Date: 8 September 2008

Speakers: Sabine Freizer, Director, Europe Programme, International Crisis Group
                Tamara Kovziridse, Deputy Minister for Economic Development of Georgia 
                Ghia Nodia, Minister of Education of Georgia
                David Darchiashvili, Chairman, Committee on European Integration, Parliament of Georgia; 
                Tomas Valasek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defence, Centre for European Reform; 
                Nicu Popescu, Research Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations

Chair: Michael Emerson, Senior Fellow and Head of the Neighbourhood Policy Unit, CEPS

Ghia Nodia described the Georgian-Russian war as an attempt by Russia to change the political direction in Georgia, from a Western-style democracy to a satellite of Russia. The war was planned and initiated by Russia with the broader objective of putting the South Caucasus and Central Asia region under control.

The Georgian government faced two options on the 7th of August: sitting back and watching how Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia were taken over or trying to protect Georgians in the region. David Darchiashvili described the peace settlement format of 1992 as unfair for Georgia. The Georgian government tried to avoid a military confrontation by engaging talks and declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Russia provoked Georgia and any country would have jumped into this trap, as there were no alternatives. Tamara Kovziridze discussed the economic impact of the war.

Since 2004 the Georgian government has pursued a very liberal economic policy. Despite the Russian embargo on wine and mineral water, the economy was growing at over 12% with FDI amounting to 20% of GDP. The Georgian government estimates the economic war damage at 1 bio. US dollars. This figure includes the damage to the civilian infrastructure and the costs incurred by IDPs (about 30.000 long-term IDPs). It does not include the damage in territories where the Georgian government has no access and damage to the military equipment. Georgia is seeking a high level of integration with the EU. The EU should speed up the procedure of establishing free trade relations with Georgia.

Sabine Freizer underlined three factors that have led to the current situation. Since 2004 the Georgian government tried to internationalize the conflicts. Russia has taken advantage of this in its broader conflicts with the West, on issues of NATO enlargement and Kosovo independence. Finally, she mentioned the lack of strategic thinking within NATO and the EU on the consequences of showing support to Georgia, for example by promising membership during the NATO Bucharest summit. In her view, Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not matter to many parties.

If there are international discussions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where will they be? Russia has actually failed in this war 1) by not receiving any support for its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence 2) through the impact on the Russian economy and 3) by not managing to divide the EU. The EU is now strengthened, particularly on the issue of recognition. Tomas Valasek focused on two issues: 1) What the EU learned? 2) What the EU can do afterwards? The war was a pivotal moment in that it changed the way we think about the eastern neighbourhood. Russia was complicit in creating the conditions that led to the war by not being an independent broker. Russia’s aim was to roll back Western influence by making sure that Georgia would not become an example for other countries in the region.

The EU’s policy should be about what moderates Russian behaviour and not sanctions. Russia is in a mood of pre-emptive threat deterrence. The EU should stop being only a neutral broker. The EU’s real response must be to step up relations through offering a membership perspective to eastern neighbours and getting involved in frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Crimea). The EU should be more active in reaching out to the eastern neighbourhood by signaling that it does not recognize spheres of influence, eastern neighbours should be allowed to be part of the EU and reforms are not in vain.

Nicu Popescu concluded by saying that Georgia now faces two different models of development: 1) a Versailles syndrome of a country destroyed and seeking revenge with a political system focused on external dangers, or 2) the Cypriot model of a country focused on itself, and on a modernization and reforms path. Russia is not a status-quo player, it wants a multi-polar world. Major disagreements have appeared in Russia-China relations: interference in a sovereign state and the recognition of separatist regions are unacceptable for China.