov.

This is a promising project that would unquestionably help improve the energy supply situation in Europe overall, and we are very pleased that this project has the backing not only of the Italian and Russian governments but also of the European Commission.

Other Russian companies, LUKOIL, for example, are working actively in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. LUKOIL alone has already invested \$1.5 billion in the region and it intends to continue developing this mutually beneficial partnership.

We also have a good outlook for cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. Last year, Russia's Atomstroieksport won a tender to build a nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. We hope that the contract will be signed this year.

This Russian project is also interesting in terms of developing technology cooperation between Russia and Europe. Our German partners, Areva and Siemens, will supply a large amount of equipment directly involved in ensuring safety and enhancing the plant's technical and economic performance.

The electricity sector is another area in which we can develop our cooperation. Russia has traditionally been a reliable partner for southeast Europe in this sector. One of the most important projects in this area is the synchronisation of the energy systems in western, central and southern Europe with the energy systems of the CIS and the Baltic countries. This project's implementation will enable us to create an electricity chain forming a ring around the entire Black Sea region and uniting all the European countries located in the region. Furthermore, this will help to put in place the main parameters for a common energy market.

I stress that our energy companies are ready to discuss in substance the question of taking part in privatising and modernising generation capacity in the countries of the region. There is particular interest in building heating and electricity stations in Macedonia and modernising electricity stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia's Siloviye Mashiny is one company that has deservedly established a reputation for itself as a reliable partner in the region and has long been cooperating with countries in the region, supplying turbines and generators for energy facilities.

It is pleasing to see that today our partnership has become a two-way street. Croatian company Konchar, for example, has been working successfully on the Russian market for a long time now, supplying equipment for electricity production, transmission and distribution.

I think that we could achieve significant results by combining our efforts in work to reconstruct energy facilities built in earlier years with Soviet assistance. Of course, we intend to take part in tenders under equal conditions with other competitors.

Russia is also ready to discuss the question of helping to create regional energy transit hubs. You can rest assured that Russian companies will maintain the most stringent environmental standards in any work undertaken as part of joint energy projects in the Balkans.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that our companies are working in the energy sector, in particular in production, in another part of the world, the Caspian, not so far from here, and are competing against the world's leading energy companies. And our environmental standards are higher than those our partners from other countries follow in their oil and gas production operations.

It is our conviction that the way to strengthen our cooperation in the energy sector is to strengthen our trust in each other. This requires transparency, the supremacy of the law, complete absence of discrimination, open markets, and of course, readiness to stand up for our national interests.

Colleagues,

Russia's economy is developing so fast now that we are able to address far-reaching social and infrastructure issues.

The international economic forum that took place recently in St Petersburg, and which was attended by delegates from more than 60 countries, analysed in detail the current situation and development outlook for the Russian economy and assessed its prospects very positively.

The Russian economy is growing at a rate of 6.9 percent a year on average, and it increased by 7.7 percent over the first four months of this year. The energy sector accounts for only 1.6 percent of this growth. The service sector, construction, machine-building and the chemicals industry account for the rest.

These facts convincingly demonstrate our consistent and steady progress, and I think that this is just the beginning. Our country has a highly optimistic development outlook and I am convinced that constructive cooperation with your region and with Europe as a whole will only multiply our future achievements.

In short, we are interested in mutually beneficial, open and good-neighbourly cooperation. We hope that we will be able to, whether in multilateral format as at this summit, or in bilateral format, hold productive discussions on all the items on the agenda and on the real mechanisms for carrying out our cooperation in the energy sector in general.

*Statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Miliband, in the House of Commons on the Litvinenko case*

London, 16 July 2007. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on developments in the Litvinenko case. This is a situation the Government has not sought, and does not welcome. However we have no choice but to address it.

[...]

Since Mr Litvinenko's death, the Government's key priority has been to ensure the integrity of the legal process in order to secure justice for Mr Litvinenko. The Director of Public Prosecutions made clear that the allegations against Mr Lugovoy refer to a crime against a British citizen in London. The appropriate venue for the trial is therefore London. Moreover, both the UN and the EU have reported their concern that the law in Russia is applied selectively. There would, therefore, be grounds for a legal challenge over any attempt to accept a trial in Russia.

Given the importance of this issue, and Russia's failure to co-operate to find a solution, we need an appropriate response. Our aims are clear: first to advance our judicial process, second to bring home to the Russian government the consequences of their failure to co-operate and third to emphasise our commitment to promoting the safety of British citizens and visitors.

I have therefore agreed with colleagues across Government the following steps. First, we will expel four diplomats from the Russian Embassy in London. Second, we shall review the extent of our co-operation with Russia on a range of issues and as an initial step we have suspended visa facilitation negotiations with Russia and made other changes to visa practice. Third, international agreements mean Mr Lugovoy could be extradited to the UK if he travelled abroad. Fourth, we are grateful for the strong support we have received from EU partners and close allies, including through the EU Presidency statement on 1 June. We will discuss with partners the need for future EU-Russia engagement to take our concerns on this case into account.

*Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Russian-British relations*

Moscow, 16 July 2007. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

The actions of official London look like a well orchestrated act whose aim is to deliberately politicize the investigation of the so called "Litvinenko case," on which the Russian side was always ready to cooperate, but on a strictly professional basis.

The British side is well aware that the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not provide for the possibility of extraditing Russian citizens to foreign states. Our position is

also consistent with the European Convention on Extradition, which allows a state party to refuse extradition of its citizens.

[...]

Miliband announced "reviewing" the entire range of bilateral relations with Moscow as well as the plans of London to bring the "Litvinenko" case into the context of the relationship between the European Union and Russia. Evidently the well-known attempts by individual EU members to speculate on "Euro-solidarity" are becoming infectious.

In this connection the statement by Miliband that Britain would like to see in Russia a partner in the international arena looks naive. They should understand in London that such provocative actions will not be left without an adequate answer and cannot fail to produce consequences for Russian-British relations as a whole.

**Related Document:**

Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary on Russian-British Relations Moscow, 17 July 2007. [Download here.](#)

*EU Presidency declaration on the Litvinenko case*

Brussels, 18 July 2007. [Link](#)

The Presidency recalls its statement of 1 June on the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a grave and reckless crime. The EU expresses its disappointment at Russia's failure to cooperate constructively with the UK authorities. The EU underlines the importance of urgent and constructive cooperation by the Russian Federation on this matter. The EU hopes for a satisfactory solution to this matter, which raises important questions of common interest to EU Member States. Our capacity to speak out has to be strengthened. Tackling climate change, promoting economic and social development, dealing efficiently with migration, fighting organised crime and people trafficking, and combating terrorism are some of the challenges that require leadership and shared responses.

Portugal will pay particular attention to questions of disarmament and non-proliferation.

*Representation Made to British Ambassador in Moscow Anthony Brenton*

Moscow, 19 July 2007. [Link](#)

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 19 called in Britain's ambassador in Moscow, Anthony Brenton, to make a representation to him over the unfriendly actions taken by the British government towards the Russian Federation.

The ambassador was informed of the measures taken by the Russian side in response, including a decision to expel four British embassy staff members in Moscow from Russia within ten days.

The ambassador was told that in regard to the restrictions imposed by London on the issuance of visas to diplomats heading for work at Russia's embassy in London the Russian side will act in mirror-like fashion.

Explanations were demanded from the ambassador over British officials' statements about a toughening up of the visa issuance procedure for members of Russian government entities. Until receipt of explanations of the new practice, Russian officials will not apply for British visas and analogous visa applications from British officials will not be considered.

It was also stated that the measures announced on July 16 by the British side make continued Russian-British cooperation impossible in the fight against terrorism at this stage.

### UK response to Russian foreign ministry statement

London, 19 July 2007. [Link](#)

Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said on Thursday 19 July:

'Our Ambassador was called to a meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry this afternoon at 12.30 UK time. He was informed of a series of measures that the Russian government propose to take. We are now studying those measures very carefully to ensure that we understand the detail. We are disappointed that the Russian government should have signalled no new co-operation in the case of the extradition of Mr Andrei Lugovoi for the alleged murder of Alexander Litvinenko. We obviously believe that the decision to expel four embassy staff is completely unjustified and we will be doing everything to ensure that they and their families are properly looked after.

'We are, however, much heartened that over the last 36 hours across the international community, European countries, the EU as a whole and the United States should have put out such positive statements about the need to defend the integrity of the British judicial system and that's something that we will be taking forward with the international community over the next few days and weeks. Thank you very much indeed'.

### European Parliament recommendation a negotiation mandate for a new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement

Strasbourg, 12 July 2007. [Link](#)

[Extracts]

D. whereas Ukraine has declared its will to pursue the path of European integration and to become a Member State of the EU, and whereas this aim continues to be supported by a consensus of all actors on its political stage,

E. whereas Parliament has called on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to consider giving Ukraine a clear European perspective,

[...]

16. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council and asks it to instruct the Commission to take them into account when pursuing the negotiations:

a) draw the attention of its Ukrainian partners to the need to further consolidate the footings of liberal democracy, in particular as far as a stable constitutional system, the protection of human rights and individual freedoms, including the rights of minorities, strengthening democratic control mechanisms, including a strong civil society, and stable anchoring of the rule of law are concerned; recall in this regard the recommendations contained in the opinions of the Venice Commission relating to Ukraine, many of which still remain to be implemented;

b) call on the Ukrainian authorities to fulfil their obligations under international human rights law and to exercise due diligence in securing women's rights to equality, life, liberty and security, and zero tolerance in relation to discrimination, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;

c) point out that the key to the stabilisation of Ukraine lies in unravelling political from economic powers, weeding out corruption, bringing transparency to public procurement procedures and ensuring an independent judiciary; urge that Ukraine implement and enforce anti-corruption measures; stress the need to ensure legal certainty and the prevention of competing legal jurisdictions within Ukrainian law; support the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive administrative reform; emphasise the need for effective implementation of the revised Action Plan in the fields of justice and home affairs;

d) express its concern at the allegations of ill-treatment and torture by the police of detainees with the aim of extracting confessions, and call on the Ukrainian authorities to fully implement the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

e) deepen the regular political dialogue on bilateral, regional and international issues in line with the commitments entered into by Ukraine at regional and international level; provide for Ukraine's close involvement in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as in the development of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area; aim at strengthening its role in the East European region and encourage it to continue

its activities focused on the promotion of stability, security and democracy, as well as of sustainable development, in the common neighbourhood, with particular emphasis on the settlement of frozen conflicts in that region; draw on the experience of Ukraine's cooperation with the EU Border Assistance Mission on its border with Moldova, bearing in mind that Parliament approves the initiative to extend the mandate of the mission for a further two years;

f) support free enterprise and the consolidation of the Ukrainian market economy, and work upon approximation of legislation towards the Community *acquis* in order to improve its investment climate, with particular reference to Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and to Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, and by adopting legislation on project financing, and contribute to its growth potential; highlight that the key to attracting foreign investment to Ukraine is the establishment of a sound, stable and predictable investment climate, and urge the Government of Ukraine to pursue the implementation of its planned legal and judicial reforms and to address outstanding problems relating to VAT reimbursement and export controls as a matter of priority; call on Member States having experienced civil servants with appropriate language skills to engage in twinning arrangements, with a view to better advising their Ukrainian counterparts on the EU *acquis communautaire*;

g) point out the need to set up a stable regulatory framework which would ensure the creation of a competitive market economy based on the principle of property rights, as a factor inextricably linked to Ukraine's European perspective; h) welcome the establishment of the Interagency Commission on Combating Illegal Acquisitions and Seizures of Enterprises; encourage the Government to take concrete action, through the requisite reforms of corporate legislation and of the judiciary, to eliminate the threat of illegal acquisitions and seizures of enterprises;

i) lay down a concrete plan for the gradual establishment of a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area, to be grounded on a common regulatory basis and to cover almost all trade in goods, services and capital between the EU and Ukraine; call on all parties to include agricultural products as far as possible; emphasise in this respect the importance of making further progress with the process of regulatory reform, especially in the areas of competition policy, state subsidies, public procurement, taxation and intellectual property rights;

j) take fully into account Ukraine's critical role in ensuring the energy security of the EU and give due attention to the fact that Ukraine's full control over its energy security is directly connected to its political stability and prosperity; k) urge, therefore, that the energy sector of Ukraine fully comply with principles of market economy and transparency, in particular as far as prices, network access and efficiency are concerned; support rapid integration of Ukraine into the European Energy Community; note the importance of Ukraine's signing up to the Energy Community Treaty; in this regard, urge the

speeding-up of the procedure for nuclear safety evaluation of all operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine, in accordance with the work programme of the Joint Working Group on Nuclear Safety; assist diversification of Ukraine's resources, e.g. by accessing direct supplies from Central Asia; strengthen its strategic role as a transit country for supplying the EU with oil and gas, e.g. by backing a reversal of the Odessa-Brody pipeline and advocating its extension into the EU; emphasise the need to involve Ukraine in the development of the Nabucco gas pipeline project, to complete the Caspian Sea-Black Sea-EU energy corridor and to join Ukraine's electricity grid to the UCTE network; press for a strengthening of energy cooperation within the framework of the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova alliance (GUAM);

l) stress the importance of a sustainable energy strategy for Ukraine; point out that, following the experience of the nuclear catastrophe of Chernobyl, and facing the problems of growing import dependence and the challenge of climate change, Ukraine has to make major efforts in respect of energy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energy; point out that Ukraine is one of the most energy-inefficient countries in the world and that achieving average efficiency standards would allow the country to satisfy its internal energy demand; call for technical cooperation in this sphere between the EU and Ukraine, and for such cooperation to be included in the new enhanced agreement;

m) strengthen Ukraine's potential as a key partner in management of migration flows and borders; envisage further joint steps in the fight against organised crime including the eventual conferment on Ukraine of "privileged status" in relation to Europol; ensure effective implementation of visa facilitation and readmission agreements; envisage the objective of and necessary steps towards the introduction of a visa-free travel regime;

n) deepen cooperation between the EU and Ukraine on environmental issues and strengthen Ukraine's capacity to tackle matters relating to air and water quality, waste management, nature protection and radiation contamination, some of which have strong cross-border implications; provide technical and financial assistance to Ukraine in the process of gradual approximation to the EU environmental *acquis* and environmental standards based on international environmental law, including the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context and the 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats; envisage the setting-up of a fully operational and sustainable mechanism to promote environmental awareness and protection by providing a forum for cooperation between governments, civil society/NGOs and the private sector in the EU's eastern neighbourhood;

o) call on the political leadership of Ukraine to implement the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially bearing in mind the significant possibilities open to Ukraine to use flexible mechanisms under that Protocol; support joint action by the EU and Ukraine on the future of the Kyoto Protocol;

p) provide for Ukraine's participation in Community agencies and programmes in order to increase the access of its

policy-makers and experts to European networks; increase and widen opportunities for people-to-people contacts, in particular for civil society actors, students and researchers; enhance cooperation in the context of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development and continue the work on the establishment/development of a structured EU-Ukraine dialogue on science, technology and space research;

q) point out that the Member States who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 should play an active role in Ukraine's move towards the European Union, allowing Ukraine to benefit from their experience of reforms;

### EU External Relations Council Conclusions on Ukraine

Brussels, 24 July 2007. [Link](#)

The Council took note of progress in preparations for the EU-Ukraine summit that is scheduled to take place in Kiev on 14 September.

The summit, the tenth to be held under the EU-Ukraine partnership and cooperation agreement, is expected to cover:

- developments in the EU and in Ukraine;
- relations with Ukraine as regards, in particular: the preparation of a new enhanced agreement, cooperation in foreign and security issues, trade, border-related issues and energy, nuclear safety and the environment;
- international issues, including Russia, Moldova and Belarus.

### Poll shows Yanukovich's Party of Regions Leads in Ukraine

Angus Reid Global Monitor  
7 July 2007. [Link](#)

Which of these parties would you vote for in the legislative election?

Party of Regions (PR)	26.3%
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	22.7%
People's Self-Defence	20.1%
People's Union-Our Ukraine (NS-NU)	10.2%
Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	3.1%
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)	2.1%

Source: Taras Shevchenko Political and Sociological Studies Institute

Methodology: Interviews with 2,027 Ukrainian adults, conducted from Jun. 25 to Jul. 1, 2006. Margin of error is 2.4 per cent.

### EU Presidency declaration on «presidential elections» in Nagorno-Karabakh on 19 July 2007

Brussels, 19 July 2007., May 2007. [Link](#)

The EU is aware that "presidential elections" have taken place in Nagorno-Karabakh on 19 July 2007.

The EU underlines that it does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Neither does it recognize the legitimacy of these "presidential elections", which should not have any impact on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Furthermore, the EU recalls that refugees and internally-displaced persons should be given the right to a safe, secure and dignified return of their homes in order to fully participate in electoral acts.

The EU reiterates its firm support to the OSCE Minsk-Group and its Co-Chairmen, and their efforts towards a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU urges the parties concerned to intensify their efforts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict.

"The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association

*EU External Relations Council Conclusions on the Middle East peace process*Brussels, 24 July 2007. [Link](#)

1. Reiterating its conclusions of 18 June, the Council stresses the urgency of taking forward a credible peace process which will give the Palestinian people the perspective of an independent, democratic and viable state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security, and bring peace and stability to the Middle East. The Council calls on the parties to desist from any action that threatens the viability of this solution.

2. In this context, settlement activities in and around East Jerusalem as well as in the rest of the West Bank and the ongoing construction of the barrier on Palestinian land which are against international law are of particular concern. The EU will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed by the parties. Stopping all violence among the parties is of the utmost importance for the peace process to succeed. The EU strongly condemns the firing of Qassam rockets into Israeli territory. While recognizing Israel's legitimate right to self defence, the EU calls on Israel to exercise utmost restraint and underlines that action should not be disproportionate or in contradiction to international humanitarian law. While welcoming the release of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston, the EU reiterates its call for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldier, and commends efforts, including by partners in the region to that effect. It equally calls for the immediate release of Palestinian legislators detained by Israel.

3. The Council strongly encourages the parties to continue their bilateral dialogue, which should both achieve concrete results and lead to meaningful political negotiations to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement. The Council welcomes the meeting between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas on 16 July and reiterates its hope that these meetings will soon lead, in the framework of a renewed political process, to meaningful negotiations on the final status. The Council emphasizes again the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative as a major element in moving the Middle East Peace Process forward. It expresses its hope that the ongoing dialogue between the Arab League and Israel will support a renewed political process aimed at advancing regional peace. In accordance with the Roadmap, the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, should in due course convene an international conference to achieve these goals. In this context, the EU welcomes the speech of President Bush of 16 July and is determined to work with the US, other Quartet partners as well as partners in the region, in an effort to bring about an early end to the Israeli-Arab conflict. It expects the Quartet to participate in the international meeting proposed by President Bush and stands ready to play an active role.

4. The EU welcomes the meeting of Quartet Principals in Lisbon. In this context the EU emphasizes its determination to play an active role with a view to urgently put in place a political and diplomatic process offering a political perspective in the quest for a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, in conformity with the relevant UNSC resolutions and on the basis of the Roadmap, notably its goals and principles. It looks forward to a meeting in the region with the Israelis and the Palestinians and representatives of the Arab League. The EU will continue to play an active role in the Quartet whose commitment is underlined by the appointment of Tony Blair

as Quartet Representative. The Council warmly welcomes the appointment and looks forward to working with him.

5. The Council welcomes, as a first step, the partial transfer by Israel of withheld Palestinian tax and custom revenues but it reiterates its call for the immediate, complete and regular release of the remaining and future funds. The Council welcomes the initial release of 255 prisoners and detainees as part of the commitment by Israel following the recent meetings between President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert in Sharm el- Sheik and Jerusalem. The Council urges further steps to meet the commitments made at these meetings, including a removal of checkpoints and barriers in the West Bank. Such moves will support progress on the political track.

6. The Council reiterates its full support for President Abbas and the government under Prime Minister Fayyad. The Council reaffirms its position on events in Gaza. Reconciliation and national unity behind the programme of peace articulated by President Abbas are the only way to achieve Palestinian national goals by peaceful, lawful and democratic means. The EU opposes any division of the Palestinian territories and confirms its readiness to engage with all Palestinian parties whose policy and actions reflect the Quartet principles.

7. The EU has resumed relations with institutions of the Palestinian Authority. The EU has started to provide direct financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian government. The Council confirms its commitment to help build the institutions and economy of the future Palestinian state and stresses the need to fully develop the economy in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the promotion of cooperation with the Palestinian private sector. The Council has confirmed its support to the Palestinian Civil Police through re-engagement of the EUPOL COPPS. The Council calls on Israel to provide the necessary conditions to this end.

8. Gravely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation, the EU will continue doing its utmost to ensure the provision of emergency and humanitarian assistance to the population of Gaza, whom it will not abandon. The Council calls on all parties to work towards an opening of the crossings in and out of Gaza for both humanitarian and commercial flows. Karni and other crossings must be open on a regular and predictable basis, in view of reaching the transit volumes foreseen in the Agreement on Movement and Access. This is necessary to ensure the viability of the Palestinian economy and to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian people, both in Gaza and in the West Bank. It also underlines the need to re-open the Rafah crossing point and stands ready to resume the full activities of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah as soon as conditions allow.

*Is there a way for the Greater Middle East?*

European Security Forum  
Working Paper No. 26  
July 2007.

[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

Referring to the vast area stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan, the US administration coined the term 'Greater Middle East' as it sought to follow up the invasion of Iraq with a strategic plan for peace and democratic reform. A new working paper by the CEPS European Security Forum examines the interconnected and overlapping conflicts in the region, seen partly in the frame of the unintended consequences of US policy and partly in relation to al-Qaeda's expansion.

## Related Event:

26 th CEPS/IISS/DCAF European Security Forum  
Brussels, 18 June 2007. [Link](#).

*What Went Wrong? The Impact of Western Policies towards Hamas & Hizbollah*

Nathalie Tocci

CEPS Policy Brief, n. 135, July 2007. [Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

International policies and in particular EU and US policies towards Hamas and Hizbollah have had multiple and interrelated effects over the last two years. Most visibly, Western policies have had an impact on the two movements themselves, on the domestic governance systems in Palestine and Lebanon, and on the relations between Hamas and Hizbollah and their respective domestic political rivals. In turn, they have also had ramifications on the conflicts between Israel and Palestine/Lebanon, and on the mediating roles of the international community. The balance sheet is far from positive. This Policy Brief gives a comparative analysis of the influence of Western policies on key domestic and international dimensions of the Middle Eastern conundrum. It argues that despite their declared aims, Western policies have often hampered the quest for international peace, democracy and good governance, as well as inter- and intra-state reconciliation.

*A propitious moment for the EU to assert itself in the Palestinian occupied territories?*

Ruth Hanau-Santini

CEPS Commentary, July 2007. [Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

Given the deteriorating and explosive situation in the Palestinian occupied territories and the record-low credibility of the United States in the region, CEPS Visiting Research Fellow Ruth Hanau-Santini argues in this Commentary that it is time for the member states of the European Union to demonstrate their commitment to be major players with a long-term vision for the Middle East. She further outlines what this new role would consist of.

*Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU's Normative Power in the Western Balkans*

Gergana Noutcheva

CEPS Working Document, n. 274, July 2007.

[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

This paper examines the EU's external power through the prism of perceptions by non-EU countries, as shown in the case of this paper in the Western Balkans. The paper argues that the EU's policy in the Western Balkans lacks a strong normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with the EU's demands in areas related to state sovereignty. The perceived lack of legitimacy opens up political space for domestic actors to contest the positions taken by the EU on normative grounds. The Western Balkan countries have responded by giving preference to internal sources of legitimacy and asserting domestic reasons for fake compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance with the EU's conditions, with the latter provoking imposed compliance. The EU's transformative leverage in the region has been much weaker to date in comparison with that in Central and Eastern Europe prior to EU accession. The paper also makes the case for widening the debate about EU foreign policy to include contributions that focus on the external impact of the EU's actions. It links the study of EU foreign policy to the literature on Europeanisation that developed in the context of the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

*Decentralisation of Serbia: The Minority Dimension*

Beata Huszka

CEPS Policy Brief, n. 137, July 2007.

[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

This policy brief argues that the decentralisation of Serbia through delegating more authority to municipalities could benefit minority groups that constitute a local majority. Although there are three such minority communities living in Serbia, the Bosniaks in Sandzak, the Albanians in Presevo Valley and the Hungarians in Vojvodina, the paper focuses on the first two groups, because their problems could potentially destabilise Serbia and the wider region. Thus, addressing the root causes of tensions in these two regions is an urgent task. Moreover, not only would minorities gain from sound decentralisation – so too would all municipalities regardless of ethnicity. Ultimately, decentralisation would be an essential step in Serbia's democratisation process following the example of other Central and Eastern European countries.

***What exactly is happening in Turkey? On the way to normalisation or breakdown?***

Senem Aydin Düzgit

CEPS Commentary, July 2007. [Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

The current saga of events in Turkey can be traced back to the last-minute nomination of Abdullah Gül as the AKP's candidate for the Presidency in April. On the eve of the first round of votes held in the Turkish Grand Assembly on the election of the President, the military issued a statement on its official website, highlighting the threat to secularism and hinting at a possible intervention if deemed necessary. While this was interpreted by most commentators as yet another military memorandum issued to intervene in civilian politics, Senem Aydin Düzgit argues in this CEPS Commentary that the statement needs to be viewed in a wider framework in order to have a better understanding of what it implies for Turkish politics as well as for Turkey's relations with Europe.

***EU Policy in the South Causasus: A View from Azerbaijan***

Elkhan Nuriyev

CEPS Working Document, n. 272, July 2007.

[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

Since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007, the South Caucasus has become a region of direct concern to the EU's strategy in its wider neighbourhood. This study examines the trends affecting EU policies in the South Caucasus, with a specific focus on EU–Azerbaijan relations. It argues that in the three main areas in which Azerbaijan affects Europe's interests – cooperation in the energy sector, democratisation and conflict resolution – so far the EU has engaged well on a regional energy strategy, but less so on democratic reforms and almost not at all on conflict settlement in Nagorno Karabakh. The study concludes that the EU needs to balance its involvement in all three areas, especially given the deeper democratic changes it wishes to see in Azerbaijan, with a list of recommendations for doing so.

***The EU and Uzbekistan: Where to go from here?***

Michael Hall

CEPS Policy Brief, n. 138, July 2007.

[Download for free](#)

[Abstract]

Two years following the EU's principled stance towards the Uzbek regime of President Islam Karimov, in response to its harsh suppression of the Andijon uprising, the strain in relations appears to be taking its toll on both sides. The Uzbek government has made tentative overtures to the EU, and there

are indications that some in the EU are willing to accept such overtures at face value in the rush to normalise relations, often citing security and energy concerns, as well as 'progress' in the sphere of human rights. This paper finds, however, that arguments that Uzbekistan can meaningfully contribute to European security – of any kind – and that the Karimov regime is willing to reform do not stand up to closer examination. In the author's view, any normalisation of relations must be contingent not on promises or cosmetic changes from Uzbekistan, but on concrete measures taken to improve the lives of its citizens.

***Opportunities at CEPS for outstanding scholars interested in European foreign, security and neighbourhood policy issues***

CEPS invites expressions of interest for posts of Senior Research Fellow and/or Research Fellow for one year (possibly renewable for a second year). These positions could be made available for individuals able to make important and original contributions through publications, to be written while at CEPS.

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The junior level would be for a recent PhD graduate, or an advanced PhD candidate.

Any nationality. The theme should be of relevance to a major policy concern at the broad European or global level (EU foreign, security and neighbourhood policies, and issues involving other major actors - US, Russia, China, India, Arab/Muslim world).

These positions will only be filled by individual(s) of outstanding capability. Interested persons should write to [george.dura@ceps.eu](mailto:george.dura@ceps.eu) with a CV and an outline of the proposed project

***Compagnia di Sao Paolo, the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and the VolkswagenStiftung***

2007 Call for Applications in European Foreign and Security Policy Studies

[Link](#)

The Compagnia di Sao Paolo, the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and the VolkswagenStiftung are inviting a new round of applications in European Foreign and Security Policy Studies.

CEPS has hosted several of these fellows in the past and is happy to continue to do so.

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