Speaker: Michael Emerson, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS

Discussant: Paavo Väyrynen, MEP, Chairman of the ELDR Working Group on Wider Europe
 
Chairman: Michael Leigh, Deputy Director-General, DG External Relations, European Commission
 
After introductory words by Michael Leigh, Deputy Director-General for External Relations at the European Commission, Michael Emerson, Senior Research Fellow at CEPS, presented his newly published CEPS book, entitled ‘The Wider Europe Matrix’.
 
Mr Emerson stated that the ‘matrix’ is the central message of his new publication. The front cover of the book pictures four geometrical figures representing the relations between a dominant power and its smaller neighbours. Two of these are familiar conceptual models within political science: the concentric circles of the cobweb, the hub-and-spoke model. The matrix then combines the geographic and policy vectors of the relationship between the centre and the numerous neighbours. The Rubik cube amounts to three slices of matrices stuck together, gives a 3-dimensional structure to the matrix model, with each slice representing the matrices of more than one major external power.
 
The Middle East exemplifies the Rubik cube model, where the EU is not the dominant actor, compared to the United States, or, in Central Asia, Russia. Since there are multiple external actors in play, a framework for their cooperation is needed. In theory there are three possible ways of interaction: either the actors cooperate, or one dominant actor emerges, or the actors act in contradiction to one another.
 
In his publication, the author has privileged the ‘Wider Europe’ concept above the ‘Neighbourhood’. The geographical Wider Europe together with the EU represent all the member states of Council of Europe. On the other hand, the ‘Neighbourhood’ includes North-America as well as the Greater Middle East (non-European Mediterranean states, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Central Asia).
 
In a comparison of basic demographic and economic data between the EU, the Wider Europe, and the Greater Middle East, the author noted that beyond the EU and its candidate states the rest of the Wider Europe region contributes only 10% to the combined wealth. The same is true for the Wider Middle East.
 
The Wider Europe policy may be seen as having any of four objectives. Mr Emerson suggested that one of them should become the major strategic objective of the EU, namely, the transformation of neighbouring states through the process of Europeanisation. Mr Emerson offered a working definition of Europeanisation. At the same time he explained that the crucial factor which largely determines the positive outcome of the Europeanisation process is the ‘mega-incentive’ of accession to the EU.
 
Following the above theoretical framework, Mr Emerson identified three familiar European policy dimensions, comprising a total of seven common European policy spaces. Here is where the matrix comes into play, which is constituted on the one hand by the geographical areas and on the other all the different policy dimensions. Mr Emerson stressed the fact that the task of filling in the cells was a daunting but necessary task, which falls under the responsibility of the European Commission. Mr Emerson made a proposal to the Chairman, Mr Leigh, to use this as a programmatic framework for the next Commission. It should be considered as a comprehensive framework and should be pushed through in every department of the Commission. This process was likened to Delors push for the completion of the internal market in 1992, that would only be possible under a similar strong presidential leadership of the European Commission.
 
Next, Mr Emerson gave a brief description of the seven spaces. The first two are ‘democracy and human rights’ and ‘education, culture and research’. The third policy space deals with the ‘Economic Area’, where the author pleads for the EU to take the lead in the creation of a Pan-European Free Trade Area. The fourth and fifth spaces deal with ‘macro-economic and monetary affairs’ and ‘economic infrastructures and networks’ respectively. Regarding the sixth ‘space’ on Justice and home affairs, Mr Emerson highlighted the need for the establishment of clear benchmarks for different categories of neighbours with regard to the gradual move towards a visa-free regime with the EU. The introduction of a visa-regime between the new EU members and the neighbours (where previously there was a visa-free regime) is perceived by the outsiders as the biggest negative effect of EU enlargement.
 
The seventh and final policy space on the Wider Europe matrix is occupied by ‘External and Security policies’. Mr Emerson claims that the EU has to play a more pronounced role in conflict resolution, notably in Moldova and Georgia. The still lingering inconsistencies between EU institutions with regard to external and security policies need to be ironed out.
 
Mr Emerson disputes the view held by the president of the European Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, that the new EU neighbours can benefit from ‘everything but institutions’. The author argues that for the outsiders there exist other possibilities for institutional participation than full member state status in the Council. Associate or observer status can be envisaged for the new neighbours in the European Parliament and in other EU institutions and agencies.
 
The European Conference is too thin an insitutional structure to accomodate the new neighbours’ aspirations. It should be restructured using the Wider Europe framework into a more formalised ‘Pan-European Conference’ and should establish formal links with the Council of Europe. In order to function it would nevertheless need a core structure, which would give it direction.
 
Mr Emerson expressed his concern over the fact that the Wider Europe policy may remain thin and small and that its potential might not be fully exploited. According to the author, the EU can afford to grant the prospect of membership to a country such as Ukraine. This should not necessarily imply the establishment of a specific date for the start of accession negotiations, but would be an opportunity to Europeanise Ukraine. In the case of Moldova, the EU could even afford to offer this state a seat on the SAA train. Otherwise, the possibility exists that after Romania’s accession, Moldova might try for the East-German model of integration into the EU. After the events in Georgia, the Council has started to reconsider its position on the Southern Caucasus, possibly to include that region into the Wider Europe framework.
 
The EU and Russia are presently heading towards a situation of mutual exclusion. Russia does not like the Wider Europe framework, where it would be put on a par with countries such as Moldova. However, Russia likes the idea of common European policy spaces. If these are worked out systematically, this would according to Mr Emerson be the adequate framework to bring Russia back into the business.
 
Mr Paavo Väyrynen, Finnish Member of the European Parliament and Chairman of the ELDR working group on Wider Europe, congratulated Mr Emerson on his new publication. He declared to be satisfied with the author’s clear differentiation between the ‘Wider Europe’ and ‘Neighbourhood’ concepts, which the European Commission did not make. Mr Väyrynen stated that ‘The Wider Europe Matrix’ was an excellent starting point for future discussion. Mr Väyrynen expressed his wish to make a few personal comments.
 
Firstly, he is a bit skeptical of using the term Wider Middle East. According to him, the geographical area identified by Mr Emerson as the Wider Middle East can keep its name, but the policies in this region should be called ‘the Southern Dimension’. He made a comparison with the ‘Northern Dimension’ which has its own internal and external dynamics and comprises for instance areas around the Barents Sea or the Baltic Sea.
 
Mr Väyrynen’s second comment referred to the Wider Europe idea itself. He agreed with Mr Emerson that the European Conference should be further developed into a Pan-European Conference. However, one should not too easily dismiss the Council of Europe:  it is universal in membership (all European democracies can be members) and it has a general mandate (economic cooperation was introduced in the CoE’s early days, but failed to develop). Therefore, if the CoE becomes truly Pan-European, it could be given more competences and be better utilised. It also has the advantage over the European Conference, that it has well-established institutions. Further, Mr Väyrynen, drew the audience’s attention to the name: according to him the Pan-European ‘Conference’ sounds too weak. He is more in favour of naming it the Pan-European ‘Confederation’.
 
Thirdly, the Finnish MEP pointed out that full membership of the Council of Europe is not necessary and that certain non-European Mediterranean states could for instance be given associate membership status. This is already the case in the OSCE.
 
Finally, Mr Väyrynen raised some questions regarding the term ‘Neighbourhood Policy’. It is termed in a very vague way: it does not imply the prospect of EU membership, but it does not exclude it either. He rather sees it as an artificial link between European and non-European states. Accordingly, this leads to an unfounded division between those considered to have an EU perspective and the others. As for Russia, although it belongs to this policy framework, it would prefer to see a separate framework for itself. Therefore, there is an overall need for further clarification of both concepts.
 
Mr Leigh decided to add a few final comments before opening the debate to the floor. He stated that Mr Emerson’s presentation constituted a more detailed elaboration of the final vision which the Commission implied in its communication on the Wider Europe. He found the seven policy spaces particularly useful. However, he was hesitant about wrapping everything in the Wider Europe or New Neighbourhood. Neighbourhood policies such as the Barcelona Process already exist, so therefore, he argued that ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’.
 
Finally, he briefly commented on the forthcoming Action Plans. He sees the AP’s as a way to take concrete steps and not as a grand vision of how things might be in the future. Rather, the AP’s should combine vision with practical steps. The AP’s will be a constant point of reference for EU financial support. Mr Leigh insisted that this initiative is separate from a membership commitment. According to him, it should be considered as a medium-term policy.