Speaker: Ghia Nodia, Head of the Political Science Department, Tbilisi Ilia Chavchavadze University.

Ghia Nodia proposed to start off the session by offering a clearer picture of the significance of the velvet revolution by answering the following questions: Why did the velvet revolution happen? What came before the velvet revolution? What is the current situation in Georgia in the aftermath of the velvet revolution?
 
Mr Nodia explained that the ‘rose revolution’ received its name from the fact that the protesters were holding roses. However, he questioned the validity of the term revolution. Some critics, so he argued, consider these events as a peaceful regime change or coup. In reality, the velvet revolution was an extra-legal and extra-constitutional way of changing the government. It was given some form of legitimacy due to the fact the regime change was welcomed by the world and met with great enthusiasm by the Georgian population.
 
The ‘revolution’ was welcomed for two main reasons. Firstly, it happened in a non-violent and orderly way, which gave it greater social legitimacy. This comes in stark opposition to the 1992 revolution in Georgia, which was a popular rebellion involving armed conflict and casualties. Secondly, immediately after Shevarnadze resigned, the constitutional order, which was never put into question by the protests, was once again restored. Rather, the Shevarnadze regime was ousted for not respecting the constitutional framework by tampering with the parliamentary elections results. The Georgian people merely defended the state institutions and restored the constitutional order. Therefore we could even speak of a ‘non-revolution’.
 
According to Mr Nodia, the velvet revolution gave an enormous boost to Georgian national self-esteem. This explains the high level of public euphoria in the aftermath of the revolution, which in turn resulted into an ‘obscenely’ high approval rate for the leader of the revolution. Before the velvet revolution, support for Mr Saakashvili amounted to around 40% of voters, whereas he received 96% of total votes in the January presidential elections. All other serious contenders to the presidential race refused to run, realising the futility of their attempt. This vote was also seen as a referendum of acceptance of the revolution.
 
Mr Nodia examined the factors which led to the toppling of the Shevarnadze regime. Shevarnadze was quite popular with the West and was enjoying political credibility both at home and abroad for three main achievements. When he came to power he succeeded in restoring order in a Georgian state run by competing warlords. He managed to stabilise the economy and institute a fairly liberal regime, with a relatively free press, media and civil society. He also managed to reduce Russia’s influence and position Georgia closer to Europe and the West generally. However, in the last four years of his tenure, President Shevarnadze squandered his political capital on all these accounts. After stepping down, Mr Shevarnadze publicly declared that his biggest mistake had been to allow too much freedom, thus weakening his regime.
 
Mr Nodia, subsequently looked at the results of the velvet revolution. He first focused on the new leadership. The revolution Troika leaders are all relatively young. Both Saakashvili and Burjanadze are under 40 years old and the prime minister designate, Zvanhia, is about 40. The other ministerial positions will most likely be filled by officials around the age of thirty. Despite being so young, the new team is seen as dynamic and well-educated and enjoys a high rate of credibility with the Georgian public.
 
On addressing the issue of what the new government will do, Mr Nodia stated that the foremost priority of Saakashvili is the fight against corruption. The government has already started arresting people on charges of corruption, mainly amongst officials from the Shevarnadze regime. Equally important but less visible will be the new government’s attempts to ‘make the state work’ as it were, by creating strong and effective institutions.
 
In terms of the new government’s foreign policy orientations, Mr Nodia expressed his feeling that the difference with the Shevarnadze regime will not be very striking. Georgia will continue to look westward, but the message of the new government in this direction will be more distinct and energetic. Georgia has expressed its wish to develop closer ties with NATO, with the aim of joining in the medium-term. Its long-term strategic development aim is accession to the European Union. It was therefore not surprising to see the EU flag next to the new Georgian flag at the presidential inauguration ceremony.
 
On relations with Russia, Saakashvili has taken up a cautious approach and is in favour of instituting a moderate dialogue. Mr Saakashvili is ready to make small concessions to the Russians where necessary, but not on matters of principle. Saakashvili summed up this approach in the following terms: “Shevarnadze needed Russia as an enemy, I need Russia as a friend”. Saakashvili intends to develop a working relationship with the Putin administration. Mr Saakashvili would in principle agree to develop a strong cooperation with the Russians on the Chechen issue and accept the Russian presence in the Georgian economy. In return, Mr Saakashvili expects two things: the withdrawal of Russian troops and bases from Georgian territory for which it enjoys the support of the European Union and the United States; and the agreement of Russia to put an end to the support of separatist forces. In Moscow, the velvet revolution was largely unforeseen and came as a shock. The days when Moscow could manipulate Tbilisi are over and Russia will have to engage in a different relationship with its Georgian partners. Strikingly enough, Saakashvili’s first official visit was to Strasbourg. However, he has recently held talks in Moscow. A trip to Washington is scheduled for a later date. The importance which Mr Saakashvili attaches to relations with Russia is also reflected in the fact that he appointed one of his closest aids as an Ambassador to Russia.
 
Regarding Mr Saakashvili himself, Mr Nodia expressed certain commonly held fears that Saakashvili is too confrontational, emotional, not a good unifier and rather disorganised. At the same time Mr Nodia made a point of mentioning that the new President has a lot of charisma and can be decisive in demanding moments. He is quite flexible and shows a lot of prudence. However, the new president is not too tolerant towards criticism, therefore some concerns have been raised regarding the future of press and media freedom.
 
It is still too early to speak of any achievements by the new Georgian president, considering that the presidential inauguration ceremony only took place on the 25th of January. However, the government has already started cracking down on corruption and has carried out arrests. Concrete steps are being taken to curb corruption of officials by raising their salaries. For this purpose a fund was created, sponsored by George Soros and the World Bank. Its aim is to  raise the salaries of high ranking officials from 60 dollars per month to around 1.000 dollars. This move would also allow the government to attract competent personnel more easily. The new government is also determined to fight against the shadow economy (which accounts for roughly 50% of Georgian economy) through the fight against smuggling.
 
On the issue of territorial integrity, it is not yet clear how the new leaders in Georgia intend to deal with the secessionist regimes in Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Adzharia. There are fears, on the part the Abashidze regime in Adzharia, that the democratisation process taking place in Georgia could spill-over in their province, thus destabilizing the regime. For now, the Georgian government maintains the dialogue with the Adzharian authorities, but keeps a low profile. Georgia supports the local NGOs, but without rocking the boat too much.
 
Relations with the two secessionist entities are either very strained or totally cut off. Saakashvili has spoken of a possible crack down on Georgian guerillas situated in the neighbourhood of Abkhazia in a move to restart the dialogue with Abkhazian authorities. Saakashvili does not rule out a military solution to the conflicts. However this remains a highly unlikely and unrealistic option.
 
Mr Nodia rounded off this session by making a final point regarding the two major challenges which the Georgian government will be facing in the coming months, namely the problems of democratisation and of statehood. Georgian democracy is weak and there is much talk going on regarding a deficiency in terms of democracy. The state is equally weak and needs to be consolidated through creating effective institutions. Mr Nodia stressed the fact that, developing both does not necessarily go hand in hand and is often contradictory. Too much freedom and democracy can be seen has hampering the creation of solid state structures. Similarly, a strong state can more easily dampen the calls for increased democratisation. Both issues will have to be watched closely.